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ii 
Abstract 
This thesis is mainly concerned with the expansion of limited liability within 
partnerships in the UK, US, and China and the concomitant need to strengthen 
creditor protection. Limited liability used to be a privilege largely restricted to 
shareholders of corporations, who are liable for corporate debts only to the 
extent of their capital contributions in the corporation. Recent years have 
witnessed an innovative combination of limited liability and the partnership 
structure. In this thesis, the hybrid entities of limited liability and partnership 
structure will be referred to as partnerships with limited liability, which include 
the limited partnership, the limited liability partnership (LLP), and the limited 
liability company (LLC).  
 
As limited liability induces opportunism against creditors, corporate law contains 
many stringent rules to mitigate risks for creditors. However, despite having the 
liability shield similar to that of corporations, partnerships with limited liability 
have a much lighter regime for creditor protection. This allows businesses to 
utilise limited liability while circumventing the creditor protection rules under 
the corporate law.  
 
This thesis will highlight such regulatory asymmetry of creditor protection 
between corporations and partnerships in the UK, US, and China and consider 
whether it is necessary to transpose corporate rules for creditor protection to 
partnerships with limited liability. Further, this thesis will make an overall 
evaluation of the creditor protection regime in China and propose further 
improvements, drawing on the experience of the UK and US. It is worth noting 
that “UK law” in this thesis refers to the law of England and Wales, excluding 
law in Scotland unless otherwise indicated. 
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Introduction  
1. Objectives of the Thesis  
This thesis will pursue two objectives. First, it will consider the issue of creditor 
protection in partnerships with limited liability in the context of the UK, US, and 
China. It is worth noting that “UK law” in this thesis refers to the law of England 
and Wales, excluding law in Scotland unless otherwise indicated. Second, it will 
make an overall evaluation of the Chinese creditor protection regime and make 
suggestions for its further reform, drawing on the experience of the UK and US. 
These two objectives will be pursued in the following analysis.  
1.1 Reconsidering Creditor Protection with Rise of Partnerships with Limited 
Liability 
In recent years, China has been eager to emulate Anglo-American commercial 
law, especially aspects of US law. In this thesis, the hybrid entities with 
partnership structure and limited liability will be analysed in particular and 
referred to as partnerships with limited liability, which include the limited 
partnership, the limited liability partnership (LLP), and the limited liability 
company (LLC), a unique US non-corporate entity.1 Partnerships with limited 
liability have become popular vehicles for professional firms, private equity 
firms, and other businesses that want to utilise limited liability while 
circumventing the double taxation and stringent regulation of corporations. 
Limited liability used to be a feature restricted to corporations. As a core 
feature of corporate law, limited liability limits claims of corporate creditors to 
the corporate assets and prevents creditors from reaching the personal assets of 
shareholders. Although limited liability can encourage investment and 
entrepreneurialism, it also induces opportunism against creditors. To safeguard 
the interests of creditors, many corporate rules are designed to mitigate the 
                                         
1 The LLC here refers to a unique US non-corporate business entity, different from the UK limited 
company and the Chinese limited liability company, both of which are corporations. Both the 
LLC and LLP provide limited liability for all of its owners, while in the limited partnership only the 
limited partners can enjoy limited liability, and general partners still undertake unlimited liability. 
See Chapter 1. 
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risks of limited liability, such as legal capital rules, fiduciary duties, insolvency 
rules, and piercing the corporate veil.  
Traditionally, partners assume unlimited liability for the debts of the partnership. 
Therefore, partnerships are not subject to the creditor protection rules as seen 
in corporate law, which are designed to deal with problems under limited 
liability. However, when the liability shield in partnerships is becoming closer to 
that of corporations, one has to wonder whether there is a need to transpose 
creditor protection rules under corporate law to partnership law. 
To answer the question, this thesis will examine the risks of limited liability and 
basic corporate rules to counteract such risks under the UK, US, and Chinese law. 
Then it will consider whether these rules should be extended to partnerships 
with limited liability. Although partnerships with limited liability have become 
increasingly prevalent in the UK, US, and China, they still feature much less in 
scholarly discussion than corporations. This thesis will contribute to the 
discussion of partnerships with limited liability, especially those in China, by 
focusing on the aspect of limited liability and the concomitant issue of creditor 
protection.  
1.2 Evaluating the Creditor Protection Regime in China on the Verge of Debt 
Crisis  
In considering whether to extend corporate rules for creditor protection into 
partnerships, this thesis makes an overall evaluation of the creditor protection 
regime in China, based on a comparison with its UK and US equivalents. On the 
surface, China has already established a creditor protection regime that 
converges with those in the UK and US. However, as a country that only started 
to transform into a market economy in the 1980s and make the accommodating 
legal reforms, China still experiences many difficulties in the theory and 
practice of creditor protection. Therefore, an evaluation of its creditor 
protection regime is necessary to reveal its problems and inform its future 
reform.  
Further, the creditor protection issue has never been so relevant in China, as 
this thesis is being written when the country’s debt has risen to an 
Introduction 
 
 
22 
unprecedented level. After decades of miraculous growth, many believe that 
China is on the verge of a “Bear Stearns moment”2 and that its credit-fuelled 
growth is destined for a catastrophic hard landing. There are many signs that 
seem to confirm this view: the excessive investment in infrastructure, the 
industrial overcapacity, the rapid growth and large scale of the shadow banking 
system, the rising rates of intra-bank lending, and most recently, the first 
corporate bond default in China.3 
Statistics also indicate an alarming scale of credit in China. According to 
the China Balance Sheet published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS) in 2013, China's total debt, including corporate debt, government debt, 
and household debt, reached RMB 111.6 trillion ($18.3 trillion) at the end of 
2012, equaling 215.7 percent of that year’s GDP. Corporate debt accounted for 
the largest share of China's debt, amounting to 113.5 percent of GDP, with 
household debt at 31.1 percent and financial sector debt at 17.6 percent.4 
Many hold the assumption that the Chinese state can always be the lender of last 
resort and rescue local governments, banks, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which are too big to fail.5 Therefore, most observers do not expect a major debt 
crisis in China.  However, even if a full-blown crisis does not happen, it is 
foreseeable that the country will not maintain its fast growth, many businesses 
will be shut down, and as a result many creditors will face defaults.  
The imminent “debt crisis” in China is an important factor that prompts this 
thesis to focus on the issue of creditor protection. Under such circumstances, 
sound legal rules to protect creditors are crucial for maintaining the stability of 
the market and creditors’ faith in China’s investment environment.  
                                         
2 Bear Stearns is a US investment bank that failed in 2008 and was regarded as a symbol for the 
financial crisis starting in 2008. 
3 Rana Foroohar, “China’s Growing Debt Problem,” time.com, April 10, 2014, 
http://time.com/57158/chinas-growing-debt-problem/, (accessed March 20, 2014). 
4 Jack Perkowski, “China's Debt: How Serious Is It? ,” forbes.com, January 21, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2014/01/21/chinas-debt-how-serious-is-it/, (accessed 
March 20, 2014). 
5 Rana Foroohar, “China’s Growing Debt Problem,” time.com, April 10, 2014, 
http://time.com/57158/chinas-growing-debt-problem/, (accessed March 20, 2014). 
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2. Structure 
This thesis will be principally divided into six chapters. To set the context of the 
discussion, the first chapter will make an introduction to the legislative 
background of partnerships with limited liability in the UK, US, and China and 
compare their essential features including entity status, limited liability, and tax 
treatment. The second chapter will discuss the issue of limited liability and 
make an overall comparison of the creditor protection regimes in the UK, US, 
and China. The third chapter will discuss creditor protection rules that operate 
outside the formal procedure of insolvency, including self-protection of creditors, 
legal capital rules, liability insurance, fiduciary duties and rule of veil-piercing. 
Chapter Four will evaluate corporate bankruptcy rules in China based on a 
comparison with those in the UK and US and propose to establish a bankruptcy 
regime for partnerships. Chapter Five will be the concluding chapter to 
summarise the whole thesis. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to Partnerships with Limited Liability in UK, 
US and China  
Introduction to Chapter 1 
To set the context of the discussion of this thesis, this chapter will give an 
introductory overview of partnerships with limited liability in the UK, US, and 
China, including limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships (LLP), and 
limited liability companies (LLC), a unique business organisation in the US. With 
the creation of these entities, corporations are no longer the only business 
organisation that can offer limited liability protection to owners.  
This chapter will be divided into three sections. In section 1.1, the legislative 
background of partnerships with limited liability in the UK and US will be 
introduced. It should be noted that corporate and partnership law in the US is 
enacted by individual states, but they often choose to adopt model laws with 
some variations. Here, the model laws on partnerships1 and the laws of some 
particular states will be considered, especially the laws of Wyoming, which was 
the first state to establish LLCs, and Delaware, which is a major destination for 
business charters. Section 1.2 will focus on Chinese partnerships with limited 
liability and compare their characteristics with their counterparts in the UK and 
US.  The final section will consider the regulatory competition theory as the 
explanation for the fast expansion of partnerships with limited liability, despite 
their downsides for the interests of creditors.  
                                         
1 The model laws discussed here include the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act (ULPA) and Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA), all of which are 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). 
While the UPA and ULPA were widely adopted among the US states, the ULLCA is less so. For 
more information, see the official website of NCCUSL: http://uniformlaws.org/Default.aspx.  
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1.1 The Legislative Background of Partnerships with Limited Liability in the 
UK and US  
1.1.1 The US 
i. US LLCs  
Traditionally, separate legal personality and limited liability were regarded as 
the core defining features of the corporation.2 Separate legal personality refers 
to the notion that a corporation is a legal entity separate from its shareholders, 
directors, employees, creditors, and other parties involved.3 Limited liability 
means that shareholders of a business organisation are liable for the 
corporation’s debts only to the extent of the capital they have invested in the 
corporation.4  While separate legal personality allows a corporation to own 
assets and prevents shareholders and their creditors from taking corporate assets 
out of the corporation, limited liability limits claims of corporate creditors to 
the corporate assets and prevents creditors from reaching the personal assets of 
shareholders.5 Although separate legal personality is not necessarily linked with 
limited liability,6 it can facilitate limited liability by delineating assets of the 
corporation and those of its shareholders.7  
                                         
2 A business corporation has five defining characteristics: (1) legal personality; (2) limited liability; 
(3) transferable shares; (4) centralised management; (5) ownership shared by equity investors. 
See Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, and Henry Hansmann, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a 
Comparative and Functional Approach, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p 5. 
3 P Davies, Introduction to Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), p 9. 
4 ibid., p 53. 
5 Some scholars describe separate legal personality as the strongest form of “entity shielding” in 
that it shields the corporate entity from withdrawal of its owners and claims of their personal 
creditors, while limited liability is viewed as “owner shielding” as it protects owners from claims 
of creditors of the business entity. It is worth noting that entity shielding is not equivalent to 
separate legal personality. When partnerships were still not viewed as entities under the 
common law, they already had a weak function of entity shielding. Also, limited liability is not 
necessarily associated with separate legal personality and limited partnerships are a case in 
point. See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and R Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” 
Harvard L. Rev. 119 (2005): 1335. 
6 Limited liability can exist in organisations without separate legal personality, for example, limited 
partnerships; also, under the Anglo-American law, corporations have acquired separate legal 
personality before limited liability. See 2.1.1. 
7 Davies, Introduction to Company Law, p 10 (above note 3). 
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In the US, the assumption that only corporations can acquire separate legal 
personality and limited liability started to crumble when the LLC was created as 
a legal entity8 and gained full-fledged limited liability protection for its 
members. Compared with corporations, the US LLC offers the additional benefits 
of structural flexibility and partnership tax treatment.9 In this thesis, the LLC 
will be viewed as a form of partnership with limited liability due to the LLC’s 
flexible structure and light regulation, which resemble partnerships more than 
corporations.  
The first US LLC act was passed in the state of Wyoming10 in 1977 as a result of 
the lobbying efforts of lawyers who were seeking combination of limited liability 
and transparent taxation for their clients.11 Later, the LLC was established 
throughout the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Besides the enactment of 
LLC statutes in individual states, a uniform LLC law was also being created. In 
1996, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL), a quasi-political organisation aimed at promoting uniformity of law at 
the national level,12 promulgated the first version of the Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (ULLCA). The statutes provided by the NCCUSL are model 
laws, which each state can choose to adopt or not. Not many states have 
adopted the ULLCA 1996 and its updated version in 2006,13 and therefore state 
LLC laws remain differed on many issues. 
                                         
8 The LLC is defined as a legal entity separate from its members under the US law, for example, 
section 104 of the ULLCA 2006 states that  
“(a) A limited liability company is an entity distinct from its members...” 
9 H M Friedman, “The Silent LLC Revolution--The Social Cost of Academic Neglect,” Bepress 
Legal Series (2004): 371, 391-401. 
10 Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act (Chapter 29, Title 17 of Wyoming statutes, available at 
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/statutes/statutes.aspx?file=titles/Title17/T17CH29.htm, accessed on 
June 20, 2013) 
11 S P Hamill, “The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration 
Question,” Mich. L. Rev. 95 (1996): 393, 401. 
12 B H Kobayashi and Larry E Ribstein, “Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for 
Limited Liability Companies,” Illinois Law and Economics Research Papers Series No. LE09-
017, 2009, http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2011/1/Kobayashi.pdf 
(accessed on August 20, 2013). 
13 The number of the states that have adopted the ULLCA can be found at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Limited%20Liability%20Company%20 (accessed on 
November 12, 2013). 
Chapter 1 Introduction to Partnerships in UK, US and China 
 
 
27 
LLCs have challenged the position of corporations as the dominant business 
organisation. It is estimated that in the US the number of new LLCs formed 
outpaced the number of new corporations formed by a margin of nearly two to 
one in 2007. In Delaware and Colorado, the ratio of new LLCs to new 
corporations was higher than 3:1 in 2007. In ten states and the District of 
Columbia, the ratio was higher than 4:1. The highest ratio, which was found in 
Connecticut, was a staggering 11.826 to 1.14  
 Many have argued the appeal of LLCs lies in the fact that they provide corporate 
features with the additional benefits of greater flexibility and partnership tax 
treatment.15  To understand why the partnership tax treatment can be an 
attractive feature of LLCs, the different treatment of partnerships and 
corporations under the tax law will be elaborated here. Although corporations 
can attract business owners with their limited liability shield and separate legal 
personality, which can significantly reduce risks for shareholders, they are at a 
disadvantage to partnerships in terms of taxation. As the corporation has legal 
personality separate from its owners, it suffers double taxation. To be specific, 
the corporation will be taxed for its profits, and at the same time, its 
shareholders will pay income tax for dividends distributed to them by the 
corporation. In contrast, partners will pay income tax for profits made by the 
partnership while the partnership itself will not be taxed.16 Under the common 
law, the fundamental reason for this is that partnerships are traditionally 
regarded as merely aggregates of individual partners rather than independent 
entities.17 Although partnerships now, including limited partnerships and limited 
                                         
14 R D Chrisman, “LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New 
LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs 
Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006,” Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 15 
(2010): 459, 460. 
15 See for example, Friedman, “The Silent LLC Revolution--the Social Cost of Academic Neglect” 
(above note 9). 
16 S Kapusta and B Nichols, “Limited Liability Companies: the Optimal Business Organization for 
the Twenty-First Century?,” Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 9, no. 2 (1994): 
803, 805. 
17 Larry E Ribstein, “Why Corporations?,” University of Illinois Legal Working Paper Series, 
(bepress, 2005), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=uiuclwps 
(accessed on September 1, 2012), 33. 
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liability partnerships (LLPs), have become recognised as legal entities in the 
US,18 the traditional transparent approach of partnership tax has been retained.  
Similar to the partnership, the LLC is also regarded as transparent in the eyes of 
tax law and only its members will be taxed for its profits. Thus, the LLC is an 
ideal alternative to business owners who want the benefits of separate legal 
personality and limited liability, which used to be restricted to corporations, and 
also have the benefit of partnership tax treatment.19  
To summarise, the LLC marks the start of a revolution that introduces limited 
liability into non-corporate organisations. The LLC is defined as a legal entity 
under US law. Following the LLC, other forms of partnerships with limited 
liability will also gain force across the US. This will be further discussed below.  
ii. US LLPs 
After the creation of LLCs, the appearance of the LLP across the US further 
challenged the notion that limited liability is restricted to corporations. The first 
LLP legislation in the US was passed in Texas in 1991,20 when a widespread debt 
and loan crisis caused great fear among lawyers and accountants for being held 
liable for their role in the failures of financial institutions. The Texas Business 
Law Foundation, a registered lobbying body representing interests of lawyers, 
played a very active role in the passing of the LLP Act in Texas.21 
                                         
18 UPA 1997 § 201(a); ULPA 2001 § 104(a). 
19 However, when the LLC was first created, it was uncertain whether the LLC could enjoy 
corporate features and partnership tax treatment at the same time. For discussions on the 
changed approach towards LLCs under the US federal tax law and resulting changes on LLC 
statutes, see  C W Murdock, “Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: 
Legislative and Case Law Developments and their Implications for the Future,” The Business 
Lawyer 56 (2000): 499; R Keatinge et al., “The Limited Liability Company: An Study of the 
Emerging Entity,” The Business Lawyer 47 (1992): 375; J William Callison, “Federalism, 
Regulatory Competition, and the Limited Liability Movement: the Coyote Howled and the Herd 
Stampeded,” J. Corp. L. 26 (2000): 951. 
20 Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act  (Article 6132b-3.08 of Texas Vernon's Civil Statutes, 
effective until January 1, 2010, available at http://law.onecle.com/texas/vernons/6132a-
1.00.html, accessed on June 21, 2014). 
21 R W Hamilton, “Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly),” U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 66 (1994): 1065. 
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The Texas LLP Act passed in 1991 is a prototype of the first generation of US LLP 
legislation, which limited partners’ tort liability in order to provide “peace of 
mind” for partners who were not directly involved in other partners’ 
misconducts.22 Under the Texas LLP Act 1991, a partner was shielded from the 
tort liability of the partnership arising from “errors, omissions, negligence, 
incompetence or malfeasance” of other partners.23  
Following Texas, the majority of states in the US adopted LLP legislation at a 
remarkable speed, stimulated by the multistate professional firms that needed 
recognition of the limited liability in other states.24 The New York LLP Act, 
promulgated in 1993,25 and the Minnesota LLP Act, promulgated 1994,26 
exemplify a second generation of LLP legislation, which extended partners’ 
limited liability protection from tort liability to ordinary business debts, 
shielding partners from all tort and contractual liabilities of the partnership.27 
This was a drastic step in the expansion of limited liability. The second 
generation of LLP acts in the US departed significantly from the original 
rationale of the LLP: to protect partners in professional firms from malpractice 
liabilities that they cannot foresee or control. LLPs with extended liability 
shields bear more resemblance to LLCs rather than the Texas prototype.28 Since 
1993, the comprehensive liability shield created by the Minnesota LLP Act 
became the mainstream formula in the US.29 Even Texas amended its LLP 
legislation in 1997 to provide that partners of LLPs are shielded from both tort 
and contract liabilities of the partnership.30  
                                         
22 ibid., 1066. 
23 Texas Revised Civil Statute, article 6132b-3.08 § a(2) (See above note 20). 
24 Hamilton, “Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly),” 1075 (above 
note 21). 
25 Registered Limited Liability Partnership (New York Partnership Act, article 8-B, available at 
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/partnership/, accessed on June 22, 2014). 
26 Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 (Chapter 323A of Minnesota Statutes, available at 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=323A, accessed on May 21, 2014) 
27 Hamilton, “Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly),” 1087 (above 
note 21).  
28 ibid., 1095. 
29 J S Naylor, “Is the Limited Liability Partnership Now the Entity of Choice for Delaware Law Firms,” 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 24 (1999): 145, 154. 
30 General Partnerships (Chapter 15 of Texas Business Organisation Code, available at 
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/, accessed on June 20, 2014)) 
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The extensive liability shield of the second generation of LLP legislation has 
been incorporated by the model partnership law. In the US, most states have 
adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), which was first promulgated by the 
NCCUSL in 1992 to replace the old model partnership law enacted in 1914 and 
has been amended several times. As the US LLP is a species of partnership, a 
model law for the US LLP has been included in the UPA since the amendment in 
1996.31 The latest version of the UPA, the UPA 1997, which has been adopted by 
most states32 provides that:  
 
“An obligation of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a 
limited liability partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or 
otherwise, is solely the obligation of the partnership. A partner is not 
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or 
otherwise, for such an obligation solely by reason of being or so acting 
as a partner. This subsection applies notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent in the partnership agreement that existed immediately 
before the vote required to become a limited liability partnership under 
Section 1001(b).”33 
 
It is noticeable that even under such an extensive limited liability protection, 
partners’ protection in the LLP is not unrestricted. First, all LLP legislation 
provide that partners will be responsible for their own negligence and 
misconduct. This is a logical deduction from the general agency theory under the 
common law, that actors will be liable for their own actions even if they act as 
                                                                                                                           
§ 801(a): “Except as provided by the partnership agreement, a partner is not personally liable to 
any person, including a partner, directly or indirectly, by contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, for 
any obligation of the partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited liability partnership.” 
31 For a summary of the legislative history of the UPA, see 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act (accessed on 
November 12, 2013). 
32 The number of the states that have adopted the UPA can be found at: 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act (accessed on November 12, 
2013). 
33 UPA (1997) § 306(c). 
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agents of others.34 Second, the LLP acts usually provide that partners are liable 
for the conduct of those under their direct control or supervision.35  
 
iii. US Limited Partnerships 
Unlike LLCs and LLPs, which are relatively recent inventions, US limited 
partnerships came into being in the nineteenth century. The first US limited 
partnership legislation was passed in New York in 1822,36 only a decade later 
than the first US incorporation legislation was passed in New York in 1811.37 Also, 
in 1916, the NCCUSL promulgated the first version of the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act (ULPA).38 It was found that few businesses chose to organise as 
limited partnerships in the US and UK when the structure was first introduced in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century.39 However, with the development of 
the private equity industry, limited partnerships became the dominant form for 
private equity firms since the 1980s.40  
 
As private equity firms became increasingly important in the US, the limited 
partnership was further adopted to meet the needs of the private equity firms. 
Evidence can be found in the latest version of the model limited partnership law, 
the ULPA 2001, which has strengthened the limited partnership’s feature of an 
entrenched, centralised management structure.41  
                                         
34 Thomas E Rutledge, “Limited Liability (or Not): Reflections on the Holy Grail,” South Dakota L. 
Rev. 51, no. 3 (2006): 418, 435. 
35 Naylor, “Is the Limited Liability Partnership Now the Entity of Choice for Delaware Law Firms,” 
149 (above note 29). 
36 Eric Hilt and Katharine E O'Banion, “The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822–1858: 
Partnerships Without Kinship,” The Journal of Economic History 69, no. 3 (2009): 615. 
37 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and R Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” 139 (above 
note 5). 
38 For a legislative history of the ULPA, see 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Limited%20Partnership/ulpa%20last%20amended%2
02013%20summary.pdf (accessed on November 12, 2013). 
39 N R Lamoreaux, “Partnerships, Corporations, and the Theory of the Firm,” The American 
Economic Review 88, no. 2 (1998): 66, 68. 
40 George W Fenn, N Liang, and Stephen Prowse, “The Economics of the Private Equity Market,” 
Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1995): 21. 
41 Larry E Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 130. 
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Furthermore, the ULPA 2001 has expanded the limited liability shield in limited 
partnerships. Under the ULPA 2001, the “control rule” that curbed the limited 
liability of limited partners was abolished.42 The “control rule” was stated in 
ULPA 1916 as: “A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner 
unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, 
he takes part in the control of the business.”43 The eradication of the control 
role in the ULPA 2001 means that limited partners will have limited liability even 
if they participate in the management. The removal of the control rule has been 
attributed to the uncertainty it caused.44  
Moreover, ULPA 2001 even provides for the choice of limited liability limited 
partnership (LLLP) in which all partners have limited liability protection. The 
ULPA 2001 states that a limited partnership can elect to be a LLLP by stating in 
its certificate that the limited partnership is a LLLP.45 This corresponds with the 
trend of extending limited liability protection in LLPs to both contractual and 
tort liabilities.46   
 
Another fundamental change of the ULPA 2001 from previous uniform laws is 
that it is a stand-alone act without the need to refer to the general partnership 
law. In the US, previous versions of the ULPA were linked with partnership 
statutes in the sense that they contained rules that refered to the general 
partnership law; for example, the duties of general partners must be determined 
by reference to the general partnership law.47 Given the fact that limited 
partnerships involve relationships fundamentally different from those in small 
and informal partnerships and the problems caused by linking these two entities, 
the drafting committee of the ULPA 2001 eschewed the linkage between the 
ULPA and the general partnership law.48  
                                         
42 ULPA (2001) § 303. 
43 ULPA 1914 § 7, see also Daniel S Kleinberger, “A User's Guide to the New Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act,” Suffolk UL Rev. 37 (2004): 583, 625. 
44 The control rule is set forth in section 303 in both ULPA 1976 and 1985 while eradicated in ULPA 
2001 section 303, see Kleinberger, “A User's Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act,” 
627 (above note 43). 
45 ULPA 2001 §102(9); § 201(a)(4); §404(c). 
46 Kleinberger, “A User's Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act,” 619 (above note 43). 
47 ibid., 585. 
48 ULPA 2001, prefatory note. 
Chapter 1 Introduction to Partnerships in UK, US and China 
 
 
33 
Summary of 1.1.1 
In summary, in the US, the corporation has long ceased to be the only business 
organisation that can take advantage of limited liability. The LLC was the first 
non-corporate entity to formally acquire the feature of limited liability and has 
already challenged the dominant position of corporations. Later, the US LLP was 
created to protect partners of professional firms from tort liabilities arising from 
other partners’ mistakes, and the liability shield of LLP partners in many states 
has expanded to both contractual and tort liabilities. The expansion of limited 
liability into partnerships is also marked by a rediscovery of the limited 
partnership, which has become a popular vehicle for private equity firms since 
the 1980s. A similar trend has also emerged on the other side of the Atlantic, 
which will be discussed in the following subsection.  
 
1.1.2 The UK 
i. UK LLPs 
Originally, the UK LLP was designed to meet the specific needs of professional 
firms as were LLPs in the US. However, given strong opinions in the consultation 
process against restricting LLP to professionals, the Limited Liability Partnership 
Act (LLPA) 2000 finally devised the LLP as a body corporate that can be used by 
not only professional firms but also by small enterprises as an alternative to the 
ordinary partnership and private company.49 
 
Since a UK LLP is a body corporate with its members acting as its agent, it will 
be liable for debts caused by a member’s wrongful act or omission in the course 
of the business of the LLP or with its authority.50 The member who directly 
caused the debt, for example a lawyer who has been negligent towards her 
client, can be held liable through a tort action. Although other members are not 
liable for the partnership debts, they will be required to contribute to the LLP’s 
assets if their withdrawal of capital has rendered it insolvent.51  
                                         
49 G Morse, Partnership Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 293. 
50 LLPA 2000, s 6(4). 
51 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214A. 
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With limited liability and separate legal personality, the LLP is subject to a 
regulatory regime similar to that imposed on companies, such as public 
disclosure requirements and insolvency procedures.52 Its members will also be 
regulated by the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.53 However, 
seemingly contradictory to its corporate status, the LLP is not only treated as a 
partnership under tax law,54 but it also has the flexible internal governance of a 
partnership. According to the LLPA 2000, the internal relations of the LLP are 
governed by agreement between the members and will be subject to default 
regulatory provisions where the agreement is silent.55  
 
As LLPs were originally envisaged for the needs of large professional firms, it is 
doubtful whether they can meet the needs of small enterprises, which may just 
as well organise as private companies and ordinary partnerships. After all, UK 
LLPs are subject to cumbersome disclosure and insolvency rules analogous to 
corporations.56 In addition, the partnership treatment under tax law may not be 
a great advantage for small firms in the UK, since they enjoy great tax reliefs if 
they organise as private companies.57 In reality, although many law and audit 
firms have converted to LLPs, including the "Big Four" (PwC LLP, KPMG LLP, 
Deloitte & Touche LLP, and Ernst & Young LLP), small enterprises in the UK 
usually prefer to stay as private companies or ordinary partnerships.58 
 
ii. UK Limited Partnerships 
In the UK, the limited partnership legislation reform is also oriented towards the 
needs of private equity firms. Since the Inland Revenue and the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) approved the limited partnership as an organisational 
                                         
52 UK LLP Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090). 
53 Part III, LLP Regulations 2001, SI 2001/1090. 
54 LLPA 2000, s 10. 
55 LLPA 2000, s 5. 
56 J Freedman, “Limited Liability Partnerships in the United Kingdom-Do They Have a Role for 
Small Firms,” J. Corp. L. 26 (2000): 897, 903. 
57 ibid., 904.  
58 Mathias M Siems, “Regulatory Competition in Partnership Law.,” International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2009): 767, 785. 
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form for venture capital59 on May 26, 1987, the UK limited partnership has 
flourished as a private equity vehicle.60 However, the Limited Partnership Act 
(LPA) in the UK seems to be stagnant without much change since it was enacted 
in 1907. 
In 2000, Myners made a suggestion in a report on institutional investors to 
abolish the 20-partner limit in the limited partnership.61 Also, the report noted 
the uncertainty caused by the provision similar to the US “control rule,” namely 
the rule that participation in management will trigger unlimited liability for 
limited partners.62 The report pointed out that since many institutional investors 
who invested as limited partners also played an investment advisory/oversight 
role, it is difficult to determine when they have crossed the line and invited 
unlimited liability. 
At the request of the DTI in 1997, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission initiated a reassessment of both the Partnership Act 1890 and the 
LPA 1907 and issued three reports in 2000,63 2001,64 and 2003.65 The final report 
in 2003 considered reform on issues including the entity status of limited 
partnerships. As pointed out by the report, traditionally under the Anglo-
                                         
59 Venture capital is a type of private equity specializing in investing in start-up companies.  
60 Law Commission and Scottish Law commission, “Partnership Law: Report on a Reference Under 
Section 3(1)(E) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 283, Scot Law Com No 192, 
2003),” November 30, 2003, 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc283_Partnership_Law.pdf (accessed on November 3, 
2013), at para 1.6. 
 
61 P Myners, The Myners Review of Institutional Investment, (London: HM Treasury, 2000), at para 
12.103. The 20-partner limit that applied to both the ordinary partnership and the limited 
partnership was abolished in 2002 by the Regulatory Reform (Removal of 20 Member Limit in 
Partnerships) Order 2002 (SI 2002/3203). 
62 LPA 1907, s 6. 
63 Law Commission and Scottish Law commission, “Partnership Law: a Joint Consultation Paper 
(Law Com No 159, Scot Law Com No 111, 2000),” Scotlawcom.Gov.Uk, September 10, 2000, 
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/download_file/view/138/ (accessed on November 3, 2013). 
64 Law Commission and Scottish Law commission, “Limited Partnership Act 1907: a Joint 
Consultation Paper (Law Com No 161, Scot Law Com No 118, 2001),” October 26, 2001, 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp161_Limited_Partnerships_Act.pdf (accessed on 
November 3, 2013). 
65 Law Commission and Scottish Law commission, “Partnership Law: Report on a Reference under 
Section 3(1)(E) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 283, Scot Law Com No 192, 2003) 
,” November 30, 2003, http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc283_Partnership_Law.pdf 
(accessed on November 3, 2013). 
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American law, a partnership is regarded as an aggregate of individual partners 
rather than an independent entity.66 This is one of the major differences that 
distinguishes partnerships from corporations. The exception is the Scottish 
partnership, which has separate legal personality under the law.67 The final 
report in 2003 proposed to accord separate legal personality to English 
partnerships, including limited partnerships, to solve the difficulties caused by 
the “aggregates” approach. First, the aggregates approach under the English 
partnership law hinders the continuity of partnerships; to be specific, a 
partnership will terminate because of change of the identity of partners.68 
Second, as partnerships have no separate legal personality, they cannot become 
owners of property, and this causes great problems regarding settlement of 
deeds, enforcement of partnership debts, transfer of partnership property, and 
partnership insolvency.69 Finally, adopting the entity approach towards the 
partnership would also improve conceptual clarity in English law and its 
consistency with rules in other common law jurisdictions, including Scotland and 
the US.70 The solution advanced by the report is to recognise partnerships as 
entities without regarding them as bodies corporate and importing corporate law 
into partnerships.  
Corresponding with the Myners report, the final report in 2003 also observed the 
lack of guidance to determine what activities constituted participation in 
management and triggered loss of limited liability for limited partners.71  
However, despite the various suggestions made by the Myners report and the 
final report on partnership law, up until now changes have not taken place 
regarding entity status of partnerships and “management rule” in limited 
partnerships.  
                                         
66 ibid., at para 2.5-2.9. 
67 Morse, Partnership Law, 7-8 (above note 49). 
68 Partnership Law: Report on a Reference Under Section 3(1)(E) of the Law Commissions Act 
1965 (2003), at para 5.8 (above note 65). 
69 ibid., at paras 5.20-5.24. 
70 ibid., at para 5.25-5.36. The US has defined partnerships, including both limited partnerships and 
LLPs, as legal entities. See discussion above regarding US partnerships.  
71 ibid., at para 17.3-17.4. 
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Summary of 1.1.2 
In summary, the UK has also witnessed an expansion of limited liability in the 
partnership, marked by the creation of LLPs and the reform of limited 
partnerships. Similarly to the US, the momentum behind this movement came 
from the private equity industry and professional firms. However, some aspects 
of the partnerships with limited liability in the UK are distinctive. First, the UK 
LLP differs from its US counterpart in that it is designed for the needs of both 
professional firms and small enterprises. Second, while the US LLP is viewed as a 
species of ordinary partnership, the UK LLP is defined as a body corporate. 
Finally, as to limited partnerships, the legislation in the UK seems to be stagnant 
compared with the revolutionary changes in the US, especially in terms of the 
entity status of partnerships and the “management” rule that will trigger loss of 
limited liability. The next section will proceed to describe the legislative 
background of partnerships with limited liability in China and compare their 
main features with their UK-US counterparts.  
 
1.2 Partnerships with Limited Liability in China  
1.2.1 Introducing Limited Partnerships and SGPs into China  
Following the promulgation of the new company law in 2006, China introduced 
limited partnerships and LLPs by the enactment of the Partnership Enterprise 
Law (PEL) in 2006. As in the UK and US context, considerations for specific 
industries were the reason for this reform in partnership law. The purpose of 
introducing the limited partnership was unequivocally stated as encouraging 
venture capital investments, which was viewed as a new source of financing for 
innovative high-tech enterprises.72 The PEL 2006 also provides for the equivalent 
of the LLP, the Special General Partnership (SGP), which is restricted to use by 
professional firms.73 
 
                                         
72 Yong Wu and Thomas Earl Geu, “The New PRC Limited Partnership Enterprise Law and the 
Limited Partnership Law of the United States: A Selective Analytical Comparison,” UCLA Pac. 
Basin LJ 25 (2007): 133, 140. 
73 PEL 2006, article 55. 
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Before the formal introduction of limited partnerships in China, private equity 
investments had already been flourishing for decades, and private equity 
partnerships registered in the US had been well known in the country.74 It was 
estimated that venture capital firms in China had raised $1.17 billion in 2005, far 
more than $325 million in 2002.75 To facilitate formation of private equity firms, 
some regions, for example Shenzhen, had already permitted use of limited 
partnerships.76  Since the formal introduction of the limited partnership in 2006, 
the private equity industry in China has expanded rapidly. In 2008-2009, China 
ranked third worldwide in terms of the amount private equity investment, after 
only the US (first) and Britain (second).77 The prosperity of the private equity 
industry has boosted the use of limited partnerships. As reported by China Daily, 
the major English newspaper in China, the number of private equity firms in 
China organised as limited partnerships had reached 7,511 at the end of 2012.78 
   
Since the reform of law firms and accounting firms from governmental affiliates 
to private agencies started in 1998, Chinese law and accounting industries have 
thrived and become increasingly globalised.79 As a result, the SGP was 
introduced to facilitate their further development and follow the international 
trend to limit liability for professionals. With promotion by the state, the SGP 
has become the main form of organisation for large accounting firms in China. In 
2010, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC) jointly issued the Temporary Measure for Promoting Large and 
                                         
74 June Kim, “The Rise of Private Equity in China: A Case Study of Successful and Failed Foreign 
Private Equity Investments,” Scholarship.Claremont.Edu, 2014, 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/921/ (accessed on February 21, 2014). 
75 Frederik Balfour, “Venture Capital’s New Promised Land,” Business Week 3967 (2006): 44. 
76 Wu and Geu, “The New PRC Limited Partnership Enterprise Law and the Limited Partnership 
Law of the United States: a Selective Analytical Comparison”, 139-140. 
77 A Metrick and A Yasuda, “Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey,” European 
Financial Management 17, no. 4 (2011): 619, 620. 
78 “Limited Partnerships in Venture Capital Private Equity Now 7,511 ,” chinadaily.com.cn, January 
10, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/10/content_16103740.htm (accessed on 
February 21, 2014). 
79 Sida Liu, “Globalization as Boundary Blurring: International and Local Law Firms in China's 
Corporate Law Market,” Law & Society Review 42, no. 4 (2008): 771; S W Deng and R Macve, 
“The Origination and Development of China’s Audit Firms: Translation meets Self-
Determination,” LSE Working Paper, May 2013, 
http://www.business.cf.ac.uk/sites/default/files/ipa2012/Final_Version_IPA_Paper_Reference_1
83.pdf(accessed on February 21, 2014).. 
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Medium-sized Accounting Firms to Adopt the Special General Partnership,80 
which mandated large accounting firms to convert to SGPs and encouraged 
medium size firms to do the same.  
 
Large law firms have also started to embrace SGPs as the Law on Lawyers81 and 
Regulation on Law Firms82 expressly permit law firms to organise as SGPs. For 
example, Dacheng, one of the largest law firms in China, has converted to an 
SGP in 2009. 83 It is worth noting that SGPs are intended for the needs of large 
professional firms. The threshold to use the SGP form for accounting firms is “25 
partners, 50 accountants and assets worth 10 million Yuan,”84 and there is a 
similar standard for law firms.85 Thus, SGPs are actually denied to small 
professional firms.  
   
Chinese legal and auditing practices have been rapidly expanding in recent years 
and exposed to increased risks as they step into international businesses. For 
example, Chinese arms of the “big four” accounting firms have been charged for 
their involvement in the alleged accounting frauds committed by some Chinese 
companies listed in the US and Canada.86  The increased risks make it essential 
for partners of professional partnerships to have limited liability protection. It is 
                                         
80 Temporary Measure for Promoting Large and Medium-sized Accounting Firms to Adopt the 
Special General Partnership (draft) [关于推动大中型会计师事务所采用特殊 普通合伙组织形式的
暂行规定 Guanyu Tuidong Dazhongxin Kuaijishi Shiwusuo Caiyong Teshuputonghehuo Zuzhi 
Xingshi de Zanxin Guiding]. The official version is available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-
07/23/content_1662348.htm. The English translation is quoted from Lin Lin, “The Limited 
Liability Partnership in China: A Long Way Ahead,” International Company and Commercial L. 
Rev. 21, no. 7 (2010): 259, 260. 
81 Law on Lawyers 2007, article 15.  
82 Article 5, Administrative Measures for Law Firms 2008 [律师事务所管理办法 Lvshi Shiwusuo 
Guanli Banfa]. The official version is available at http://www.moj.gov.cn/2008zcfg/2008-
07/22/content_906515.html. The English translation is quoted from Lin Lin, “The Limited Liability 
Partnership in China: A Long Way Ahead,” International Company and Commercial L. Rev. 21, 
no. 7 (2010): 259, 260. 
83 “Biggest Law Firm in China Quietly Turned Into SGP[中国最大规模律师事务所悄然转身特殊普通
合伙 Zhongguo Zuida Guimo Lvshi Shiwusuo Qiaoran Zhuanshen Teshuputonghehuo],” 
December 10, 2009, http://blog.legaldaily.com.cn/blog/html/81/2441181-4419.html (accessed 
on February 10, 2014). 
84 Temporary Measure for Promoting Large and Medium-sized Accounting Firms to Adopt the 
Special General Partnership (draft), article 5 (above note 80). 
85 Administrative Measures for Law Firms 2008, article 6 (above note 82). 
86 “SEC Levels Charges Against Auditors' Chinese Arms ,” online.wsj.com, December 3, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324355904578157252180759338.html 
(accessed August 20, 2013).  
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foreseeable that more and more large law firms and accounting firms will 
organise as SGPs in the future.  
 
Summary of 1.2.1  
In summary, as in the UK and US, China has also seen the rise of partnerships 
with limited liability stimulated by similar forces. China introduced limited 
partnerships in order to promote private equity investments with the 
promulgation of PEL 2006. The PEL 2006 also provides for the SGP, the 
equivalent of the LLP, to meet the needs of large professional firms. As Chinese 
limited partnerships and SGPs closely resemble their UK and US counterparts, it 
is obvious that China has noticed the benefits of these new business 
organisations in the UK and US and decided to make a reproduction. However, a 
closer examination will reveal that although Chinese partnerships with limited 
liability converge with their UK-US counterparts in principle, they differ in 
important matters, and the partnership legislation contains many ambiguities 
and inconsistencies. Based on comparisons with the UK and US, the following 
subsection will examine the main features of Chinese partnerships with limited 
liability, including the extent of their independence from partners, the scope of 
limited liability for partners, their advantage in taxation, and the linkage of 
their legislation to ordinary partnership law.  
1.2.2 Characteristics of Chinese Partnerships with Limited Liability  
 i. Entity Status  
The Chinese PEL is silent on whether partnerships, including limited partnerships 
and SGPs, are legal entities separate from their partners. However, partnerships 
in China effectively resemble legal entities in many ways. Under the Chinese law, 
partnerships have independent assets,87 have the capacity to sue or be sued in 
their own name,88 and are permitted to go bankrupt.  
 
                                         
87 PEL 2006, article 20. 
88 Lin, “The Limited Liability Partnership in China: a Long Way Ahead,” 260 (above note 82). 
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In the UK, while limited partnerships and ordinary partnerships are still not 
viewed as entities,89 the UK LLP is defined as a body corporate with a separate 
legal personality.90 The UK LLP can own property, has continuity of existence 
regardless of changes of membership, and can sue and be sued in its own 
name.91 Also, it is worth noting that unlike the US LLP and Chinese SGP, both of 
which are categorised as a species of general partnerships, the UK LLP is 
regarded as a new entity distinguished from both partnerships and corporations. 
The US has undergone a more revolutionary trend in the partnership law. In the 
US, different versions of the UPA since the one in 1994 have provided that the 
partnership is a legal entity.92  Consistent with this approach, the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) 2001 also provides that the limited partnership is 
a legal entity.93 
As discussed earlier, lack of entity status for English partnerships is a source of 
problems.94 The lack of entity status for Chinese partnerships will cause less 
severe problems as they are effectively treated as entities in many ways. 
However, to avoid practical and theoretical confusion, it is advisable for the 
Chinese partnership law to clearly define partnerships as legal entities 
independent from their partners.  
ii. Limited Liability  
China is circumspect in shielding limited partners from liabilities of the 
partnership. In terms of limited partnerships, the PEL provides that a limited 
partner “shall not manage partnership affairs or represent the partnership in its 
relations with people outside the partnership.”95 This is consistent with the 
traditional rule that limited partners’ liability rests on their passivity. Also, a list 
                                         
89 Partnership Act 1890, article 1: “Partnership is the relation which subsists between persons 
carrying on a business in common with a view of profit.” Also see 1.1.2 (ii).  
90 LLPA 2000, s 1. 
91 Siems, “Regulatory Competition in Partnership Law.,” 784 (above note 58). 
92 For the latest version of UPA, see UPA 1997 § 201(a). 
93 ULPA 2001 § 104(a). 
94 See 1.2.2 above. 
95 PEL 2006, article 68 
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of safe harbours is provided, defining activities that fall outside of managing the 
partnership’s affairs.96  
However, there is no specific provision regarding whether this list is exhaustive, 
and the definition of and exceptions to “management” clearly needs further 
clarification. In both the UK and US, similar problems have been noticed. In the 
US, after several attempts at clarification of the “control rule,” the ULPA 2001 
finally abolished it for the difficulty it caused. In China, such drastic approach is 
unlikely to be adopted in the near future. However, with the increasing number 
of limited partnerships, it has become imperative to clarify the meaning of 
“management” and delineate the liability shield of limited partners. 
Besides the management rule, the liability shield of limited partners is also 
restricted by the “estoppel rule” provided by the Chinese PEL. The PEL contains 
a rule similar to the estoppel rule under the common law97 and states that 
limited partners holding themselves out to third parties as general partners will 
be liable to such third parties for the partnership’s debts.98 Also, limited 
                                         
96 PEL 2006, article 68: 
“The following acts of a limited partner shall not be deemed to be management of partnership 
affairs:  
 (1) to participate in deciding on a general partner’s entering into or retiring from the 
partnership; 
(2) to raise suggestions concerning the operation and management of the partnership; 
(3) to participate in the selection of a public accounting firm responsible for providing auditing 
services to the partnership; 
(4) to obtain the audited financial statements of the partnership; 
(5) where his personal interests are involved, to consult the financial materials of the 
partnership such as the accounting books; 
(6) when his interests in the partnership are infringed upon, to claim his rights from the 
partners who are liable or to initiate a lawsuit; 
(7) when the managing partners neglect to exercise their rights, to urge them to do so, or to 
initiate a lawsuit in his own name for the benefit of the partnership; and 
(8) to provide guaranty for the partnership according to law.” 
97 The estoppel rule in the limited partnership context means that if creditors of the partnership 
extend credit on the reasonable belief that the limited partner is in fact a general partner, the 
limited partner is estopped from denying personal liability to such creditors. See  Carter G 
Bishop, “The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule Unwittingly 
Resurrected Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel Liability as Well as Full General Partner 
Liability?,” Suffolk UL Rev. 37 (2004): 677, 681. 
98 PEL, article 76. 
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partners will be liable for losses caused by unauthorised execution of the 
partnership’s affairs.99 
The liability shield granted to SGPs under Chinese law is even more restrictive 
than that given to limited partnerships. As a general rule, partners of SGPs still 
assume unlimited liability (jointly and severally) for the partnership's debts. 
However, when a partner incurs debts by intentional acts or gross negligence in 
the course of business of the partnership, other partners will only be liable to 
the extent of their share in the partnership.100 Further, after the debts are paid 
off with the property of the partnership, the partner who incurred the debts by 
her intentional acts or gross negligence shall reimburse the partnership in 
accordance with the partnership agreement.101  
In the US, with the promulgation of the second generation of LLP acts, the scope 
of limited liability protection of partners of LLPs has been extended from tort 
liability caused by malpractice to ordinary business debts. However, even under 
such statutes, partners will still be liable for their own negligence and 
misconduct as well as the conduct of those under their direct control or 
supervision. Similarly, in the UK, although the liability shield of an LLP is 
extensive, it is not impregnable. Members who are wrongful or negligent can be 
held liable through a tort action, and other members will be required to 
contribute to the LLP’s assets if their withdrawal of capital has rendered the LLP 
insolvent.102 
The liability shield of the Chinese SGP seems to be too narrow compared with 
those of LLPs in the UK and US. While partners of LLPs in the UK and some US 
states are shielded from both contractual and tort liability incurred by other 
partners, partners of Chinese SGPs are only protected from tort liability caused 
by intentional or grossly negligent acts of other partners.103 The liability shield 
of SGPs cannot fully meet the demands of Chinese law firms and accounting 
                                         
99 ibid., article 98. 
100 ibid., article 57. 
101 ibid., article 58. 
102 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214A. 
103 Lin, “The Limited Liability Partnership in China: A Long Way Ahead,” 261 (above note 82). 
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firms, which are expanding rapidly both domestically and internationally. When 
a professional firm has operations across the country, it is unreasonable to 
require a partner to be liable for the mistake of others who work at a distance. 
In a word, the liability shield of Chinese SGPs should be expanded, although 
measures of client protection, for example malpractice insurance, should be 
strengthened at the same time.104   
iii. Tax Treatment  
Under the Chinese PEL, only partners will be taxed for the profits of the 
partnership, and no additional income tax will be imposed on the partnership.105 
This is similar to the current stance in the US and UK, where partnerships, 
including partnerships with limited liability, are subject to transparent tax 
treatment.  
 
In the Anglo-American legal system, the transparent tax treatment used to be 
associated with the aggregate nature of partnerships. As partnerships are 
regarded as merely aggregates of individual partners rather than independent 
entities, partnerships themselves should not be subject to tax. However, today, 
the rationale for the tax treatment is based on practical considerations rather 
than theories. Even when partnerships with limited liability have acquired entity 
status and limited liability that used to define corporations, they can still enjoy 
the transparent tax treatment because it is attractive for business owners.  
 
The similar pragmatic approach can also be found in the Chinese context. 
Although partnerships are treated as legal entities in many ways under the 
Chinese law, they are subject to transparent tax treatment. The tax treatments 
for private equity partnerships in China are made even more attractive due to 
competition among local governments. This will be further considered in the 
final section of this chapter.  
                                         
104 This will be further discussed in 3.3. 
105 PEL, article 6. 
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iv. Linkage  
In China, the rules for ordinary partnerships, as well as for limited partnerships 
and SGPs, are provided in the single statute of PEL 2006. It provides that the 
rules of the ordinary partnership will apply where there is a lack of specific rules 
on the limited partnership and the SGP.106 Compressing rules of three different 
entities into a single statue saves lots of efforts for the legislature. However this 
can lead to a great deal of incoherence of rules and unpredictability of judicial 
practice.  
In the US, the ULPA was linked with partnership statutes before 2001 in the 
sense that they contained rules that refered to the general partnership law. 
Drawbacks of such linkage have been observed. First, it will increase information 
costs, as those who want to form a new entity need to refer to several different 
statutes. Second, it may result in incoherence by linking incompatible rules to 
the new entities. Third, the courts may interpret the new statute in a way that 
is inappropriate for the relationship governed by the new statute.107  
It is likely that these problems will also emerge in the Chinese context and 
become even more acute. There are only four articles regarding SGPs in the 
partnership law, and articles dealing with limited partnerships are also too 
succinct. Many important issues, for example duties of general partners to 
limited partners in limited partnerships, must be read from the provisions 
regarding ordinary partnerships. 
Although it is unlikely that China will enact separate legislation for the SGP and 
limited partnership as is the practice in the US, detailed regulations for each of 
them can be promulgated regarding specific problems such as their different 
standards of bankruptcy.108  
                                         
106 PEL, articles 55 and 60. 
107 Larry E Ribstein, “Linking Statutory Forms,” Law and Contemporary Problems 58 (1995): 187, 
203. 
108 See 4.2.1 (iii). 
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Summary of 1.2.2 
The above discussion has summarised the essential characteristics of Chinese 
partnerships with limited liability, including entity status, limited liability, tax 
treatment, and linkage of law. Drawing from experience in the UK and US, 
amendments to the basic principles of the Chinese partnership law have also 
been considered. First, the limited liability shield in the Chinese partnership law 
needs to be clarified and expanded. Second, the Chinese partnership law should 
formally define partnerships as independent legal entities. Third, under the 
current partnership law framework, detailed regulations can be promulgated to 
reflect the individual traits of SGPs and limited partnerships and provide a more 
useful guide than the PEL in theory and practice. From the discussions made so 
far, it can be seen that partnerships of limited liability have expanded at a fast 
pace in the UK, US, and China, ending the traditional practice that only 
corporations can obtain limited liability for business owners. The next section 
will make a brief review of the regulatory competition theory, which has been 
propounded to explain the fast spread of partnerships with limited liability.  
1.3 Regulatory Competition and the Rise of Partnerships with Limited 
Liability  
1.3.1 Interstate Regulatory Competition in the US  
As discussed above, proliferation of LLCs, LLPs, and limited partnerships is owed 
to their appeal to business owners with the combined benefits of limited liability, 
entity status, tax advantage, and structural flexibility. They are especially 
desirable for certain industries including private equity, law, and accounting. 
However, there is also a downside to these business organisations. By 
segregating owners from the debts of the business, limited liability reduces the 
pool of assets available to creditors of the business. Therefore, limited liability 
effectively reduces creditors’ chances of being paid and puts them in a riskier 
position than under an unlimited liability arrangement.109 In corporations, 
various devices have been designed to constrain the risks of limited liability. 
                                         
109 Jonathan M Landers, “A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in 
Bankruptcy,” U. of Chicago L. Rev. (1975): 589, 614. 
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However, in partnerships with limited liability, not only are creditors not 
protected by the traditional partnership rule of unlimited liability, measures for 
creditor protection are much lighter than in corporations.110 
In the US, fears about the dark side of limited liability have led to an outpouring 
of criticism against partnerships with limited liability. For example, in 
commenting on the expansion of limited liability within US LLP statutes, one 
scholar was worried that such legislation would be regarded as “lawyer’s 
legislation” and lead to “further erosion of the image of the legal profession,” 
which was already not held in the highest esteem.111 Further, it has been 
commented that expansion of limited liability within partnership law was not 
based on a “principled and spirited exchange of views,” but rather, it was 
propelled by “partnership syndicators and the professionals who either represent 
them or are sensitive to their needs.” In this process, interests of trade creditors 
and employees have been ignored.112   
One has to wonder why partnerships with limited liability have spread so quickly 
despite so much criticism. A viable explanation can be found in the regulatory 
competition theory, which first emerged in the US corporate context. It has long 
been observed that there is fierce competition for corporate charters among US 
states, which resulted in corporate laws that mostly consist of “enabling 
rules.”113 In the US, corporations can choose their place of incorporation and 
thereby choose their governing law. This is because under the Anglo-American 
law, corporations are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where they 
incorporate, and their place of incorporation is regarded as the domicile. 
Corporations can have their main business operations, directors, or shareholders 
                                         
110 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and R Squire, “The New Business Entities in Evolutionary 
Perspective,” European Business Organization L. Rev. 8, no. 1 (2007): 59, 61. 
111 Hamilton, “Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly),” 1103 (above 
note 21). 
112 R W Hillman, “Limited Liability and Externalization of Risk: A Comment on the Death of 
Partnership,” Washington U. Law Quarterly 70 (1992): 477, 487. 
113 William J Carney, “The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters,” The Journal 
of Legal Studies 26, no. 1 (1997): 303, 320. 
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in jurisdictions other than its place of incorporation and still be governed by the 
law of the latter.114    
 
States are incentivised to compete for corporate charters which come with a 
one-off incorporation fee and a periodic franchise tax.115 Delaware is 
undisputedly the winner of the competition for corporate charters. A small state 
with a narrow tax-base, Delaware was forced to look to incorporations for 
revenue. 116 It has become the leading state for incorporation since the 1920s, 
with more than half of the Fortune 500 firms registered there. Its success has 
been attributed to its commitment to a favorable business environment and 
efforts in cultivating a sophisticated judiciary in business law.117 However, 
Delaware has also been severely criticised for making its corporate law 
appealing to management, who usually decide where to incorporate to the 
detriment of other constituencies. As commented by Cary, Delaware had led the 
“race to the bottom” in the US corporate law.118 
Directly opposed to the "race to the bottom" theory is the "race to the top" 
argument. It justifies Delaware's permissiveness towards the management on the 
ground that the management is motivated by market discipline, namely the 
possibility of a hostile takeover, to register the company under the optimal 
company law.119 On this view, a corporation incorporated under inefficient 
company law will produce lower return on capital for shareholders and is prone 
to fail in the market, leading to decline of the firm's stock and making it an easy 
target for hostile takeovers. Therefore, the management will choose to 
incorporate under the law that can maximise the value of the firm, and thus 
states will compete to enact value-maximising legislation, which is in line with 
shareholders' interests.  
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With the rise of partnerships with limited liability in the US, the discussions on 
regulatory competition have spread to these entities. Like companies, 
partnerships120 and LLCs121 can choose their place of registration and 
consequently their governing law, so it can be argued that they will also choose 
to register in a jurisdiction with the most favourable legislation. This argument 
has been substantiated by empirical findings. First, Delaware has become the 
major destination for large LLCs, with its deference to freedom of contract122 
and judicial expertise in business law. It is found that all fifteen LLCs that filed 
for or completed an initial offering between 31 March 2004 and 31 March 2010 
were chartered in Delaware.123 Also, a study in 2009 suggested that 61% of large 
LLCs, defined in this study as those with more than fifty employees that formed 
outside of their home states, were chartered in Delaware.124 Second, it has been 
found that all publicly traded limited partnerships or master limited partnerships 
are registered in Delaware due to their high degree of flexibility under the 
Delaware law.125 Finally, it has been found that states offering full limited 
liability to LLP partners usually have a larger number of LLPs than those offering 
only partial protection.126  
 
Against such a backdrop, the debates on “race to the bottom” or “race to the 
top” have also emerged in the partnership context. Some have argued that the 
expansion of limited liability in non-corporate entities in the US, especially LLCs, 
is not supported by sound theoretical bases or consideration for public 
interest.127 Others contend that although new legislation that grants limited 
liability is stimulated by regulatory competition, it does not mean that it is not 
efficient. For example, as the leading scholar of non-corporate business entities, 
                                         
120 Siems, “Regulatory Competition in Partnership Law,” 775 (above note 58). 
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Ribstein believes that as a result of regulatory competition, LLC legislation is 
evolving towards efficiency.128 Ribstein argues that regulatory competition 
among the states can produce legislation that meets the needs of the market 
and facilitates the efficient evolution of business entities, while legislation by a 
central planner cannot. The gist of his argument is that a market-oriented 
evolutionary process is more likely to produce efficient results than top-own 
central planning. This line of argument can be traced to Hayek, who cast doubts 
on the ability of a central planner to command all the necessary knowledge to 
make an optimal decision.129  
 
Summary of 1.3.1 
To summarise, the regulatory competition theory, which was initially used to 
explain the deregulation of US corporate law, can also provide an answer for 
expansion of limited liability within partnerships. However, as in the corporate 
context, it is debatable whether regulatory competition will lead to efficient 
legislation. 
1.3.2 Regulatory Competition in the EU  
As businesses can choose their place of formation under the free establishment 
principle in the European Union (EU),130 it seems that the EU has a market for 
corporate law which is parallel to that of the US. However, due to the fact that 
the EU consists of independent states that each imposes regulatory barriers to 
business mobility, there is unlikely to be a regulatory competition for corporate 
charters as fierce as the one in the US. Furthermore, unlike the US where 
businesses can choose to be governed by a body of law by choosing its 
incorporation place, there are two conflicting theories within the EU regarding 
how to determine the governing law for businesses.  
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The real seat doctrine adopted by most continental countries131 requires that a 
company is governed by the law of the country where a company has its head 
office or its main business operations. Countries with the real seat approach will 
assert control over and tax corporations operating within their jurisdiction, even 
if the corporations are incorporated in other jurisdictions.132 
 
This is in stark contrast to the incorporation doctrine adopted by the UK and 
some other EU countries,133 which decides a company's governing law based on 
its place of registration.134 As the incorporation approach allows companies to 
opt for light regulation and avoid taxes by choosing the place of incorporation, it 
gives rise to concerns that it will produce race to the bottom effects, especially 
the deleterious effects on creditors and minority shareholders.135 
 
A series of ECJ rulings based on the free establishment principle have indirectly 
supported the incorporation doctrine.136 In Centros,137 the Danish authorities 
refused a registration of a branch of a UK company on the ground that the 
company had no operations in the UK and was only formed in the UK to evade 
the minimum capital requirement imposed by Denmark.  The ECJ stated that 
although the company was incorporated in the UK to avoid the minimum capital 
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and Path Dependence,” European Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (2002): 47, at note 
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requirement in Denmark, it did not mean that formation of a branch by a UK 
company in Denmark was not covered by freedom of establishment.138 As a 
company registered in a member state would be prevented from exercising its 
freedom of establishment by another Member State’s practice to register its 
branch, such practice was tantamount to a breach of freedom of 
establishment.139 Then, the court considered whether there was sufficient 
evidence of fraud or abuse, and whether the refusal to register the branch was 
justified as a measure intended to prevent abuse of the freedom of 
establishment. The court concluded that “the fact that a national of a Member 
State who wishes to set up a company chooses to form it in the Member State 
whose rules of company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up 
branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the 
right of establishment. The right to form a company in accordance with the law 
of a Member State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in 
the exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by 
the Treaty.”140 
 
In Uberseering,141 Uberseering was incorporated in the Netherlands and 
therefore should be governed by Dutch law according to the incorporation theory 
adopted by the Netherlands, but the German courts found that its real seat was 
in Germany and therefore its entity status should be decided by German law. 
However, since the company had not been formed under German law, it was 
regarded as having no legal capacity and no right to sue in a German court unless 
it was reincorporated under German law. The ECJ decided that as the company 
was validly incorporated in the Netherlands, it was entitled to exercise its 
freedom of establishment in Germany. The fact that its shares were acquired by 
German nationals did not cause it to cease to be a legal person under Dutch 
law.142 The requirement of reincorporation in Germany constituted an 
                                         
138 ibid., at para 20. 
139 ibid., at para 21. 
140 ibid., at para 27. 
141 Case C-208/00 Uberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH ECR 
[2002] I-9919. 
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infringement of freedom of establishment.143 By the decision in Uberseering, the 
ECJ has confirmed that a company formed in accordance with the legislation of 
one member state could transfer its registered office or actual place of 
administration to another member state without losing its legal personality.144  
 
In Inspire Art,145 the ECJ considered whether the Netherlands could impose 
minimum capital on a company incorporated in the UK when it sought to operate 
in the Netherlands. Citing Centros, the ECJ stated that the fact that Inspire Art 
was formed in the UK to avoid the stricter minimum capital rule under the Dutch 
company law did not preclude it from the freedom of establishment.  
      
The ECJ has confirmed in these cases that a company is entitled to freedom of 
establishment once it is validly formed in one jurisdiction, and its legal 
personality cannot be stripped away based on the real seat approach. Also, it is 
not an abuse the freedom for a company to incorporate in a jurisdiction in order 
to avoid laws in another.146 The ECJ has also confirmed that non-corporate 
businesses are also entitled to the freedom of establishment. For example, in 
Cartesio,147 the ECJ stated that a limited partnership was also protected by the 
freedom of establishment. Therefore, it is theoretically possible for enterprises 
looking at a partnership form to register in a jurisdiction with the most 
attractive regulatory regime. 
 
However, it is worth noting that decisions in these cases are made based on the 
freedom of establishment and have avoided ruling directly on the merits of the 
incorporation theory versus real seat theory.148 Without a formal recognition of 
the incorporation theory, companies still face uncertainties in taking legal 
arbitrage strategies within the EU. Therefore, it is unlikely that the EU will see a 
regulatory competition movement as seen in the US. Furthermore, as the 
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country with most competitive advantage in corporate law, the UK has not 
charged a significant fee for corporate registration.149 There are also no 
significant franchise fees for corporations within the EU.150 Therefore, it is 
unlikely that member states will try to beat the UK to the bottom.  
 
In fact, the regulatory competition within the EU is better described as “defense 
regulatory completion,” since member states are not so much interested in 
attracting foreign corporations as keeping local businesses from leaving.151 For 
example, since Centros, the UK has seen an increasing number of private 
companies from continental Europe to incorporate under its law.152 This trend is 
mostly driven by the eradication of the minimum capital requirement for private 
companies in the UK. In order to prevent companies from leaving, some EU 
countries have abolished or lowered their minimum capital requirements.153 The 
effect of regulatory competition within the EU in this aspect has been positive, 
as minimum capital is a redundant and ineffective measure for creditor 
protection.154  
 
In addition, the legislative history of UK corporate law has suggested that its 
reform in corporate law, including its measures to relax regulatory burdens for 
private companies, is mainly intended to facilitate the growth of domestic 
businesses rather than to attract corporate charters from outside.155 Also, the 
consultation paper issued before reform of the LPA 1907 clearly refers to the 
competition from other EU jurisdictions as part of the reason for reform.156 This 
demonstrates that although the UK is not much interested in attracting charters 
from other jurisdictions, it is keen in keeping businesses from leaving. The 
                                         
149 W Schön, “Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in Tax and Company Law 
Compared,” Common Market L. Rev. 42, no. 2 (2005): 331, 346. 
150 ibid., 339. 
151 Martin Gelter, “The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate Law,” J. Corp. L. 
Stud. 5 (2005): 247, 424. 
152 Siems, “Regulatory Competition in Partnership Law,” 800 (above note 58). 
153 Armour, “Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition”, 
398 (above note 146). 
154 See 3.1.2. 
155 Schön, “Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in Tax and Company Law 
Compared,” 346 (above note 149).  
156 Limited Partnership Act 1907: a Joint Consultation Paper (2001), at para 1.10 (above note 64). 
Chapter 1 Introduction to Partnerships in UK, US and China 
 
 
55 
enactment of the LLPA 2000 can provide further evidence for this, which was 
enacted partly out of the fear that law firms and accounting firms would leave 
for Jersey, which was the first to introduce the LLP in Europe.157 
 
Summary of 1.3.2 
To summarise, as a result of a series of ECJ cases based on freedom of 
establishment, it is likely that a form of regulatory competition will emerge in 
the EU, although it has not been settled whether businesses within the EU are 
governed by the law of its place of incorporation or real seat. However, the 
regulatory competition within the EU diverges from that in the US where states 
have strong incentives to attract enterprises from other jurisdictions. In the EU, 
the regulatory competition is defensive in the sense that the priority of member 
states is to keep its local businesses and facilitate business vitality. The 
enactment of the UK LLPA 2000 and reform of the LPA 1907 have clearly been 
propelled by such “defensive competition.”  
1.3.3 Regulatory Competition in China? 
The above discussions have considered regulatory competition as the motivating 
force behind the proliferation of partnerships with limited liability in the US and 
UK. In the US, state legislatures compete to attract businesses by producing 
flexible company statutes and providing for partnerships with limited liability. In 
the UK, while the incentive to attract businesses from other jurisdictions is not 
so strong, the legislature is motivated to reform company law and provide for 
partnerships with limited liability in response to competition from other EU 
countries.  
A similar theory cannot be applied to the Chinese context. The fundamental 
reason lies in the fact that China has a centralised legislative system, in stark 
contrast to the decentralised lawmaking power in the US and EU.158 In the US, 
the federal legislature and state legislatures form two separate legal systems. In 
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fact, most legal areas belong to state powers, including corporate law, 
partnership law, and law on other business entities. As observed by one 
commenter, for lawyers, state statutes are in fact the most common form of 
law.159  
In contrast, China has a unified legislative system in which the NPC and its 
Standing Committee have supremacy160 and the ultimate lawmaking power.161 
However, the Legislation Law promulgated in 2000 has delegated some 
lawmaking power to congresses and governments at both the provincial and local 
levels.162 According to the Legislation Law, localities can make two forms of law: 
local regulations enacted by local congresses163 and local rules made by local 
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governments,164 provided they are not in contravention of the Constitution and 
the laws enacted by a higher authority. It is unclear from the Legislation Law in 
what specific areas localities can make legislation. Under the Legislation Law, 
local regulations and rules can be formulated to implement higher level laws on 
matters that require the formulation of local regulations/rules.165  
Due to the centralised legislative system in China, it is impossible for local 
governments to enact their own company or partnership laws and to compete for 
businesses by offering less restrictive legislation. Instead, to promote the growth 
of local economies, Chinese local governments have competed fiercely to attract 
businesses and investments by offering tax deductions.166 This is evident with 
private equity firms, which have become an increasingly important source of 
financing for Chinese enterprises.  In China, many local governments have 
offered tax incentives and other supportive measures for private equity firms. 
The greater tax reductions for private equity partnerships offered by Xinjiang 
and Tibet, which are relatively less developed regions, have attracted many 
private equity partnerships, and some companies even chose to relocate to these 
two regions and reregister as limited partnerships.167  
The tax reductions offered by many local governments have conflicted with the 
regulations on taxation of partnerships issued by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
and State Administration of Taxation (SAT).168 According to the regulations 
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issued by the MoF and SAT, partners, including limited and general partners in 
limited partnerships, will be taxed as “self-employed industrial and commercial 
households” for their income and be subject to progressive tax rates ranging 
from 5 percent to 35 percent.169 However, many local governments have lowered 
the income rate of partners in private equity partnerships to 20 percent.170 This 
has attracted attention of the MoF and SAT, which have issued an announcement 
in 2009 to stress that the legislative power on taxation is concentrated with the 
central government, and the tax reductions that have exceeded the authority of 
local governments will be rescinded.171  
Summary of 1.3.3 
In summary, the regulatory competition theory cannot be used to explain the 
introduction of partnerships with limited liability in China, as China has a 
centralised legislative system. The enactment of new forms of partnership is a 
response to the fast growth of private equity firms and professional firms and is 
aimed at to promote their further development. Although local governments are 
competing to attract private equity partnerships by offering tax reductions, it is 
foreseeable that those rules that conflict with national tax laws and regulations 
will soon be rescinded.  
Conclusion of Chapter 1 
In the UK, US, and China, the corporation is no longer the only business 
organisation that can take advantage of limited liability. Partnerships with 
limited liability can now serve as an alternative for business owners who want to 
utilise limited liability while not being subject to double taxation. In the US, the 
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LLC was the first non-corporate entity to formally acquire the feature of limited 
liability and has already challenged the dominant position of corporations. Later, 
the US LLP was created to protect partners of professional firms from tort 
liabilities arising from other partners’ mistakes, and the liability shield of LLP 
partners in many states has expanded to both contractual and tort liabilities. 
Similar phenomena have also emerged in Britain, which has also seen limited 
partnerships become a major form for private equity firms and enacted its LLP 
statute in 2000.  China has also embraced this trend by introducing limited 
partnerships and SGPs with the promulgation of the new partnership law in 2006.  
Despite the fact that limited liability can increase risks for creditors and that 
partnerships usually contain lighter rules for creditor protection, partnerships 
with limited liability have expanded at a rapid speed from one jurisdiction to 
another. In the UK and US, regulatory competition can provide an answer for this 
phenomenon. However, in China, where lawmaking power is centralised, 
introudction of partnerships with limited liability can only be viewed as a legal 
response to the fast growth of the private equity industry and professional firms, 
out of the desire to promote their further development.  
Well aware of the benefits of limited partnerships and SGPs, China has ignored 
the issues heatedly debated in the UK and US. As a result, legislation on these 
new entities is fraught with theoretical and practical pitfalls. Most importantly, 
the risks of limited liability to creditors are usually ignored. The next chapter 
will compare the history of limited liability in the UK, US and China to explain 
why limited liability now is rarely viewed with suspicion in China, despite its 
incongruity with the traditional Chinese business model. Then it will discuss the 
risks of limited liability to creditors, an issue often ignored by Chinese scholars, 
and measures that are designed to mitigate these risks.  
Chapter 2 Limited Liability and Creditor Protection  
 
 
60 
Chapter 2 Limited Liability and Creditor Protection 
Introduction 
While limited liability can reduce risks for business owners and thus encourage 
investments, it in fact increases risks for creditors of the business as their claims 
are limited to the business assets and they cannot reach the personal assets of 
owners. In corporations, the risks to creditors caused by limited liability have 
been mitigated by various measures. However, in partnerships with limited 
liability, where the traditional partnership rule of unlimited liability has been 
eradicated, protection for creditors is much lighter. This problem has been 
noticed in both the UK and US, where specialised creditor protection rules have 
been applied to partnerships with limited liability and even transposed some 
corporate rules into them. However, in China, it is rare to see any reflection on 
the downsides of limited liability or protective measures for creditors of 
partnerships with limited liability. This chapter will argue that China should 
strengthen creditor protection in partnership law along with the introduction of 
limited liability and it is worth considering whether corporate-style rules for 
creditor-protection should be transposed onto partnerships. In the first section, 
to understand why discussions on limited liability are voluminous in the UK and 
US while few in China, the history of limited liability in the UK and US will be 
presented in a contrasting light to the legislative history of limited liability in 
China. The second section will explore the risks of limited liability by looking at 
the doubts cast on limited liability in the UK and US and scholarly discussions on 
its efficiency. Finally, section three will compare the creditor protection regime 
of China to those in the UK and US. It will be shown that despite having the 
corporate rules of creditor protection similar to those in the UK and US, China 
has failed to devise a partnership creditor protection regime that is 
proportionate to the increased risks caused by limited liability. 
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2.1 History of Limited Liability in the UK, US and China 
2.1.1 Development of Limited Liability in the UK and US 
Limited liability has been deemed an essential feature of the corporation in the 
Anglo-American legal system and most jurisdictions around the world. Under 
most circumstances, the corporation is closely associated with limited liability to 
such an extent that they seem to be inextricable. Much legal research start with 
the assumption that limited liability naturally flows from the corporation and is 
at its core. Some even argue that limited liability is the main reason that 
businesses incorporate. For example, Hugh Sowards claims, "The hallmark of the 
corporation is limited liability. This is usually the central reason for 
incorporation."1 
 
However, in fact, limited liability had existed in Europe long before it was 
written into modern corporate law. It had been used in the sea trade as early as 
in medieval times. Here follows a brief examination of the origin of limited 
liability in the medieval Europe and the development of limited liability as a 
corporate feature under Anglo-American law.  
 
i. Historic origin in Medieval Europe 
By the twelfth century, the compagnia, a form of partnership, was widely used 
to conduct the overland trade in the cities of Italy.2 The compagnia is similar to 
modern general partnerships in that its members assumed joint and several 
liability for the partnership debts.3 
 
Around the same period, medieval Italy also saw the flourishing of another form 
of partnership for sea trade- the commenda-which had a liability shield for its 
partners.4 The commenda involved a travelling partner and an investing partner. 
                                         
1 Quoted from K F Forbes, “Limited Liability and the Development of the Business Corporation,” JL 
Econ. & Org. 2 (1986): 163. 
2 Robert Sabatino Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 74.  
3 ibid., 74.  
4 ibid., 75. 
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The travelling partner would embark on a dangerous voyage while the investing 
partner would provide only funding for the trip and stay on land. Usually three 
fourths of the profits of the voyage would go to the investing partner while only 
one fourth would go to the travelling partner.5 This arrangement may seem 
unfair to modern eyes as the travelling partner was at the risk of losing his life, 
while the investing partner’s losses were limited to his capital contribution to 
their voyage.6 
 
The commenda is regarded as the predecessor of the modern limited partnership, 
which also combined capital with labour and skill. However, the commenda is 
not a long term organisation like today’s limited partnership or company. It 
ended as soon as the ship arrived at the shore with the proceeds of the voyage 
being divided between the sea traders and the passive investors.7Although 
partnerships and companies today can also be used only for a one-time venture, 
by default they will have a longer continuity until certain circumstances cause 
the dissolution.  
 
During the medieval times, the commenda was used across the Europe8 and 
provides evidence that in Europe, limited liability arrangement preceded the 
creation of the business corporation in the modern sense. Although the 
commenda was not introduced into British law during the medieval times, there 
is evidence that it was known in England as early as in the thirteenth century.9 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the combination of limited liability and a 
business organisation was not a strange new concept to Britain when it started 
to see the wide use of limited liability and finally established it within its 
corporate law. The following section will discuss how limited liability becomes 
to be viewed as a feature of corporations under the Anglo-American law.  
                                         
5 R W Hillman, “Limited Liability in Historical Perspective,” Wash & Lee L. Rev. 54 (1997): 615.  
6 M M Postan, E E Rich, and E Miller, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe From the 
Decline of the Roman Empire  Volume 3: Economic Organisation and Policies in the Middle Ages 
, (Cambridge University Press, 1963), 50. 
 
7  Robert Sabatino Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350, 76-77. 
8 A D Kessler, “Limited Liability in Context: Lessons From the French Origins of the American 
Limited Partnership,” The Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 511, 514. 
9 Judson A Crane, “Are Limited Partnerships Necessary--the Return of the Commenda,” Minn. L. 
Rev. 17 (1932): 351, 352.  
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ii. Limited Liability Became a Corporate Feature under Anglo-American Law 
In Britain, limited liability became a feature of chartered companies during the 
era of great discovery, when European countries started to launch ambitious 
voyages to the rest of the world. For Portugal and Spain, the monarchs played a 
major role in financing these voyages. In contrast, British voyages relied mainly 
on charted joint stock companies (charted companies).10 The formation of a 
charted corporation required the state to pass a special act granting a charter, 
which usually gave monopoly privileges.11 Chartered companies had acquired 
limited liability, entity status, centralised management and tradable shares in 
the seventeenth century.12 With trademarks similar to modern corporations, 
chartered companies obtained capital from diversified sources like today’s 
public companies. For example, the British East India Company advocated 
"noblemen, gentlemen, shopkeepers, widows, orphans, and all other subjects 
may be traders, and employ their capital in a joint stock."13 
 
With the advent of the industrial revolution in Britain in the eighteenth century 
and later in North America, more capital-intensive businesses started to flourish 
and they needed to form as corporations in order to raise capital.14 As it was 
difficult to obtain charters to form a chartered company in both Britain and 
America15 and privileges associated with charters were not essential for most 
businesses, unincorporated joint stock companies were created to emulate 
features of chartered companies including limited liability. An unincorporated 
joint stock company (JSC) was actually a partnership with its assets held by a 
trust.16 The trustee managed the business for the benefit of the partners, while 
partners, as the equitable owner of the trust property, retained tradable claims 
                                         
10 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and R Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” Harvard L. 
Rev. 119 (2005): 1335, 1374. 
11 Margaret Blair, “Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century,” UCLA L. Rev. 51, no. 2 (2004): 1, 9.  
12 Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” 1376 (above note 10).  
13 S Williston, “History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800. I,” Harvard L. Rev. 2, no. 
3 (1888): 105, 109. 
14 P I Blumberg, “Limited Liability and Corporate Groups,” J. Corp. L. 11 (1985): 573, 593. 
15 The state legislatures in America were less sparing in issuing charters, but charters were still 
restricted to certain industries. See ibid.; and also Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, “Law and 
the Rise of the Firm,” 1391 (above note 10).  
16 Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” 1381 (above note 10).  
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on their investment. 17 Through the trust structure, JSCs could achieve 
centralised management, entity status, tradable shares and limited liability- 
privileges that were granted to chartered corporations by the state.18 
 
However, with the enactment of general incorporation legislation, the 
corporation created by the state started to gradually replace the partnership 
and its variant JSC as the main form of business venture. Britain passed its first 
general incorporation act in 1844 (Joint Stock Companies Act 1844), which 
required all companies with transferable shares and companies with twenty-five 
or more members (with or without transferable shares) to be registered with the 
state. Although this act made the corporation more widely accessible, it did not 
make limited liability the default rule of the corporation. It was only ten years 
later, when Parliament passed the Limited Liability Act 1855 and the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856 that limited liability institution was established within 
corporations. Later, the single most significant case in English corporate law, 
Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd,19 confirmed separate personality and limited 
liability of a company even for a de facto one-man company. In that case, Mr. 
Salomon was a sole trader and sold his business to a company in which he owned 
most of the shares. Other shareholders in the company, namely his wife and 
children, were only nominal as they held shares only to fulfill the threshold of 
seven members for a company to be registered as required by the Companies Act 
1862. Therefore, Mr. Salomon was effectively the sole controller of the company. 
Besides being the controlling shareholder and director, Mr. Salomon was also a 
secured creditor of the company as he sold his business to the company in 
exchange for an amount of debentures. When the company slipped into financial 
difficulty and had only enough assets to pay the debentures, its outside creditors 
claimed that Mr. Salomon should take liability for its outstanding debts and the 
debt owed to Mr. Salomon should not be paid as the company actually acted as 
his agent. The House of Lords found that the Companies Act only required seven 
members holding at least one share each for a company to be registered, it did 
not require members to be independent or have substantial shareholding. Hence, 
                                         
17 Margaret Blair, “Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us,” Berkeley Bus. 
LJ 1 (2004): 1. 
18 William J Carney, “Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents,” U. Colo. L. Rev. 66 
(1994): 855, 868. 
19 [1897] AC 22 (HL) 
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although Mr. Salomon effectively controlled the company, the company was a 
separate legal person and Mr. Salomon was not liable for its debts in the absence 
of fraud and illegal purpose. Further, as a secured creditor (holder of 
debentures), he was entitled to be paid in priority to unsecured creditors. This 
case confirms that small businesses can also take advantage of the separate 
personality and limited liability provided by the corporate form. Thus, it opened 
the floodgatess for private companies in Britain.20  
 
As early as in 1811, New York passed the first incorporation act in the US, and 
other states soon followed.21  Limited liability gradually became the general rule 
in corporate law in the US after it was adopted by a Massachusetts statute in 
1830.22 As limited liability became the default rule of incorporation, limited 
liability was increasingly regarded as a feature restricted to corporations. Even 
when owners of other business organisations arranged for limited liability 
contractually, it was usual for courts to invalidate such arrangement.23 
 
The exception was limited partnerships, which were also granted limited liability 
by legislation. In this business organisation, although the general partners still 
undertake unlimited liability for the losses of the partnership, the limited 
partners are only liable to the extent of their investments.  In the US, limited 
partnership had became available since the early 19th century. The first limited 
partnership legislation was passed in New York in 1822.24 Many have traced the 
origin of limited partnerships to the medieval commenda.25 The US limited 
partnership was introduced from France and it was a New York lawyer who first 
used “limited partnership” as the equivalence of société en commandite simple 
in the French commercial code.26 Britain was more circumspect than the US on 
the expansion of limited liability, however, it at last enacted the Limited 
                                         
20 LCB Gower, “The English Private Company,” Law and Contemporary Problems (1953): 535, 538. 
21 Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” 1392 (above note 10).  
22 Blumberg, “Limited Liability and Corporate Groups,” 593 (above note 14). 
23 Carney, “Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents,” 876 (above note 18).  
24 Eric Hilt and Katharine E O'Banion, “The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822–1858: 
Partnerships Without Kinship,” The Journal of Economic History 69, no. 3 (2009): 615. 
25 Hillman, “Limited Liability in Historical Perspective”, 621 (above note 5). 
26 Hilt and O'Banion, “The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822–1858: Partnerships Without 
Kinship,” 621 (above note 24). 
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Partnership Act in 1907. It has been found that few businesses chose to organise 
as limited partnerships in the US and UK when the option was first introduced in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century.27 As discussed in Chapter 1, limited 
partnerships only become popular when private equity firms found them suitable 
to their needs.  
 
Summary of 2.1.1 
In summary, under the Anglo-American law, the development of limited liability 
preceded the corporation in the modern sense, but limited liability was not 
formally established until general corporate laws were enacted. However, even 
before limited liability was established a corporate feature under the Anglo-
American law, it was known in Britain as a feature of the Italian partnership 
commenda, which was used across the medieval Europe.  
 
In contrast, limited liability was a strange notion to China when it initiated its 
legal reform in the early twentieth century. In fact, for China, limited liability, 
with the package of corporate law, was an import or “legal transplant” from the 
Western legal systems. The process of this importation or “legal transplant” of 
limited liability into China will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2.2.2 Limited Liability as a “Legal Transplant” into China 
i. The Early Modern Era 
In the traditional Chinese society, partnerships organised by kinship or close 
personal relationships were the dominant form of business. 28 Partnerships did 
                                         
27 N R Lamoreaux, “Partnerships, Corporations, and the Theory of the Firm,” The American 
Economic Review 88, no. 2 (1998): 66，68. 
28 Wuxiong Tufei, A Study on Partner's Liability [Hehuo Gudong Zeren Zhi Yanjiu 合伙股东责任之
研究], (Beijing: China University of Political science and Law Press, 2004), p 22. This book was 
first published in 1936 as a product of the researches on the Chinese society conducted by the 
Japanese before the outbreak of the war in 1937. These researches were intended to assist 
Japanese in their invasion and governing in China, however, today they provide invaluable 
insights into various aspects of the early modern Chinese society.  
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not provide limited liability to their partners and the alternative institutions to 
limit liability, for example insurance, were also absent.29  
 
However, before the first modern incorporation law, Company Law 1904 (gongsi 
lv公司律), was enacted by the Qing government, the Chinese society was 
already exposed to various Western business organisations. For example, the 
British East India Company, a chartered company, had a presence in China since 
the 18th century.30 Also, from 1866 onwards, shares of British companies were 
traded in the stock market in Shanghai.31 In 1872, the first modern corporation in 
China, the China Merchant’s Steam Navigation Company, was created as part of 
the governmental efforts to promote modern business corporations.32 The 
company limited its liability by using the guarantor mechanism. Namely, if it 
failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, the guarantor would be responsible 
for all outstanding liabilities.33  
 
In 1904, the first modern corporate legislation in China was enacted after the 
empire had encountered unprecedented humiliations by Japan and Western 
powers.34 The Company Law 1904 was based on a mixture of Japanese and 
English company law.35 It provided four types of business entities: partnership,36 
                                         
29 W C Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China,” The Journal of Asian Studies 54, no. 1 (1995): 43，47. 
30 ibid., 47. References to British East India Company can be found in many books finished around 
1840, the year that first Anglo-Chinese war broke out, see Shujun Wei, A Study on Corporation 
Law in Modern China [Jindai Zhongguo Gongsifa Shilun 近代中国公司法史论], (Shanghai: 
Shanghai Social Sciences Academy Press, 2009), p 11-12. 
31 Elisabeth Koll and William N Goetzmann, “The History of Corporate Ownership in China: State 
Patronage, Company Legislation, and the Issue of Control,” (Yale ICF Working Paper, 2004), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=572122 (accessed on March 1, 2013). 
32 The establishment of the China Merchant’s Steam Navigation Company marked the start of a 
generation of corporations managed by merchants while supervised by the government. 
However, corporations emerged in this period were tightly controlled by the government and not 
business corporations in the real sense. See Wei, A Study on Corporation Law in Modern China 
[Jindai Zhongguo Gongsifa Shilun 近代中国公司法史论], p 15 (above note 30). 
33 Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China,” 47 (above note 29).  
34 Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China,” 47 (above note 29).For more information on the legislative background of the Company 
Law 1904, see Wei, A Study on Corporation Law in Modern China [Jindai Zhongguo Gongsifa 
Shilun 近代中国公司法史论], p 34-38 (above note 30). 
35 Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China,” 47 (above note 29). 
36 合资公司 (hezi gongsi).  
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limited partnership,37 joint stock company of limited and unlimited liability 
shareholders,38 and company limited by shares.39 The objectives behind the 
Company Law were to facilitate the growth of Chinese industrial enterprises, 
establish a legal system that measured up to Western standards and 
consequently entrench the authority of the central government.40  
 
However, the influence of the Company Law 1904 was very limited.  It failed to 
encourage the growth of Chinese enterprises in the form of modern corporations. 
Enterprises in China still preferred to stay as they were.41 Business people were 
unwilling to register their enterprises with the government because they were 
guarded towards the government and saw registration as a threat to privacy. 
They were also suspicious about the public and this led to their reluctance to be 
listed on the stock market.42 Another important factor for the failure of the 
Company Law 1904 was the uncertainty of how courts would adjudicate cases 
that involved corporations.43  
  
After the fall of the Qing government in 1911, its efforts in modernising the 
Chinese legal system were carried on by its successors until the Communist Party 
took over in 1949. Corporate legislation was promulgated in 1914, 1929 and 
1946.44 However, these enactments were no more successful than the 1904 law 
at transforming Chinese businesses into modern corporations. According to one 
study, on the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
there were 1.3 million industrial and commercial enterprises among which only 
                                         
37 合资有限公司 (hezi youxian gongsi). 
38股份公司 (gufen gongsi). 
39 股份有限公司(gufen youxian gongsi). 
40 Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China,” 43-44 (above note 29).  
41 A Study on Corporation Law in Modern China [Jindai Zhongguo Gongsifa Shilun 近代中国公司法
史论], p 45 (above note 30). 
42 Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China,” 50 (above note 29). The tradition of privacy and secrecy of traditional Chinese 
businesses is also recorded in Tufei, A Study on Partner's Liability [Hehuo Gudong Zeren Zhi 
Yanjiu 合伙股东责任之研究], p 212 (above note 28). 
43 Goetzmann and Koll, “The History of Corporate Ownership in China: State Patronage, Company 
Legislation, and the Issue of Control,” 170 (above note 31). 
44 Specific discussions on each of these company acts can be found in Wei, A Study on 
Corporation Law in Modern China [Jindai Zhongguo Gongsifa Shilun 近代中国公司法史论] 
(above note 30). 
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10,000 were companies, and the rest were sole proprietorships or partnership 
enterprises. And out of the 10,000 companies, 1250 (11.7%) were unlimited 
companies similar to partnerships.45 
 
ii. Communist China 
After 1949, the Communist Party put an end to private ownership and abolished 
the emerging modern legal system laid down by previous governments. However, 
when the failure of the planned economy was painfully felt, the party decided to 
adopt a policy called “reform and opening up” in the 1980s, aimed at 
establishing a socialist market economy, which could serve as the engine for 
economic growth. In order to build a legal environment facilitative to market 
economy, the government started to borrow legislation from developed 
countries and resumed the theme of legal reforms that ran through the modern 
Chinese history.46  
 
Most significantly, a new Company Law was passed in 1993. Since the enactment 
of the Company Law 1993, businesses can incorporate in the form of limited 
liability companies or joint stock companies to obtain limited liability protection. 
The joint stock company is similar to public companies under the English 
company law, while the limited liability company resembles private companies.  
 
The main aim of the Company Law 1993 was to facilitate the restructuring of the 
SOEs. Since the 1990s, the majority of SOEs in China have been transformed into 
joint stock companies. In 60% of such companies, the state is the largest 
shareholder.47 As a transitional law, the Company Law 1993 contained many 
outmoded rules; for example, it imposed onerous capital requirements.48 More 
than a decade later, a new Company Law was promulgated in 2005 to better 
meet the needs of businesses with the deepening of the market-oriented reform. 
In 2006, limited partnership and SGPs were introduced with the enactment of 
the PEL and the same year saw the passing of Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL).  
                                         
45 F Liufang, “Chinese Partnership,” Law and Contemporary Problems 52 (1989): 43, 47. 
46 ibid., 47. 
47 Baoshu Wang and Hui Huang, “China's New Company Law and Securities Law: an Overview 
and Assessment,” Australian Journal of Corporate Law 19, no. 2 (2008): 229, 230. 
48 See 3.2. 
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iii.  Limited Liability as a Legal Transplant 
It can be concluded from the history of limited liability in China as discussed 
above that limited liability did not originate in Chinese society. Rather, as a 
feature of modern corporations, limited liability is an imported legal rule or 
“legal transplant” for China.  
 
“Legal transplant” was a term in the comparative legal study first used by Alan 
Watson.49 In his book published in 1974, he describes legal transplant as the 
"moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another".50 Watson’s 
main observations on legal transplant are two-folds: first, legal transplant of an 
individual legal rule or a large part of legal rules is extremely common; second, 
legal transplant is “socially easy”.51 His optimism with legal transplant is based 
on the assumption that “usually legal rules are not particularly devised for the 
particular society in which they now operate.”52  
 
Watson’s argument has met with strong opposition since it was first advanced. 
One of the most vehement of his critics is Pierre Legrand, who denies his 
argument completely by stating that legal transplant is impossible.53 For Legrand, 
“A rule is necessarily an incorporative cultural form. As an accretion of cultural 
elements, it is supported by impressive historical and ideological formations. A 
rule does not have any empirical existence that can be significantly detached 
from the world of meanings that characterizes a legal culture.”54 To summarise, 
Legrand does not believe that legal rules can be transplanted because they are 
endogenous to a particular cultural context. He cautions legal comparatists that 
“[l]aw is part of the symbolic apparatus through which entire communities try to 
understand themselves better…[U]nless the comparatist can learn to think of law 
as a culturally-situated phenomenon and accept that the law lives in a profound 
                                         
49 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: an Approach to Comparative Law, (Scottish Academic Press 
(Edinburgh and London), 1974). 
50 ibid., 21. 
51 ibid., 95. 
52 ibid., 95. 
53 Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants,” Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 4 (1997): 
111. 
54 ibid.,116. 
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way within a culture — specific-and therefore contingent — discourse, 
comparison rapidly becomes a pointless venture.”55 
 
Admittedly, it is right for Legrand to stress the influence of specific cultures on 
legal rules, however, he has taken this point to an extreme. As a matter of fact, 
legal transplants happen all the time and in many cases legal rules are well 
accepted by the recipient country. Furthermore, the influence of culture on 
legal rules is not absolute and unchangeable, as the culture itself is also 
constantly changing. China is a case in point. In the past, Chinese businesses 
were run around family ties. As family businesses were seen as inseparable from 
family members and consequently every member had personal liability for the 
debts of the businesses,56 people were hesitant to borrow money as an 
individual’s debts would be equated with his family’s, and failure to pay debts 
would result in a perpetual stigma. This partly accounts for people’s hesitance 
to embrace limited liability when it was first introduced into Chinese society. In 
addition, traditional Chinese businesses were largely regulated by custom and 
moral codes instead of formal legal regime established by the state. Thus, even 
after corporate law was transplanted into China in the early twentieth century, 
Chinese businesses remained mostly as family businesses and were reluctant to 
be registered with the state and organise as formal corporations.57  
 
However, in today’s China, with its rapid economic development, the influence 
of the traditional culture is fading and the general population are more ready to 
accept foreign notions. Despite the failure of transplanted corporate rules to fit 
with the local society in the early twentieth century, China has witnessed a 
relatively successful legal and economic reform since the 1980s. With enactment 
of the Company Law 1993, the company has become a common form for both 
large and small businesses. At the same time, limited liability is widely used in 
today’s China. Investors are used to buying corporate shares without the 
concerns of being held liable for corporate debts. They are equally at ease in 
becoming limited partners in private equity partnerships.  
                                         
55 ibid.,124. 
56 T Ruskola, “Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development 
Theory in a Chinese Perspective,” Stanford L. Rev. 52 (2000): 1599. 
57 Kirby, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century 
China,” 50 (above note 29). 
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It is true that transplanted legal rules in China still meet the problems of 
mismatch with the local society and many rules cannot function as well as in 
their original context. However, for China, legal transplant is inevitable, as its 
own legal traditions cannot meet the needs of building a modern state. 
Therefore, it is more meaningful to consider how to adapt transplanted rules to 
the local environment rather than to dismiss legal transplant completely. Kahn-
Freund’s argument on the influence of political factor on legal rules can throw 
some light on this issue. In his 1974 article, Kahn-Freund cautioned that legal 
rules were shaped by the social and political institutions of a given country and 
could not be easily adapted to the social and political context of another.58 He 
believed that political institutions, rather than geographical, economic, or 
cultural elements were the principal factor that influenced legal rules. This was 
because economic and cultural diversity were being reduced by industrialisation, 
urbanisation and development of communications, while political differentiation 
was on the increase.59 
  
Kahn-Freund’s insight may well explain the mismatch of many imported rules 
with Chinese society, especially those imported from the Anglo-American law. 
China differs from the UK and US politically in many fundamental aspects. First, 
China has a statute-based legal system with the legislature at the centre.60  The 
judiciary in fact has no law-making power under Chinese law and is shackled as 
to its discretion. This means that Chinese courts cannot accommodate legal rules 
to the changing circumstances as can their counterparts in the UK and US. 
Second, neither the legislature nor the judiciary can be described as 
independent as they are tightly controlled by the government. Thus, there are 
hardly any constraints on the government and it can easily interfere with the 
                                         
58 Otto Kahn Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law*,” The Modern L. Rev. 37, no. 1 
(1974): 1. 
59 ibid., 9. 
60 Constitution ( promulgated in 1982, most recently amended in 2004), article 3:  
“The State organs of the People's Republic of China apply the principle of democratic centralism.  
The National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at various levels are constituted 
through democratic elections. They are responsible to the people and subject to their 
supervision.  
All administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs of the State are created by the people's 
congresses to which they are responsible and by which they are supervised.”  
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legal procedures. Third, the Chinese legislation usually fails to balance interests 
of different social groups as most of them are excluded from the lawmaking 
process and are rarely engaged in discussions on pending legislation. In the case 
of limited liability, China has extended limited liability to partnerships to 
facilitate the growth of specific industries, especially private equity firms and 
law and accounting firms. However, there is little discussion on the risks of 
limited liability in China and the interests of creditors are largely ignored. In 
contrast, in the UK and US, many scholars have discussed risks of limited 
liability61 and their concerns have been incorporated into the legal rules. For 
example, UK LLPs are subject to financial disclosure requirements and 
insolvency rules similar to companies.62  
 
In a nutshell, one century ago, economic and cultural factors were the main 
reasons that transplanted corporate rules including limited liability are not well 
accepted in the Chinese society. However, in today’s China, as the influence of 
economic and cultural factors are receding, the political factor becomes the 
principal force that contributes to the failure of transplanted rules to adapt to 
the Chinese society. In terms of limited liability, lack of debates in the 
lawmaking process has led to the neglect of creditors’ interests in the legislaiton.  
 
Summary of 2.1.2 
To summarise, when limited liability was first transplanted into China in the 
early twentieth century, economic and cultural factors were the main reason 
that was not well accepted. Today, limited liability has become commonplace in 
Chinese society and can be adopted by both companies and partnerships. This 
can be explained by the fact that the influence of the tradition culture has 
faded and the general population are more ready to accept foreign notions as 
China is transforming into a modern state based on market economy. However, 
political institutions in China are still remarkably different from those in the 
                                         
61 E.g., J Freedman, “Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms,” The Modern L. 
Rev. 63, no. 3 (2000): 317; R J Huss, “Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: 
Forcing the Common Law Doctrine Into the Statutory Age,” U. of Cinclinati  L. Rev. 70 (2001): 
95. 
62 UK LLP Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090), part two. Also see J Freedman, “Limited Liability 
Partnerships in the United Kingdom-Do They Have a Role for Small Firms,” J. Corp. L. 26 
(2000): 897, 903. 
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developed countries whose legal rules are being emulated. This can contribute 
to the mismatch of imported rules with the Chinese society. In the case of 
limited liability, its risks to creditors have not been sufficiently recognised by 
Chinese law due to the failure to involve different groups in the lawmaking 
process. To shed some light on the discussion and reform regarding limited 
liability under Chinese law, the next section will examine the debates on limited 
liability in the UK and US.   
 
2.2 Debates on Limited Liability 
2.2.1 Acceptance of Limited Liability in the UK and US  
i. Early Doubts on Limited Liability  
In China, the legitimacy of limited liability has been taken for granted since it 
was introduced with the package of company law. However, in the UK and US 
where limited liability has developed for a long time, it is often regarded with 
suspicion, especially in the early nineteenth century. For example, in the 1800s, 
Thomas Cooper denounced limited liability as a “mode of swindling, quite 
common and honorable in these United States” and “a fraud on the honest and 
confiding part of the public.”63 Another example is an editorial issued by The 
Times on 25 May 1824, which lashed out at limited liability:  
 
“Nothing can be so unjust as for a few persons abounding in wealth to 
offer a proportion of their excess for the information of a company, to 
play with that excess—to lend the importance of their whole name and 
credit to the society, and then should the funds prove insufficient to 
answer all demands, to retire into the security of their unhazarded 
fortune, and leave the bait to be devoured by the poor deceived fish.”64 
 
                                         
63 Quoted from John H Matheson and R B Eby, “The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of 
Multiple Limited Liability Entities: an Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners,” 
Washington L. Rev. 75 (January 1, 2000): 145, 154. 
64 Quoted from Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, and Stuart Turnbull, “An Economic Analysis of 
Limited Liability in Corporation Law,” U. of Toronto LJ (1980): 117. 
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In the UK, the Limited Liability Act 1855 was passed over strong opposition.65 
After limited liability became the default in the corporation, the public 
remained suspicious about it for a long time. It was just as Jeffery had observed, 
“no well tried mechanism of company promotion and investment existed, and 
the concept of limited liability had still to win acceptance in commercial and 
industrial circles schooled in the concept of partnership liability ‘to the last 
shilling and the last acre’.”66 By 1885, only 5 percent to 10 percent of the total 
number of important business organisations were limited companies. These 
companies were concentrated only in shipping, iron and steel, while there were 
few in other industries. In terms of the size of the firm and amount of fixed 
capital, until the mid-1880s of the nineteenth century the majority of the 
manufacturing firms in the UK remained as family businesses.67  
 
Although the US was earlier than the UK in enacting for limited liability, some 
form of personal liability were imposed on shareholders by most states. This 
practice survived well into the twentieth century.68  Further, as in the UK, 
introduction of limited liability into general corporate laws in the US did not 
lead to immediate replacement of corporations for partnerships.69 In 1949, 
corporations accounted for less than forty percent of the multi-owner firms in 
the US. The proportion increased to about sixty-five percent thirty years later 
but this might have been driven by the high ratio of personal to corporate 
income tax.70 
 
ii. Change of Attitude Towards Limited Liability in the Twentieth Century 
Since corporations became the dominant business form in the twentieth century, 
the general perception of limited liability has dramatically shifted. Early in the 
                                         
65 Blumberg, “Limited Liability and Corporate Groups,” 585 (above note 14). 
66 J B Jefferys, “The Denomination and Character of Shares, 1855–1885,” The Economic History 
Review 16, no. 1 (1946): 45. 
67 P L Payne, “The Emergence of the Large Scale Company in Great Britain, 1870‐1914,” The 
Economic History Review 20, no. 3 (1967): 519, 520. 
68 Blumberg, “Limited Liability and Corporate Groups,” 593-594 (above note 14). 
69 The introduction of limited liability into corporation did not lead to a sharp increase in the number 
incorporation. See R E Meiners, J S Mofsky, and R D Tollison, “Piercing the Veil of Limited 
Liability,” Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 4 (1978): 351, 362. 
70 N R Lamoreaux and J L Rosenthal, “Entity Shielding and the Development of Business Forms: a 
Comparative Perspective,” Harvard L. Rev. 1333 (2006): 1351, 1356.  
Chapter 2 Limited Liability and Creditor Protection  
 
 
76 
twentieth century, President Butler of Columbia University acclaimed that 
limited liability corporation was “the greatest single discovery of modern times” 
and even steam and electricity stood no comparison.71 Further, the famous 
British magazine, Economist on 18 December 1926 stated:72 
 
“The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless 
inventor of the principle of limited liability, as applied to trading 
corporations, a place of honor with Watt and Stephenson, and other 
pioneers of the Industrial Revolution. The genius of these men produced 
the means by which man’s command of natural resources was 
multiplied many times over; the limited liability company, the means 
by which huge aggregations of capital required to give effect to their 
discoveries were collected, organized, and efficiently administered.” 
 
Today, limited liability has become a common feature of modern commercial 
society with the corporation as the dominant business form. Legislation even 
extends limited liability to partnerships. However, the general acceptance of 
limited liability is not the evidence of its theoretical soundness. According to the 
path dependence theory, past social institutions or contingent historical events 
can lead to inefficient institutions.73 This theory can offer an explanation to the 
legitimation of limited liability. When it first attains legitimacy contingently, a 
self-reinforcement cycle starts as preconceptions of what is appropriate 
determines future decisions.74 Although unlimited liability was regarded as more 
reasonable in the past, limited liability now has become the norm and its 
extension into partnership law seems natural as a result of its long-standing 
legitimacy in corporate law.  
However, in the UK and US, limited liability did not expand without questions. 
Many scholars have cast doubt on its soundness over the years. Efficiency is the 
core issue in the scholarly discussions on limited liability in the UK and US. The 
                                         
71 Quoted from  Matheson and Eby, “The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited 
Liability Entities: an Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners,” 154 (above note 63). 
72 Quoted from Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull, “An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law,” 117 (above note 64). 
73 J Manoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (2000): 507. 
74 ibid., 513. 
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next section will look at the scholarly discussion on limited liability surrounding 
the criterion of efficiency.  
 
2.2.2 Efficiency of Limited Liability 
i. Arguments for the Efficiency of Limited Liability 
While limited liability can encourage investments and entrepreneurship,75 it 
actually transfers risks of failure from business owners to creditors of the 
business. To be specific, by segregating owners from the debts of the business, 
limited liability reduces the pool of assets available to creditors of the 
business.76  
 
To justify limited liability, many law and economics theorists argue for its 
efficiency. Before starting a discussion on the efficiency of limited liability, the 
standard of efficiency used by law and economics scholars needs to be clarified. 
The mostly frequently mentioned efficiency-related notions are Pareto 
efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Pareto efficiency requires that at least 
one person was made better off (in her own estimation) with no one made worse 
off.77 Limited liability cannot be “Pareto efficient,” as it makes creditors worse 
off by segregating business owners from claims of creditors of the business and 
reduces the pool of assets available to creditors. Therefore, limited liability can 
only be evaluated against  Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which has a lower 
requirement than Pareto efficiency. Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, it is efficient 
when someone gains and another suffers losses as long as the gainer is able to 
compensate the loser and still have a net gain (which means there is a net 
increase in the total utility).78 By this notion of efficiency, limited liability is 
efficient only when the gains to the owners of the business exceed the costs to 
the creditors. 
 
                                         
75 This can be demonstrated by its facilitative role for development of capital-intensive enterprises 
during the industrial age, for example, railways. See Blumberg, “Limited Liability and Corporate 
Groups”, 584 (above note 14).. 
76 Jonathan M Landers, “A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in 
Bankruptcy,” U. of Chicago L. Rev. (1975): 589, 614. 
77 R Cooter and T Ulen, Law and Economics, 2nd ed., (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p 12. 
78 ibid., 41. 
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Numerous scholarly discussions on limited liability have argued for the efficiency 
of limited liability. As early as 1967, Manne argued that limited liability is 
indispensable for the smooth functioning of a publicly held corporation, which is 
a capital raising mechanism with wide public participation. His observation is 
that limited liability allows individuals to invest fractions of their capital in 
different enterprises, avoiding a disastrous financial loss. Namely, limited 
liability facilitates diversification of investments. In contrast, under a pro-rata 
liability rule, because wealthier investors are liable to a larger proportion of the 
corporation’s losses, they will be discouraged from investing in the first place. 
Also, a pro-rata liability rule may not give creditors more protection since it 
involves great difficulty and costs in recovering from individual investors.79  
 
Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull further explain the important role limited 
liability plays in an organised securities market.80 Under an unlimited liability 
rule, as individual equity investors will be required to undertake debts of the 
corporation to the extent of their personal wealth, wealthier investors are 
discouraged from investments by the larger amount of potential losses. Further, 
an organised securities market cannot exist under an unlimited liability rule. 
This is because each individual investor will assess the share price according to 
their personal wealth and thus the share price will be different for each 
individual investor. In other words, shares of a company will reflect different 
values and become non-fungible.  
 
Following Manne and Halpern, Easterbrook and Fischel render a more detailed 
examination of the efficiency of limited liability.81 First, limited liability can 
reduce monitoring costs for shareholders. As shareholders face less potential 
losses with limited liability, they will be less keen on monitoring managers than 
under an unlimited liability regime. Similarly, they will also reduce their 
monitoring on each other. Under unlimited liability, the liability to pay the 
company’s debts will transfer to certain shareholders if others cannot pay. 
                                         
79 H G Manne, “Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics,” Virginia L. Rev. 53 (1967): 
259, 262. 
80 Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull, “An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law,” 
129 (above note 64). 
81 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 
52 (1985): 89, 94. 
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Limited liability makes the wealth of other shareholders irrelevant since 
everyone’s liability is limited to their investment. Second, limited liability 
facilitates free transfer of shares with shares fixed with a homogeneous market 
price. Third, because shares have a homogeneous market price under limited 
liability, they can efficiently reflect the information about the value of the firms 
and save investors the costs of searching and negotiating price of shares 
individually. In contrast, with unlimited liability, shares of a corporation will 
have different prices and investors have to investigate and negotiate on their 
price. Also, as shares can reflect the value of the corporation, managers of the 
corporation will be incentivised to improve the value. Fourth, limited liability 
greatly reduces the risk of investment and leads to diversification of risks 
because investors can invest in different corporations without the risk of losing 
all of their investment in one bankruptcy. Fifth, limited liability can lower costs 
of capital for a corporation. This is because when shareholders face less risk 
with limited liability, they will demand a lower rate of return for their 
investment.82  
 
ii. Arguments Against Limited Liability on the Ground of Excessive Risk-Taking  
Although the benefits of limited liability in public traded companies are widely 
accepted by scholars of law and economics, limited liability is objectionable on 
some grounds. One of the most common objections against limited liability is 
that it encourages excessive risk-taking. When the assets of the corporation are 
insufficient to pay off debts, owners and managers who act as the corporation’s 
agents will have the incentive to take excessive risks as they will gain all the 
benefits while they can shift costs to creditors that exceed the assets of the 
corporation.83 However, it is argued that such moral hazard can be constrained 
by voluntary creditors through contracts. Voluntary creditors, namely those who 
                                         
82 One view is that although equity investors’ losses are limited, creditors will be facing a greater 
possibility of default and therefore will demand a risk premium on debt interest. So the lowered 
costs of equity financing will be offset by the increased costs of debt financing and the choice of 
liability rule will not have a real impact on transaction costs. See Richard A Posner, “The Rights 
of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,” U. of Chicago L. Rev. (1976): 499.  
     Such view is an extension of the Modigliani–Miller irrelevance rule which states that in a perfect 
market, i.e., one without taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric information, 
firm value will be unaffected by how the firm is financed (by equity or debt). See Martin F 
Hellwig, “Bankruptcy, Limited Liability, and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem,” The American 
Economic Review (1981): 155. 
83  Easterbrook and Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation,” 103-104 (above note 81).  
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become creditors through voluntary contracting, can negotiate terms for self-
protection and receive ex ante compensation from the corporations for the 
freedom to take risks.84 On the other hand, involuntary creditors, namely tort 
creditors, cannot charge ex ante compensation or protect themselves by 
contract;85 they may suffer most from excessive risk-taking as they are treated 
as unsecured creditors. Further, employees and small trade creditors usually 
lack bargaining power and are also susceptible to the harm caused by risky 
corporate behaviour. 
 
iii. Arguments Against Limited Liability In Private Companies 
Another strong criticism against limited liability is related to its function in 
private companies, which are usually owner-managed and have concentrated 
ownership.86 Most theories that argue for the efficiency of limited liability are 
based on the observation of publicly traded companies with independent 
management and freely transferable shares. Even if these theories hold true in 
the case of public traded companies, the situation is completely different in 
private companies. First, as there is usually an overlapping of management and 
ownership in private corporations, the monitoring costs on the management are 
already low. Thus, limited liability cannot reduce monitoring costs on the 
management in such corporations in a significant way.87 Second, because there 
are a small number of shareholders, who usually have family ties or at least are 
familiar with each other, it is also not necessary to introduce limited liability in 
order to reduce the monitoring costs on other shareholders. Third, the shares in 
private companies are usually not freely transferable because of lack of a ready 
market, so managers will not be influenced by the share price. Fourth, 
diversification is almost impossible for owners of private companies. Owners of 
small companies are usually required to provide personal guarantee to their 
corporation’s debts and effectively undertake unlimited liability for the losses of 
                                         
84 Voluntary creditors are employees, consumers, trade creditors and debt investors who voluntarily 
enter into contracts with companies. Involuntary creditors are victims of torts who cannot 
negotiate with companies in advance. 
85 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts,” Yale LJ (1991): 1879. 
86 Freedman, “Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms,” 331 (above note 62). 
87 Easterbrook and Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation,” 110 (above note 81). 
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the corporation. In addition, owner-managers have invested their human capital 
in the corporation, which cannot be diversified.   
 
Finally, the excessive risk-taking problem will be magnified in private companies 
and this may lead to inefficient risk bearing. This is because owner-managers 
have stronger incentive to engage in risky projects and transfer risks to creditors 
and benefits to themselves.88 To protect themselves, creditors in strong 
bargaining positions can require owners of small corporations to provide personal 
guarantee and contract around limited liability. However, those in a weaker 
position may simply accept the default limited liability rule and consequently 
bear the losses of the corporation. This means that the ultimate risk-bearers are 
those less capable of bearing risk. In a word, limited liability in private 
companies may not produce the benefits as argued in public companies. Similar 
analysis holds true in partnerships with limited liability, which are usually 
owner-managed.89 
 
The risks from private companies to creditors had been discerned by Kahn-
Freund as early as 1944. In his seminal article in 1944, Kahn-Freund argued that 
the privilege of incorporation and limited liability had deviated from its original 
purpose to encourage capitalists to undertake risky adventures as now businesses 
could incorporate even when no outside capital was needed.90 Concerned with 
abuse of incorporation and limited liability to the detriment of creditors, 
he denounced the decision of Salomon as “calamitous”91 and lamented that 
forming a company in the UK was unbelievably cheap.92 His suggestion on reform 
of UK company law was to increase the threshold of minimum capital and to 
abolish private companies or to transform them into partnerships.93 In doing so, 
he believed that the company could be restored to its original function and the 
                                         
88 Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull, “An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law,” 
142 (above note 64). 
89 The exception is the US LLCs which can be member-managed or manager-managed. Also, in 
the US, there are public limited partnerships and LLCs which have been listed in the stock 
market and therefore have many passive investors. See Chapter 4.  
90 Otto Kahn Freund, “Some Reflections on Company Law Reform,” The Modern L. Rev. 7, no. 1 
(1944): 54. 
91 ibid., 54. 
92 ibid., 57. 
93 ibid., 59. 
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partnership, which was intended for small businesses, could regain its proper 
place in business life.94 However, in reality, the company law and partnership 
law has taken a contrary course to Kahn-Freund’s recommendation. 
 
iv. Arguments Against The Efficiency Standard 
The above discussion has summarised the arguments on limited liability revolving 
around the standard of efficiency. However, even if limited liability can be 
justified on the ground of efficiency, there are disputes as to whether it is 
reasonable to make efficiency the overarching value of law. First, as it is 
impossible to gauge efficiency in practice, the efficiency standard is elusive. For 
example, under both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, whether one gains or 
loses and the amount of gain or loss is determined by one’s subjective 
evaluation.95 Therefore, efficiency of a legal rule cannot be accurately 
calculated. Second, setting efficiency as the primary goal of law is 
consequentialist in the sense that it evaluates everything based on the outcome 
and sees rights as instruments to promote efficiency.96 By this logic, protecting 
creditors’ rights from risks of limited liability is not desirable if it decreases or 
fails to increase efficiency. 
 
Lastly and most importantly, the efficiency criterion only looks at the total 
utility without regard to the distribution problem. As the Pareto efficiency is 
almost impossible to achieve in reality, most law and economics discussions use 
the approach of cost-benefit analysis with the goal to achieve Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires that the gainer be able to 
compensate the loser and still have a net gain, hence, there is a net increase in 
the total utility. However, it does not require the gainer to pay actual 
compensation to the loser. Under this criterion, as long as owners of a 
corporation can gain enough to be able to compensate the creditors in theory, 
they are permitted to engage in excessive risk taking and transfer wealth to 
themselves without compensating them. 
                                         
94 ibid., 57. 
95 See previous discussion on the standards of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  
96 Objections against utilitarianism from which the notion of efficiency derived can also be applied 
directly to efficiency. See C JJ, Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: for and Against, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1973), 79-82. 
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In a nutshell, although efficiency is a useful notion in academic discussions, it 
cannot be regarded as the sole and supreme value of legal rules. In the 
discussion of creditor protection, it must be admitted that creditors’ rights have 
intrinsic values and are not merely instrument to the end of efficiency. Further, 
efficiency must be tempered with a regard to the fairness of distribution. 
Efficiency cannot be the only criterion to assess limited liability. It is also 
imperative to balance distribution of risks and gains between creditors and 
owners of businesses.  
 
Summary of 2.2.2 
In summary, limited liability cannot be fully justified by efficiency and entails 
huge risks for creditors. Therefore, creditor protection should be strengthened 
when there is liability shield in business organisations. The next section will 
discuss the agency problem between businesses and their creditors, which is 
amplified by limited liability. It will also look at the creditor protection regimes 
under both corporate and partnership law in the UK, US and China. 
 
2.3 Creditor Protection Regime in the UK, US and China 
2.3.1 Creditor Protection under Corporate Law in the UK, US and China 
i. Agency Problem and Creditor Protection 
The above discussion has pointed out the costs of limited liability for creditors. 
However, even without limited liability, owners of business organisations may 
act to the detriment of creditors. The existence of limited liability magnifies 
such risks and consequently increases the need for creditor protection. It needs 
to be stressed that this study focuses on voluntary creditors, especially those 
who invest in businesses in the form of lending. It excludes the protection of tort 
creditors and employees. 
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The risks faced by creditors of a business organisation can be analysed from the 
perspective of the agency problem theory.97 Viewed broadly, the agency 
problem can exist in any contractual relationship in which one party acts as an 
agent for the other (principal).98 It arises because information is asymmetric 
between the agent and the principal and therefore the agent can behave 
opportunistically against the principal.99  The classic agency problem exists 
between owners and managers of a business organisation when the managers run 
the businesses and the owners are removed from the management. Without 
enough monitoring by the owners, managers may “shirk” their duties100 or 
engage in self-profiting behaviors such as paying high compensation to 
themselves, self-dealing, and transferring assets to themselves.  Another agency 
problem within a business organisation arises between majority shareholders, 
who usually decide the important affairs of the business organisation, and 
minority shareholders who are usually passive.  
 
An agency problem also exists between creditors and borrowers because 
borrowers in effect manage the loan on behalf of creditors and between them 
there is great information asymmetry.101 The agency problem between the 
borrower business and its creditors is aggravated with the introduction of limited 
liability into the business. As limited liability shields owners of a business from 
its creditors, owners as well as director who act in their interests will have more 
incentive to behave opportunistically against the creditors, for example, raise 
new credits with higher priority or divert assets from the business.102 Therefore, 
creditors need more protection when dealing with businesses with limited 
liability.  
 
                                         
97 M C Jensen and W H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, no. 4 (1976): 305. 
98 Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, and Henry Hansmann, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a 
Comparative and Functional Approach, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p 35. 
99 Jensen and Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure” (above note 97) 
100 Armen A Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization,” The American Economic Review 62, no. 5 (1972): 777. 
101 Information asymmetry occurs when one party of a transaction has more information than the 
other, information asymmetry exists in markets such as insurance and second-hand cars. See 
N Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 6 ed., (London: Cengage Learning, 2011), 599. 
102 Specific types of agency problems between creditors and business organisations are discussed 
in 3.1.1 
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ii. Creditor Protection Devices under Corporate Law 
To constrain the agency problem in corporations in which owners are protected 
by limited liability, several legal devices are employed. Here a summary will be 
made of the basic legal rules for creditor protection in the UK, US and China.  
 
(a) Legal Capital: Legal Capital consists of minimum capital and capital 
maintenance requirements. Minimum capital is imposed as a threshold for 
incorporating and capital maintenance is a limitation on the company’s returning 
its capital to shareholders in ways such as purchase or redemption of its own 
shares, or dividends distribution. Although legal capital was once considered as 
essential for creditor protection, its effectiveness has been cast into doubt and 
it is losing its appeal. In the UK, US, as well as China, there is reform to lessen 
the burden of legal capital for companies. This will be further discussed later.103  
  
(b) Mandatory Insurance provisions: As an alternative to minimum capital, 
mandatory insurance is also frequently discussed. Similarly to the minimum 
capital requirement, it is difficult to set the appropriate level of insurance. It 
may also impede the entry of new businesses, which will face higher insurance 
premiums or even cannot afford insurance at all. The difference between 
minimum capital and mandatory insurance requirements is that while the former 
decreases the incentive for excessive risk taking, the latter may even increase 
such incentive in the absence of adequate monitoring by the insurer.104 
Mandatory insurance is uncommon in the corporate sphere except for specific 
industries; however, as will be discussed later, professional partnerships are 
usually required to purchase liability insurance.105  
 
(c) Personal liability: It is also believed to be necessary to impose personal 
liability on directors, including shareholders who act as directors, for a business 
organisation’s misconducts against creditors. Unlike passive shareholders, 
directors and managing shareholders are the real decision makers in the daily 
running of a bsuiness organisation. Therefore, it seems unfair for them to be 
                                         
103 See 3.1.2. 
104 Easterbrook and Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation,” 115 (above note 81). 
105 See 3.1.3. 
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shielded from the liability incurred by their own negligence or misconduct. To 
protect creditors, company law in both the UK and US have developed the 
doctrine that directors must consider the interests of the creditors of the 
company as part of their duties to the company in the event of financial 
distress.106 In the UK, such duty is reflected in the fraudulent and wrongful 
trading clauses of the insolvency law, which apply to UK LLPs as 
well.107 Additionally, the UK Companies Act 2006 imposes on directors a 
statutory duty to consider the interests of creditors as part of the duty to 
promote the success of the company.108 The Company Law 2005 in China imposes 
duties of diligence109 and loyalty on directors.110 Most scholarly discussion on 
directors’ duties in China have regarded enactment of duties of diligence and 
care as an emulation of fiduciary duties in the common law; however, a general 
creditor-regarding duty on directors has not been developed in China.111  
 
(d) Corporate insolvency law: Corporate insolvency law is indispensible for 
creditor protection. In fact, in the UK and US, insolvency law, rather than 
company law, has assumed the major role of creditor protection. With the 
enactment of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) in 2006, China has established 
a corporate bankruptcy regime similar to those in the UK and US in terms of 
structure and basic rules. However, its operation in reality is often obstructed by 
state intervention and in many cases the interests of creditors are sacrificed for 
political goals.112 
 
(e) “Piercing the corporate veil”: As an exception to the separate legal 
personality of corporations, piercing the corporate veil is the final resort to 
impose personal liability on shareholders or directors. In the UK and US, the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is developed gradually through case law. 
                                         
106 Andrew R Keay, “Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency 
and Over-Protection of Creditors,” The Modern L. Rev. 66, no. 5 (2003): 665. 
107 Insolvency Act 1986, ss 213-214, extended to LLPs by the UK LLP Regulations 2001(SI 
2001/1090).  
108 Companies Act 2006, s 172. 
109 The equivalent of duty of care under common law. 
110 Company Law 2005, articles 148-149. 
111 See 4.5.  
112 See 4.1.3.  
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Cases of veil-piercing usually involve private companies, corporate groups, fraud 
and undercapitalisation.113 As the veil-piercing rule is based on case-specific 
analysis, it has been accused of producing inconsistent results and has also been 
criticised for being an ex post remedy for damage already done.114 In China, the 
veil-piercing provision refers to a clause in the Company Law 2005, which states 
that “Where the shareholder of a company abuses the independent status of the 
company as a legal person or the limited liability of shareholders, evades debts 
and thus seriously damages the interests of the creditors of the company, he 
shall assume joint and several liability for the debts of the company.”115 The 
application of the veil-piercing rule in China is problematic and usually involves 
“commingling of assets,” namely commingling personal assets of shareholders 
with corporate assets.116 
 
Summary of 2.3.1 
In summary, in the UK, US and China, various rules can be found to constrain the 
agency problem between creditors and the business organisation, which is 
magnified by the limited liability institution. In principle, the rules to protect 
creditors of companies under the Chinese law resemble those in the UK and US. 
This demonstrates that the need to protect creditors of business organisation 
through mandatory law has also been recognised by China. However, while both 
the UK and US have strengthened regulation of partnerships to correspond to the 
risks of limited liability, China has failed to devise a creditor protection regime 
for partnerships proportionate to the increased risks caused by limited liability. 
This will be discussed in the next section.  
 
                                         
113 Robert B Thompson, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: an Empirical Study,” Cornell L. Rev. 76 
(1990): 1036. 
114 Easterbrook and Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation,” 109 (above note 81).  
115 Company Law 2005, article 20. 
116 See 3.3.2. 
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2.3.2 Creditor Protection under Partnership Law in UK, US and China 
i. UK and US 
Traditionally, partnerships in the UK and US are subject to much lighter 
regulation than corporations. The principal reason for this is that partners 
assume vicarious liability for the debts incurred on the partnership’s behalf by 
people acting as agents of the partnership.117 However, with the expansion of 
limited liability into partnership law, stricter creditor protection rules are 
imposed on partnerships. First, although there is no corporate-style legal capital 
requirement for partnerships with limited liability, some LLC and LLP statutes 
require firms to purchase liability insurance or maintain segregated funds to 
meet potential liabilities. In the UK, although the LLP statute does not provide 
for mandatory insurance, professionals such as lawyers are mandated to 
purchase professional indemnity insurance. 118 Second, personal liability can be 
imposed on partners to constrain their opportunism against creditors. For 
example, members of UK LLPs can be held personally liable under fraudulent 
and wrongful trading provisions although the fiduciary duties of owners of LLPs 
are not explicitly provided in the LLP Act and remain debatable.119 Additionally, 
LLPs in the UK and Delaware are subject to the “claw-back” provisions. In the 
UK LLPs, distributions made to members in the two years before insolvency will 
be clawed back if the member “knew or ought to have realised” at the time of 
the distribution that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding an insolvent 
winding up.120 In Delaware, partners are liable to return any distribution made 
within three years from the date of distribution if they knew at the time that 
they received the distribution that liabilities of the LLP would exceed net asset 
value.121 Third, partnerships with limited liability in both the UK and US are 
subject to bankruptcy rules modelled on corporate bankruptcy regime, which 
aims at maximising assets available to creditors.122 Finally, numerous scholarly 
                                         
117 Larry E Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation, (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2010), 43.  
118 “Practice Note: Professional Indemnity Insurance,” Lawsociety.org.Uk, January 30, 2013, 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/professional-indemnity-insurance/(accessed 
on September 1, 2013). 
119 See 3.2.1.  
120 IA 1986, s 214 A (inserted by UK LLP Regulations 2001 SI 2001/1090). See 4.3.1 
121 Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act (DRUPA) §15-309.  
122 See 4.2. 
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articles have discussed whether courts should apply corporate rules, such as 
fiduciary duties and piercing the veil doctrine to partnerships with limited 
liability.123 In practice, some US courts have already applied the veil-piercing 
rule to partnerships with limited liability.124 
 
ii. China 
In China, creditors of partnerships are protected through various provisions 
under the partnership law. First, partners are prohibited from severing the 
partnership assets prior to the liquidation of a partnership.125 Second, it is 
mandatory for Chinese SGPs, which are restricted to professional firms, to carry 
professional liability insurance. Chinese SGPs are also required to maintain an 
occupational risk fund (ORF) for the purpose of “paying the debts incurred by 
partners in their business activities.”126 However, until now the specific 
implementing rules for the ORF have not been promulgated. Therefore, 
currently, professional liability insurance is the most important safeguard for 
creditors of SGPs. Third, as to limited partnerships, the PEL provides that a 
limited partner “shall not manage partnership affairs or represent the 
partnership in its relations with people outside the partnership.”127 Further, it 
provides that limited partners holding themselves out to third parties as general 
partners will be liable to such third parties for the partnership’s debts.128 Also, 
limited partners will be liable for the losses caused by unauthorised execution of 
the partnership’s affairs.129  
 
Summary of 2.3.2 
In summary, in the UK and US, with the introduction of limited liability into 
partnerships, some corporate rules for creditor protection were transposed into 
                                         
123 E.g., David L Cohen, “Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How 
Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility 
and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company,” Okla. L. Rev. 51 (1998): 427. 
124 See 3.3.1 (ii).  
125 PEL 2006, article 21. 
126 ibid., article 59. 
127 ibid., article 68. 
128 ibid., article 76. 
129 ibid., article 98. 
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partnership law in order to mitigate the increased risks and scholars are still 
debating on introducing more corporate rules into partnership law. In contrast, 
in China although there are creditor protection rules under the partnership law, 
these rules do not reflect the risks of limited liability and the issue of importing 
corporate rules into partnership law is rarely considered.  
 
Conclusion of Chapter 2 
The scholarly discussions in the UK and US have revealed that limited liability 
cannot be fully justified by efficiency and entails huge risks for creditors. 
Therefore, the limited liability institution should be constrained with various 
devices and creditor protection should be strengthened when there is limited 
liability shield in business entities. 
 
In corporations, various devices have been designed to mitigate the risks of 
limited liability. In the UK and US, although specialised devices have been 
designed for creditor protection in partnerships with limited liability, 
partnerships are subject to much lighter regulation than corporations. Therefore, 
it is worth discussing whether corporate-style rules for creditor protection 
should be transposed into partnerships. In the US, there is already judicial 
practice to apply veil-piercing to partnerships with limited liability and this will 
be further discussed later.  
As limited liability is a legal transplant into China and has only become common 
after the reform and opening up in the 1980s, discussions on limited liability are 
much more limited than in the UK and US. The rest of this thesis will focus on 
improving the creditor protection regime for Chinese partnerships to reflect the 
risks of limited liability and consider whether certain corporate-style rules 
should be transposed into partnership law. First, this thesis will look at the 
current partnership rules for creditor protection in the UK and US and consider 
whether they can be instrumental if introduced into China. Second, the thesis 
will consider the discussions on transposing corporate rules to partnership law in 
the context of UK and US. In considering whether certain corporate rules can be 
introduced into partnership law, many scholars have started with an examination 
on the soundness of these rules in the corporate context. As put by one scholar, 
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“the availability of new types of limited liability entities (LLEs) provides an 
opportunity to reevaluate doctrines that have become entrenched in common 
law.”130 Similarly in the Chinese context, the creation of limited partnerships 
and SGPs also provide an opportunity to assess the overall creditor protection 
regime that has developed over the decades. This thesis will take this 
opportunity by making an assessment of the current creditor protection regime 
under Chinese corporate law and considering whether certain rules can be 
applied to partnerships.  
 
                                         
130 Huss, “Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law 
Doctrine Into the Statutory Age”, 95 (above note 61).  
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Chapter 3 Creditor Protection outside Insolvency 
Introduction to Chapter 3 
This chapter will consider the measures for creditor protection that are 
implemented outside the formal insolvency procedure. First, it will consider 
creditors’ self-protection, legal capital and liability insurance, which are closely 
linked and have the same purpose of increasing the possibility of repayments for 
creditors. Second, it will focus on fiduciary duties in both the corporate and 
partnership law. Fiduciary duties are relevant to the discussion of creditor 
protection first because they can reduce the costs of internal conflicts of 
businesses and benefit the creditors indirectly. Further, in the US and UK, when 
a corporation is approaching insolvency, the management is considered to owe a 
fiduciary duty to creditors and therefore has to take into account creditors’ 
interests in making business decisions.  This dimension of fiduciary duties will be 
considered in Chapter 4 as directors’ duty to creditors is implemented in the 
insolvency procedure and thus falls outside the scope of this chapter. Finally, 
this chapter will consider the rule of veil-piercing, another open-ended rule that 
impose personal liabilities on directors and partners. Although the veil-piercing 
rule usually applies to a financially distressed debtor, it is a rare and drastic 
measure and is not part of the formal insolvency procedure. This is why it is 
considered in this chapter rather than the chapter on insolvency.  
3.1 Self-Protection, Legal Capital and Liability Insurance  
3.1.1 Self-Protection  
In the UK and US, it has become a truism that when the market can do its own 
work, there is no need for state interference. The US corporate law, which 
consists mostly of default rules,1 is an encapsulation of such a stance. In the UK-
US context, sophisticated creditors are usually able to protect themselves by 
complex covenants, and the state only intervenes where private ordering fails. 
                                         
1 Bernard S Black, “Is Corporate Law Trivial: a Political and Economic Analysis,” NYUL Rev. 84 
(1989): 542. 
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However, the same thing cannot be said of creditors in China. The reliance on 
creditors’ self-protection, as the approach in the UK and US, is definitely not 
appropriate for China. The fundamental reason for this is not so much that 
Chinese creditors are not sophisticated enough as the legal and institutional 
environment is not developed enough for creditors’ self-protection. The purpose 
of this subchapter is to examine whether creditors’ self-protection will function 
in China as well as in the UK and US. Section (i) will briefly discuss the function 
of creditors’ self-protection to counteract the agency problems between 
creditors and business owners. Section (ii) will look at the legal and institutional 
obstacles in China that obstruct creditors from protecting themselves 
contractually, especially the problem of information asymmetry. Section (iii) 
will make a succinct examination of security interests under Chinese law, which 
are the primary means for creditors’ self-protection in China.  
i. The Function of Creditor Self-Protection in Constraining Agency Problem 
As discussed in Chapter 2, agency problems exist between creditors and 
borrowers because borrowers in effect manage the loan on behalf of creditors, 
and between them there is great information asymmetry.2 The agency problems 
between the borrower firm and its creditors are aggravated with the 
introduction of limited liability into the firm. Basically, there are four types of 
agency problems between creditors and borrowers that can reduce the assets 
available for repayment of creditors:3  
(1) Claim dilution 
Subsequent borrowing by the debtor to finance new projects or issue dividends 
will reduce the claims of earlier creditors in two ways. First, while subsequent 
creditors can adjust their interest rates based on the previous borrowings, 
earlier creditors offer a rate without consideration for subsequent borrowings. 
Second, if the subsequent borrowings are secured, earlier creditors will be 
subordinated in repayment.  
                                         
2 Information asymmetry occurs when one party of a transaction has more information than the 
other, information asymmetry exists in markets such as insurance and second-hand cars. See 
N Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 6 ed., (London: Cengage Learning, 2011), 599. 
3 Clifford W Smith Jr and Jerold B Warner, “On Financial Contracting: an Analysis of Bond 
Covenants,” Journal of Financial Economics 7, no. 2 (1979): 117; William W Bratton, “Bond 
Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and 
Process,” European Business Organization L. Rev. 7, no. 1 (2006): 46. 
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(2) Asset withdrawal 
Transfer of assets or the proceeds of sold assets will reduce the collateral 
available to creditors. 
(3) Underinvestment 
When a firm's debt exceeds its wealth, it will have no incentive to invest in 
profitable projects since the benefits will accrue to creditors. 
(4) Asset substitution 
The debtor firm has an incentive to substitute assets with risky investments, 
since it gains most of the profits when the investments succeed while creditors 
bear most of the losses when they fail.  
 
To ameliorate these agency problems, creditors can bargain with the debtor to 
achieve favourable contracting terms.4 First, creditors can adjust the rate of 
interests in accordance with the extent of risks of the business activity. Second, 
they can constrain shareholder opportunism by inserting covenants into the 
contract. For example, to counteract the problem of claim dilution and 
discourage excessive risk taking, creditors can set restrictions for the borrower 
to incur new debts, such as ratios of net assets to total debt.5 Another common 
condition of loan is to require a charge or guarantee.  
 
Given the sophisticated covenants used by creditors for self-protection, the 
prevailing argument in the US is that the role of corporate law should be 
confined to reducing transaction costs of contracting and that private parties 
should be free to negotiate their rights and obligations through contract.6 
However, the function of creditors’ self-protection should not be exaggerated. 
First, mandatory rules, such as fiduciary duties, mandatory insurance, insolvency 
rules and veil-piercing rule, are still indispensible for protecting creditors.7 
Second, even if creditors can be trusted to protect themselves in developed 
markets such as the UK and US, the same cannot be said of creditors in China, 
where creditors are less sophisticated and, most importantly, the legal and 
                                         
4 John Armour, “Legal Capital: an Outdated Concept?,” European Business Organization L. Rev. 7, 
no. 1 (2006): 5, 8. 
5 Smith and Warner, “On Financial Contracting: an Analysis of Bond Covenants,” 125 (above note 
3); Bratton, “Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and 
Practice, Substance and Process,” 51  (above note 3). 
6 See 3.2.1 (iii) for discussion on contractarian theory of the firm.  
7 These will be further discussed in subsequent chapters.  
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institutional environment are still under development. This will be discussed 
further in the next section.  
 
ii. Obstacles to Creditors’ Self-protection in China  
(a) Obstacles to Contractual Self-protection in China 
It is usually believed in the UK and US that sophisticated creditors such as banks 
can protect themselves by contract. However, in China, creditors’ self-
protection is obstructed by many legal and institutional obstacles.  
 
First, as the Chinese government tightly controls the lending interest rates, 
financial institutions cannot charge interest rates in a highly differentiating 
manner. However, it is noticeable that a significant change has taken place. In 
July 2013, the central bank of China, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) announced 
the relaxing of the controls on lending rates as part of its efforts in liberalising 
interests rates.8 Most noticeably in this announcement, the maximum discount of 
interest rates that can be offered by commercial banks is as much as 30% of the 
benchmark rates. This means that now Chinese financial institutions can offer 
more differentiating lending rates based on the risks of borrowers.  
 
Second, it is difficult and cumbersome to enforce contracts in China, even if 
creditors insert loan covenants for self-protection. Chinese financial institutions 
including banks have been found to be able to devise sophisticated contracts for 
self-protection. For example, when accepting a floating charge, some banks 
demand specified assets to be put in custody of a certified warehouse and set a 
maximum amount of assets that the debtor can transfer unilaterally.9 However, 
although it is possible to negotiate covenants for self-protection, creditors 
usually find judicial enforcement of contracts a formidable procedure. A survey 
carried out in 2013 found that enforcement of judgment would take 190 days in 
                                         
8 “China: PBOC Removed Lending Rate Control,” jpmorgan.com, 2013, 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer/China_PBOC_Removed_Lending_Rate_Control.pdf
?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1320612154866&blobheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cac
he-Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (accessed on 
January 2, 2014). 
9 Mark Williams and Haitian Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating 
Charge an Appropriate Transplant?,” 2012, http://works.bepress.com/haitian_lu/1 (accessed on 
January 2, 2014), 41. 
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a Chinese court in comparison to 62 days in the UK and 100 days in the US.10 It is 
worth noting that this survey was carried out in a district court in Shanghai, 
which is the most progressive region in China. Therefore, the time for 
enforcement in other cities is very likely to be much longer. The result of this is 
that creditors do not have much confidence in the effectiveness of contracts.11  
 
Third, creditors’ ability of self-protection is hampered by lack of financial 
information. In the real market, different parties usually have asymmetrical 
information,12 and this will lead to inefficiency and market failures. As obtaining 
financial information can be difficult and costly, some creditors may choose to 
be rationally ignorant of the relevant information.13 Instead of trying to assess 
the credibility of each debtor, they will raise all interest rates to compensate 
the potential costs of default. The result is that some loans will be overvalued 
while others will be undervalued. Then, adverse selection14 will occur since high 
costs of borrowing will drive out financially sound companies, and only 
companies with high risk of default will remain.   
 
In China, the information asymmetry problem is acute. First, accounting frauds 
are widespread among Chinese companies. The most high-profile cases involve 
companies publicly listed in the US and Canada which were charged with 
accounting frauds.15 Second, the credit referencing system is still incomplete in 
China. Even banks find it difficult and costly to garnish financial information.16 
The difficulty of verifying the creditworthiness of small enterprises is the most 
important reason for banks’ reluctance to offer loans to small enterprises. 
                                         
10 “Enforcing Contracts in China,” doingbusiness.org, June 2013, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/china/enforcing-contracts (accessed on 
January 2, 2014). 
11 Mingming Duan, “The Role of Formal Contracts with Weak Legal Enforcement: a Study in the 
Chinese Context,” Strategic Organization 10, no. 2 (2012): 158, 177. 
12 Information asymmetry occurs when one party of a transaction has more information than the 
other. See N Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 6 ed., (London: Cengage Learning, 2011), 599. 
13 John Armour, “Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company 
Law,” The Modern L. Rev. 63, no. 3 (2000): 355, 362. 
14 Adverse selection can be succinctly described as the bad drives out the good. For more 
discussion on adverse selection, see 3.1.3 (ii).  
15 “SEC Levels Charges Against Auditors' Chinese Arms ,” online.wsj.com, December 3, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324355904578157252180759338.html 
(accessed on August 20, 2013). 
16 Godfrey Yeung, “How Banks in China Make Lending Decisions,” Journal of Contemporary China 
18, no. 59 (2009): 285, 296. 
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However, as will be discussed below, the problem on lack of information of 
potential borrowers has been ameliorated by both governmental and private 
efforts.  
(b) Amelioration of Information Asymmetry between Borrowers and Creditors 
in China  
Since 2006, the PBOC has been building a database of credit information in order 
to assist financial institutions in investigating potential borrowers’ 
creditworthiness.17 According to a report issued by the PBOC in 2013, the credit 
database has established credit records for a large number of individuals and 
enterprises.18 At the same time, a diverse range of credit service agencies is 
thriving, including private or state-backed credit investigation agencies and 
credit rating agencies. The same report also points out the necessity of further 
developing the credit referencing system and relevant legal regime.  
 
In addition to the governmental efforts, market forces may also play a part in 
ameliorating the information asymmetry between creditors and borrowers. 
Instead of investigating into individual companies, online financial institutions 
have started to use “big data” to analyse borrowers’ creditworthiness. Alibaba, 
the world's largest e-commerce company, has started to offer loans to small 
businesses on its business platform (Alifinance) since 2011. Based in Hangzhou 
China, Alibaba has a diverse range of on-line business platforms, including those 
for exports and imports, wholesale (Aliexpress) and consumer-to-consumer 
shopping (Taobao).19 
 
Using the data collected on those platforms regarding revenue growth, 
transaction record and customer ratings, Alifinance establishes a credit scoring 
model to assess potential borrowers. It has been found that non-performing-
                                         
17 “China‘s Credit Database Grows by 40 MIn People to Become World’s Largest,” 
news.xinhuanet.com, March 16, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
03/16/content_11022369.htm (accessed on January 2, 2014). 
18 “Report on the Development of Chinese Credit Investigation Industry[中国征信业发展报告
Zhongguo Zhengxinye Fazhan Baogao],” December 2013, 
http://www.hrbcb.com.cn/download/report2003-2013.pdf (accessed on June 16, 2015) 
19 “Microfinance, E-Commerce, Big Data and China: the Alibaba Story,” cgap.org, October 11, 2013, 
http://www.cgap.org/blog/microfinance-e-commerce-big-data-and-china-alibaba-story (accessed 
on January 2, 2014). 
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loans account for less than 0.0005% of the RMB 105 billion outstanding loans 
offered by Alifinance.20 Ali has also partnered with eight Chinese banks and 
provides suppliers' records to them to assess the credibility of loan 
applicants. Its innovative approach to credit rating will also assist banks in 
screening potential borrowers. However, despite the convenience and low costs, 
the scale of loans of Alifinance is still small compared with bank loans,21 and the 
enterprises that Alifinance serves are restricted to those making transactions on 
the online platforms. The ultimate solution to the information asymmetry 
problem between creditors and borrowers lies in the establishment of 
comprehensive databases of credit records and development of professional 
credit rating agencies.  
 
iii. Self-Protection of Creditors by Security in China 
In China, creditors usually protect themselves by demanding security. A survey 
among several Chinese banks carried out in 2007 has found that most of the 
loans they issued were secured and that the security was a significant factor in 
their decision of lending.22 
 
Chinese legislation on security interests are scattered in the Security Law 
(Guaranty Law) 1995,23 the Property Law 2007,24 which has amended many rules 
in the Security Law 1995, and an array of judicial interpretations and 
administrative regulations.25 In China, security interests can take forms of 
mortgage, pledge and lien.26 Here these basic forms of security interests will be 
discussed separately. Further, the “floating charge” under Chinese law, which is 
defined as a subcategory of mortgage, will also be discussed in more details.  
                                         
20 ibid. 
21 “Jack Ma's Five-Year Plan,” forbes.com, July 5, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/07/alibaba-jack-ma-markets-equity-china.html (accessed on 
January 2, 2014). 
22 Guanghua Yu, “The Role of Mortgages: a Case for Formal Law,” Journal of Contract Law 26, no. 
1 (2009): 1, 29. 
23 Security Law 1995, the Security Law has also been translated as Guaranty Law. 
24 Property Law 2007. 
25 Lei Chen, “A Structural Analysis of Chinese Mortgage Law,” ssrn.com, 2010, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681942 (accessed on June 2, 2014), 2. 
26 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 23 (above note 9). 
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(a) Pledge and Lien 
Under the Chinese law, a pledge is a security interest created through transfer 
of a possessory interest in property, and the pledgee/creditor can sell the 
pledged property when the debtor defaults. Pledge under Chinese law is similar 
to that under the English law in that it also requires a transfer of 
possession.27 According to the Property Law 2007, a pledge can be set over 
movables or proprietary rights, including intellectual property rights and book 
debts. A pledge over movables is created upon transfer of possession, and a 
pledge over proprietary rights requires registration.28  
 
A lien under the Chinese law is similar to the concept of possessory lien in the 
common law. It gives a creditor the right to possess the debtor's movables until 
the debtor fulfills certain obligations. The Property Law provides that “if a 
debtor defaults, the creditor may retain the debtor’s movables which have been 
legally possessed by the creditor and shall have the priority in being paid with 
the said property”.29   
(b) Mortgage 
The most obvious distinction between the mortgage and pledge under Chinese 
law is that mortgage does not require a transfer of possession, and in this regard, 
the Chinese mortgage is similar to its English counterpart.30  A mortgage of 
movables is created upon conclusion of the mortgage agreement,31 while 
mortgage over immovable property requires registration.32 The mortgagee has a 
priority interest in the mortgaged property and can be repaid through sale of the 
property.  
 
                                         
27  R M Goode and E MacKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 4 ed., (London: Penguin Books, 
2010), 584. 
28 Property Law 2007, chapter 17, section one. 
29 Property Law 2007, article 230. 
30 A mortgage under English law also does not require transfer of possession, however, it is 
different from its Chinese equivalence in operation. A mortgage under English law requires a 
transfer of ownership of the mortgaged assets to creditors and the assets will be reconveyed to 
the debtor when the secured debt has been paid. However, this no longer applies to mortgage 
of land. See Goode and MacKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 586 (above note 27). 
31 Security Law 1995, article 43. 
32 Security Law 1995, article 41. 
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Among all the security interests provided under Chinese law, the mortgage is the 
most common security interest taken by creditors. The properties that can be 
mortgaged are specified in Article 180 of the Property Law, a list expanded from 
that provided by the Security Law, including: (1) buildings and other 
attachments on the ground; (2) land use right for construction; (3) the 
contractual management right to barren land, etc. obtained through bidding, 
auction, open consultation or other means; (4) production equipment, raw and 
semi-finished materials, semi-finished products and finished products; (5) 
buildings, vessels and aircraft under construction; (6) transportation vehicles; 
and (7) other property that is not prohibited from being mortgaged by laws or 
administrative regulations.33 It is worth noting that land itself cannot be 
transferred in China, as land is publicly owned under the Chinese constitution.34 
However, land use rights in the cities can be sold, acquired and mortgaged in 
the market, while rural land use rights cannot be transferred as a principle.35 
 
With the booming of the Chinese real estate market, the mortgage of land use 
rights have become increasingly important for obtaining loans. However, 
mortgage under Chinese law has several flaws that are detrimental to the 
interests of creditors. First, mortgage of real estate requires registration with 
governmental authorities, which is lengthy, complex and costly in China.36 
Second, debtors may intentionally postpone or refuse to register the mortgage 
after they obtain loans.  As the mortgage of real estate does not exist without 
registration and time of registration also determines the priority rank of 
mortgagees,37 failure or delay in registration will severely undermine the 
                                         
33 Property Law 2007, article 180. 
34 Constitution, article 6. 
35 For the policy behind the prohibition on transaction of rural land use rights and the resultant 
conflicts, see Loren Brandt et al., “Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, Fictions and Issues,” The 
China Journal (2002): 67. 
36 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 48 (above note 9). 
37 Property Law, Article 199: “Where a piece of property is mortgaged to two or more creditors, the 
proceeds from auction or sale of the mortgaged property shall be used for liquidation according 
to the following provisions: 
(1) Where the mortgage interest is registered, the liquidation shall be made in the order of the 
registration of the mortgage interest; if the order of registration is the same, liquidation of the 
claims shall be made on a pro rata basis; 
(2) The claim secured by a registered mortgage interest shall be satisfied prior to the unregistered 
ones; and 
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interests of the creditor. Under such circumstances, the creditor’s only remedy 
under Chinese law is an action for damages and not performance in specie of the 
debtor.38 Third, it is costly to enforce the mortgage when the debtor defaults. 
Under Chinese law, when a debtor defaults, the creditor cannot automatically 
acquire the title of the mortgaged property. The mortgagee needs to conclude 
an agreement with the mortgagor regarding the sale of the mortgaged property 
or apply to the court for a judicial sale.39 In reality, negotiation usually fails and 
implementation of mortgage has to go through judicial process.40 The judicial 
process can run for a long time and provide opportunity for fraud and corruption. 
(c) ‘Floating Charge’ 
In addition to pledge, lien and ordinary mortgage, the Property Law 2007 creates 
a new type of mortgage, which is similar to the floating charge under English 
law.41 Under English law, a floating charge “creates an immediate security 
interest, however, upon crystallisation, no specific asset is appropriated to the 
security and the debtor company is therefore free to deal with the asset in the 
ordinary course of business.”42 Under article 9 of the US Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC), a floating lien which closely resembles the English floating charge 
can be created, despite some nuanced differences.43  The ‘floating charge’ 
under the Chinese Property Law, described as a species of mortgage, has echoed 
this definition of floating charge. It provides that a mortgage can be set over a 
firm’s present and future assets and that the mortgagee shall have priority in 
being repaid with the mortgaged property.44 The floating charge is intended to 
be an effective protective device for creditors, as they will have security 
interests over a pool of assets when issuing loans. Another purpose envisaged for 
the floating charge is to facilitate debt financing for small and medium 
                                                                                                                           
(3) Liquidation of unregistered mortgage interests shall be made on a pro rata basis in respect of 
the claims.” 
38 Chen, “A Structural Analysis of Chinese Mortgage Law,” 15 (above note 25).  
39 Property Law 2007, article 195. 
40 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 54 (above note 9).,” 54. 
41 Goode and MacKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 678 (above note 27). 
42 ibid., 725. 
43 Lynn M LoPucki, Arvin I Abraham, and Bernd P Delahaye, “Optimizing English and American 
Security Interests,” Notre Dame L. Rev. 88 (2012): 1785. 
44 Property Law 2007, article 181. 
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enterprises (SMEs), which are always struggling with financing despite their 
increasing role in the Chinese economy.45 As the major loan providers in China, 
the Chinese banks have been noted for the tendency to favor large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), especially those concentrated in industrial areas.46 This is 
because SOEs are presumed to be backed by the government and usually have 
large assets as their collateral. SMEs, on the other hand, are usually opaque in 
financial information and wanting in assets eligible for security. Thus, banks are 
reluctant to offer loans to SMEs, and many SMEs are forced to borrow money 
through personal relationships and other informal financial sources.47   
 
One of the most salient features of ‘floating charge’ under Chinese law is that it 
is available to a wide range of businesses. Under English law, only business 
entities with separate legal personality can create a floating charge. 48 Therefore, 
the floating charge is a privilege for companies and LLPs. In the US, however, a 
floating charge can be set up by corporations, partnerships sole proprietorship as 
well as LLCs.49 China has adopted a similar stance to the US in this aspect. The 
Chinese Property Law permits the use of floating charge by both corporations 
and non-corporate businesses, including partnerships and sole proprietors. It 
states that "enterprises, self-employed industrial and commercial households 
and agricultural producers and distributors" can create a floating charge over 
their assets.50 Under Chinese law, "enterprise" refers to all business organisations, 
including companies, partnerships and sole proprietors. "Self-employed industrial 
and commercial households" are small businesses operated by individuals or 
families, without the limited liability protection. "Agricultural producers and 
distributors" are those who have contracted for land and engage in farming. The 
extension of the floating charge to rural agricultural producers is intended to 
                                         
45 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 25 (above note 9).,” 25. 
46 Yeung, “How Banks in China Make Lending Decisions” (above note 16). 
47 Galina Hale and Cheryl Long, “What Are the Sources of Financing for Chinese Firms?,” Frontiers 
of Economics and Globalization 9 (2011): 313, 326. 
48 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 30 (above note 9). 
49 M Scott Helbing, “Ucc Lien Perfection and Lien Priorities: an Overview,” December 12, 2008, 
file:///Users/weichuyi/Desktop/UCC-Lien-Perfection-and-Priority-Scott-Helbing.pdf (accessed on 
June 23, 2015). 
 
50 Property Law 2007, article 181. 
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facilitate the financing of agriculture and balance rural and urban 
development.51   
 
Another noticeable feature of the Chinese floating charge is that it can only be 
applied to a restrictive list of movable assets. This is different from its 
counterparts in the UK and US, both of which can be applied to a wide range of 
tangible and intangible assets.52 The Chinese Property Law states that a floating 
charge can only be set over "production equipment, raw and semi-finished 
materials, semi-finished products and finished products."53 Immovable property, 
including land-use rights, are excluded from this list and can only be mortgaged 
with a fixed value. In addition, intangible assets such as book debts, intellectual 
property rights can only be pledged under Chinese law. 54 
 
The Chinese floating charge is unlikely to fulfill the dual goals of protecting 
creditors and facilitating financing of small businesses and agriculture. The most 
important reason for this is that a floating charge requires a high degree of 
creditworthiness of the borrower. In China, a sophisticated system of credit 
rating is still developing. Consequently, offering loans to small businesses and 
those engaging in the rural agriculture involves high costs of verifying and 
monitoring. Given the huge transaction costs, the return for lending to small or 
agricultural businesses is too small to be attractive for banks.55  
 
In reality, many banks are reluctant to accept a floating charge and prefer a 
pledge as the security when it comes to movables. This is first because a pledge 
involves a transfer of possession and thus is more reliable in the eyes of banks. 
When banks actually accept a floating charge, they may require specified assets 
to be put in custody of a certified warehouse and demand covenants that set a 
                                         
51 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 32 (above note 9). 
52  LoPucki, Abraham, and Delahaye, “Optimizing English and American Security Interests,” 1794 
(see above note 43).  
53 Property Law 2007, article 181. 
54 Property Law 2007, article 230; also see Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms 
in China: Is the Floating Charge an Appropriate Transplant?,” 32 (above note 9). 
55 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 33 (above note 9). 
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maximum amount of assets that the debtor can transfer unilaterally.56 However, 
as revealed by a recent case involving Dezheng Resources, a metal company 
based in Qingdao, the reliability of pledges is also highly questionable. In the 
case, the company had pledged its inventories three times using the receipts of 
commodities issued by the Qingdao port and borrowed RMB 14.8 billion from 18 
domestic banks. As it is common practice for Chinese companies to deposit their 
commodities in a warehouse and use receipts issued by the warehouse to obtain 
bank loans, this case has cast doubt on the reliability of pledges.57 
 
In addition, the absence of a centralised registry in China has made it costly and 
complicated to set up a floating charge. As in both the UK and US, a floating 
charge under Chinese law must be registered in order to be perfected, namely to 
be effective against third parties.58 However, there no centralised registry in 
China for different types of movable collaterals. Therefore, a floating charge 
can involve simultanteous registrations with different governmental authorities. 
For example, the collateral over equipment, raw materials, products is to be 
registered with the authorities of administration for industry and commerce; 
while that over the aircraft, ships or vehicles is to be registered with the 
transportation divisions.  This leaves the secured creditor to be subject to a 
lengthy process of registration, which involves excessive amounts of documents 
and conflicted regulations of different governmental authorities. To improve the 
efficiency of the floating charge, and the whole system of security interests in 
China, a centralised registration system for all properties must be established. 
Particularly, electronic filing can be adopted to reduce costs and inconvenience 
of registering a floating charge.59 
 
 
Finally, a floating charge under Chinese law must be enforced with a judgment 
and an execution order made by the court. Also, court officials are in charge of 
                                         
56 ibid., 41. 
57 “China’s Ponzi Finance at Work: Triple Pledging Aluminum Ingots at Qingdao 
Port,”davidstockmanscontracorner.com, http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/chinas-ponzi-
finance-at-work-triple-pledging-aluminum-ingots-at-qingdao-port/ (accessed on July 1, 2014). 
58 LoPucki, Abraham, and Delahaye, “Optimizing English and American Security Interests,” 1794-
1795 (see above note 43); Property Law 2007 189.  
59 JIN Man, “Secured Transactions Under China and US Law,” Canadian Social Science 11, no. 3 
(2015), accessed on June 15, 2015. 
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seizure and sale of the collateral. This process is lengthy and costly and can give 
rise to hiding and fraudulent transfer of the collateral.60 In the UK, a floating 
charge is enforced through the receivership mechanism which is more likely to 
preserve the collateral for secured creditors and ensure an efficient 
enforcement.61 Further in the US, under article 9 of the UCC, a secured creditor 
can use a self-help mechanism to enforce the security interest. To be specific, a 
secured creditor can take possession of the collateral as long as it can do so 
without breach of the peace.62 In a word, the procedure of implementing a 
floating charge should be simplified in China and secured creditors can be given 
some power of self-help. 63 
 
To summarise, creditors in China are faced with restrictions on lending rates, 
weak enforcement and severe information asymmetry. As a result, they tend to 
rely on security for self-protection. However, the legal rules on security 
interests contain many flaws to the detriment of creditors. Therefore, before 
fundamental changes take place, it is unrealistic to leave creditors in China to 
protect themselves through private contracting. It is safe to conclude that 
mandatory rules of creditor protection will continue to assume a major role in 
China in the near future. The next subchapter will discuss legal capital, which is 
usually regarded an essential mandatory rule for creditor protection in company 
law.  
 
3.1. 2 Legal Capital  
Legal capital is a traditional corporate rule for creditor protection in many 
countries, especially for those in continental Europe. A legal capital regime 
usually consists of two basic rules: the minimum capital requirement that 
prescribes a threshold capital necessary for corporations to get registered, and 
the capital maintenance rule that forbids the company from returning to 
                                         
60 ibid., 16.  
61 Williams and Lu, “Expanding Secured Credit for Firms in China: Is the Floating Charge an 
Appropriate Transplant?,” 52 (above note 9). 
62 UCC § 9-609(b); also see LoPucki, Abraham, and Delahaye, “Optimizing English and American 
Security Interests,” 1803 (see above note 43); 
63 Man, “Secured Transactions Under China and US Law,” 16 (see above note 59).  
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shareholders their capital contributions, which are made as the consideration for 
shares of the company.  
In contrast, partnerships, including partnerships with limited liability, are 
generally not subject to such capital requirements. However, it is worth 
discussing whether legal capital should be introduced into partnerships with 
limited liability, as the risks for creditors of partnerships have increased with the 
extension of limited liability. The following discussion will attempt to answer 
this question by examining the relevance of legal capital in corporate law under 
current conditions in the UK, US and China. If legal capital has become out of 
date in the corporate context, there is no reason to introduce it into partnership 
law. The following discussion will be divided into three parts. First, the 
theoretical criticisms against legal capital will be explored. Second, the reform 
of legal capital in the UK and US and the underlying rationale will be examined. 
The final part will look at the development and reform of legal capital in 
Chinese corporate law.  
i. Theoretical Criticisms against Legal Capital 
Today the basic rationale for legal capital is that it can constrain agency 
problems between creditors and borrower firms and protect creditors against 
opportunistic behaviour that reduce the assets of the borrower.64 It has been 
argued that a substantial level of capital contribution by shareholders can 
reduce the chance of the company becoming insolvent when it cannot pay debts 
that fall due. Also, legal capital can increase the chance of creditors being 
repaid once the company is insolvent.65 However, many scholars have cast doubt 
on the function of legal capital, as creditors can better protect themselves by 
covenants and some ex post legal rules. Here a review will be made on the 
criticism against legal capital in the context of the UK and US.  
                                         
64 Basic forms of agency problem are (1) Claim dilution (2) Asset withdrawal (3) Underinvestment 
(4) Asset substitution, see 3.1.1 (i).  
65 Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington, The Principles of Modern Company Law, 9 ed., (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), 272. 
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(a) Minimum Capital 
Minimum capital has long been viewed as a safeguard for creditors. However, 
the initial purpose of the minimum capital requirement was to reduce the risk of 
investing in corporations and to encourage investment when formation of 
corporations gradually ceased to be a privilege conferred by the state during the 
nineteenth century in the UK and US.66 After the general incorporation 
legislation was enacted, it became free for anyone to incorporate a business and 
call for contribution of capital. Therefore, minimum capital was regarded as 
necessary for shareholder protection and encouraging investments in enterprises. 
A minimum amount of assets of a company was a reassurance to investors that 
the company was formed with seriousness. However, after limited liability was 
formally established within the corporation, the minimum capital requirement 
came to be viewed as a price to pay for limited liability, which shields 
shareholders from the debts of the company, and the purpose of the minimum 
capital requirement became creditor protection.67 In 1944, Kahn-Freund 
observed that it was unbelievably easy and cheap to form companies in Britain 
and that the private company had almost displaced the partnership. Therefore it 
was necessary to make it more costly and difficult to form a company, 
specifically to set a capital threshold even for private companies, in order to 
“restore the limited company its original function, and to the partnership its 
proper place in business life.”68  
However, legal scholarship today has found minimum capital to be defective as a 
measure for creditor protection. First, there is no reason that the government is 
more capable of assessing risks than creditors. It is actually impossible for the 
state to set a one-size-fits-all minimum capital, as the extent of risk varies 
across industries and firms with different scales. An amount of capital may be 
appropriate for a manufacturing company but too high for a service company.69 
                                         
66 See 2.1. 
67 F Machado, “Effective Creditor Protection in Private Companies: Mandatory Minimum Capital 
Rules or Ex Post Mechanisms?,” Working Paper, 2009, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568731 (accessed on January 2, 2014). 
68 Otto Kahn Freund, “Some Reflections on Company Law Reform,” The Modern L. Rev. 7, no. 1 
(1944): 54, 57. 
69 J Freedman, “Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms,” The Modern L. Rev. 63, 
no. 3 (2000): 317, 377. 
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If the minimum capital requirement is set too high, it may lead to high entry 
barriers and monopoly prices.70  However, if the minimum capital requirement is 
too low, it may only cover a small fraction of actual losses and prove to be 
meaningless.71  
Second, the minimum capital requirement only provides an indicator of the 
capital at the time of formation and cannot provide any substantial protection to 
creditors later on.  Even when a company is in compliance with a minimum 
capital requirement that is relatively high, gradually, it will lose its initial 
capital due to shareholder opportunism, business failure and asset 
depreciation.72   
In a nutshell, it is very likely that the minimum capital requirement will fail the 
objective of creditor protection. It is only meaningful as a deterrent to frivolous 
incorporations and sends a signal to owners of corporations that they need to 
pay for corporate debts.73   
(b) Capital Maintenance 
Like the minimum capital rule, the capital maintenance rule was also created to 
encourage investment in corporations.74 However, gradually it became a means 
to combat shareholders’ abuse of limited liability. As early as in the nineteenth 
century, capital maintenance was seen as essential to protecting creditors 
against the risks of limited liability. For example, in Re Exchange Banking 
Company, Flitcroft’s Case 75, Jessel M.R. observed that “the creditor, therefore, 
I may say, gives credit to th[e] capital, gives credit to the company on the faith 
of the representation that the capital shall be applied only for the purposes of 
                                         
70 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 
52 (1985): 89, 114. 
71 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts,” Yale LJ (1991): 1879, 1929. 
72 Machado, “Effective Creditor Protection in Private Companies: Mandatory Minimum Capital 
Rules or Ex Post Mechanisms?,” 8 (above note 67). 
73 Freedman, “Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms,” 337 (above note 69). 
74 Federico Clementelli, “(Under)Valuing the Rules on Capital Maintenance,” International 
Company and Commercial L. Rev. 23 (2012): 191. 
75 [1882] 21 ChD 519 (Ch) 533-534, quoted from Armour, “Share Capital and Creditor Protection: 
Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law,” 367 (above note 13). 
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the business, and he therefore has a right to say that the corporation shall keep 
its capital and not return it to the shareholders…”  
However, the effectiveness of the capital maintenance rule in creditor 
protection is questionable. The “capital” here refers to the capital contributed 
by shareholders as the consideration for shares they acquire, rather than the net 
worth of the business, which is a more accurate indicator of the financial 
situation of a business.76 By its definition, the capital maintenance rule can only 
prevent shareholders from withdrawing their capital contributions before the 
company is wound up. Therefore, it may be useful in constraining shareholders 
diverting the business assets to some extent, but it cannot prevent other types 
of shareholder opportunism, namely, changing investment decisions after loans 
have been obtained and diluting creditors’ claims by issuing new debts.77 Hence, 
the capital maintenance rule does not guarantee that the company is capable of 
fully compensating creditors.  
The creditor protection function of the capital maintenance rule is only valid to 
the extent that it fortifies the subordination of shareholders to creditors in 
insolvency by forbidding the company from returning capital to shareholders first. 
However, the same effect can also be achieved by covenants negotiated 
between creditors and borrowers. As found by an empirical study, lenders in the 
UK and the US usually negotiate covenants based on gearing and other financial 
ratios rather than on the nominal value of share capital.78 The argument that 
legal capital can be replaced by creditors’ self-protection will be further 
discussed in the following subsections.  
(c) Self-Protection by Contractual Creditors 
It has been argued that creditors’ self-protection is more effective than 
mandatory legal rules such as legal capital, especially in the UK and US where 
the market participants are well informed and supporting institutions are fully 
                                         
76 Net worth in the economic sense is the assets minus the liabilities. 
77 Jennifer Payne, “Legal Capital in the UK Following the Companies Act 2006,” Oxford Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 13/2008, 2008, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118367 (accessed on June 20, 2013). 
78 Armour, “Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law,” 378 
(above note 13). 
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developed.79 Compared with the legal capital regime, a major advantage of 
negotiated covenants are that they are based on the financial situation of the 
company when credit is extended rather than that at the company’s formation. 
Creditors can adjust the rate of interest in accordance with the extent of risks of 
the business. Further, although they cannot foresee the risks caused by 
shareholder opportunism at the time of borrowing, they can constrain 
shareholder opportunism by inserting covenants into the contract. For example, 
they can condition the loan on the financial situation of the company by 
restricting assets distribution and specifying a debt-to-equity ratio or cash flow 
level. Another possible covenant is a floating charge over the present and future 
assets of the company that will crystallise in the future.80 Creditors can also ask 
for personal guarantees by the shareholders. Additionally, market disciplines 
such as reputation of the borrower and the directors will also reinforce the self-
protection of the creditors.81  
(d) Protection of Non-Adjusting Creditors 
It can be argued that legal capital is meaningful for non-adjusting creditors, 
namely those who cannot protect themselves through negotiating contracts. 
These creditors include tort victims, suppliers who rely on a buyer company as 
their major source of income, and employees whose livelihood depends on their 
employer.82 Unlike financial institutions, these creditors are unable to devise or 
negotiate a complex contract to protect themselves. Therefore, it has been 
argued that legal capital is indispensable for their interests.  
However, upon closer examination, such an argument does not have much 
strength. First, the benefits of contracts are not restricted to creditors who 
negotiate such contracts, and other creditors can in fact freeride on their efforts. 
For example, when a contract specifies a debt-to-equity ratio for the company, 
other creditors will also benefit because it ensures the financial soundness of the 
company. Second, for tort creditors, legal capital cannot guarantee that they 
                                         
79 See 3.1.1. 
80 See 3.1.1. 
81 Machado, “Effective Creditor Protection in Private Companies: Mandatory Minimum Capital 
Rules or Ex Post Mechanisms?,” 13-14 (above note 67).  
82 Armour, “Legal Capital: an Outdated Concept?,” 8 (above note 4). 
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will be fully compensated because legal capital rules usually impose the same 
capital requirement for companies from all industries, not specifying a higher 
amount for particularly hazardous ones. Also, tort victims usually receive little 
after secured creditors are paid. In reality, tort creditors will get more 
protection from insurance since insurance can adjust to the extent of risk of a 
particular activity and the insurance company will monitor the company on an 
ongoing basis.83 Third, employees will not receive much benefit from the legal 
capital and labour law and workers’ compensation insurance is more 
instrumental in protecting their interests. Finally, as to trade creditors, although 
there is evidence that they usually offer the same interest rate to all borrowers, 
they can adjust the amount of credits that they extend according to the 
financial prospects of each borrower.84  
In summary, legal capital is ineffective for protection of creditors including tort 
creditors. In fact, creditors can protect themselves by adjusting interest rates 
and negotiating covenants. Admittedly, mandatory legal rules are still important 
for protecting creditors. The next section will look at the reform of legal capital 
in the US and UK and the ex post legal rules that are more effective alternatives 
to legal capital.  
ii. Reform of Legal Capital in the US and UK 
(a) Reform of Legal Capital in the US 
Distribution Rule under US Corporate Law 
 
In the US, legal capital has been seen as an outdated legal rule, and the task of 
creditor protection has largely been left to contract and insolvency law.  A 
majority of states in the US require no minimum capital and have abolished the 
notion of legal capital to adopt the distribution rule in the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act (RMBCA).85 The distribution rule based on the 
                                         
83 Machado, “Effective Creditor Protection in Private Companies: Mandatory Minimum Capital 
Rules or Ex Post Mechanisms?,” 16-18 (above note 67).  For more discussion on the function of 
insurance, see 3.1.3. 
84 Armour, “Legal Capital: an Outdated Concept?,” 11 (above note 4).  
85 This will be further discussed in the following.  
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insolvency test has replaced the traditional capital maintenance rule, together 
with the fraudulent transfer law.  
Distribution under the RMBCA is defined as “a direct or indirect transfer of 
money or other property (except its own shares) or incurrence of indebtedness 
by a corporation to or for the benefit of its shareholders in respect of any of its 
shares.”86 Distribution can take the form of dividend, repurchase of shares, or “a 
distribution of indebtedness.”87 Under the RMBCA, the legitimacy of distributions 
turns on the “insolvency test.” The essence of the insolvency test is to 
prohibit distributions to shareholders if such distributions would make the 
corporation insolvent. Two types of insolvency that can be used to determine 
the legitimacy of distributions are defined by the RMBCA.88  The first type of 
insolvency is in the cash-flow sense, i.e. “the corporation would not be able to 
pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business.” The second 
refers to insolvency in the balance-sheet sense, i.e. “the corporation’s total 
assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus amount that would 
be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the 
distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders 
whose preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution.” 
The distribution rule built on the insolvency test in the RMBCA was retained in 
subsequent versions of the model law and has been adopted by a majority of 
states in the US.89 However, there are some exceptions, including two important 
jurisdictions, Delaware and New York. Under the corporate law in both Delaware 
and New York, a corporation may pay dividends out of surplus or the net profits 
from the current or preceding year.90 As an additional requirement, New York 
provides that the corporation not be (or be rendered) insolvent.91 Under the 
corporate law in Delaware and New York law, surplus is the amount by which net 
                                         
86 RMBCA § 1.40 (6). 
87 RMBCA § 1.40(6). 
88 RMBCA § 6.40(c). 
89 Andreas Engert, “Life Without Legal Capital: Lessons From American Law ,” Working Paper, 
January 21, 2006, http://ssrn.com/abstract=882842(accessed on May 2, 2013), 21. 
90 Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) § 170(a); New York Business Organisation Law 
(NYBOL) § 510. 
91 NYBOL § 510. 
Chapter 3 Creditor Protection Outside Insolvency 
 
 
113 
assets exceeds stated capital.92 Although the distribution rule under New York 
and Delaware seem to be more stringent than that under the RMBCA, they leave 
lots of discretion to the board of directors in making distributions to 
shareholders. For example, the board has almost total discretion to determine 
the stated capital, and par value of shares can also be reduced or abolished by 
amending the articles of incorporation.93  
Fraudulent Transfer Law in the US 
 
In reality, there is only limited litigation against "distribution" in the US, as the 
distribution rule under the RMBCA only refers to open distributions and 
repurchases.  Most cases concerned with transferring corporate assets to 
shareholders are addressed by the fraudulent transfer law, which aims at 
constraining "hidden distributions" and also refers to the standard of 
insolvency.94 The fraudulent transfer law exists at both the state and national 
levels. The fraudulent transfer law on the federal level can be found in Section 
548 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Many states have promulgated their own 
fraudulent transfer statutes based on the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).95 Under the fraudulent transfer law, 
a transfer will be deemed as fraudulent if it is made with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud any creditor or without receiving reasonably equivalent value 
in return. Absent the "actual intent" element, a transaction can also be deemed 
as "constructive fraud". The provisions regarding constructive fraud are most 
relevant for distributions to shareholders. Constructive fraud arises when the 
debtor transfers an asset or incurs an obligation without receiving a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange and thus the debtor was rendered insolvent or left 
with unreasonably small capital.96 The basic purpose of the fraudulent transfer 
law is to give unsecured creditors recourse when the debtor transfers assets to 
evade their claims. Creditors can recover the property from the person to whom 
                                         
92 DGCL § 154; NYBOL § 102. 
93 DGCL § 241, 242; NYBOL § 801, 802. 
94 Engert, “Life Without Legal Capital: Lessons From American Law,” 25 (above note 89) 
95 D G Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy, 4 ed., (New York Foundation Press, 2006), p 153. 
96 BC § 101(32); BC § 548(2); UFTA § 4(a)(2), also see Engert, “Life Without Legal Capital: 
Lessons From American Law,” 28-33 (above note 89). 
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it has been transferred if there has been a fraudulent transfer.97 In reality, the 
fraudulent transfer rule, as well as the distribution rule, is usually enforced in 
the bankruptcy procedure.98 The fraudulent transfer rule in the US bankruptcy 
law will be further considered in later discussions.99 
Although the fraudulent transfer law does not directly impose liability on 
directors, directors can be held liable under the fiduciary duties of care and 
diligence. Furthermore, controlling shareholders and directors can be held liable 
to creditors by the veil piercing doctrine. Although the veil-piercing doctrine has 
been applied inconsistently among states, it has been found that fraud and 
undercapitalisation are among the principal reasons for veil piercing in the US.100  
 (b) Reform of Legal Capital in the UK 
In continental Europe, limited liability has been perceived as a privilege 
conferred on shareholders at the expense of creditors. In stark contrast to the 
attitude to legal capital in the US, the European Union regards legal capital as 
essential for creditor protection, and such perception is embodied by its Second 
Company Law Directive, which provides capital maintenance rules for public 
companies.101 With a legal system similar to the US and influence from the EU, 
the UK adopts a mixed approach. It shares the indifference to minimum capital 
with the US and provides no minimum capital requirement for private companies. 
Also, it only imposes a minimum share capital of GBP 50,000 on public 
companies,102 an amount of only symbolic value for most public companies. 
However, Britain seems to have embraced the European perception that 
                                         
97 See the summary of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) on: 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20Transfer%20Act%20-
%20now%20known%20as%20Voidable%20Transactions%20Act (accessed on September 1, 
2014). It is worth noting that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is now known as Uniform 
Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA) due to amendments made in 2014.  
98 R A Booth, “Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law,” U of Maryland Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2005-64, (bepress, 2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=864685, 129. 
99 See Chapter 4. 
100 Booth, “Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law,” 131 (above note 98)  
101 The Formation of Public Companies and Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, 
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shareholders obtain limited liability at the expense of creditors,103 therefore it is 
necessary for law to provide adequate protection to creditors where there is 
limited liability. In addition to a creditor-oriented insolvency regime, it has also 
promulgated relatively rigorous capital maintenance rules applicable to both 
private and public companies.  
Most UK legal capital rules are contained in the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), 
including gold-plated rules of the Second Company Law Directive104 as well as 
those developed by UK case law. The capital maintenance regime under the UK 
company law mostly consists of rules on distribution, capital reduction, share 
repurchase, and financial assistance to the purchaser of the company’s shares. 
An examination on these rules will demonstrate that it is more difficult for UK 
companies to make distributions to their shareholders than for companies in the 
US, where the distribution rule is usually allowed unless the company is or is 
rendered insolvent. First, the distribution rule contained in Part 23 of the CA 
2006105 provides that companies cannot make any form distribution of corporate 
assets unless it is made “out of profits available for the purpose,” which are 
basically calculated as accumulated realised profits less accumulated realised 
losses.106 The distribution rule for public companies is even more stringent, as 
they have to satisfy an additional requirement that their net assets will not be 
less than the aggregate of share capital and undistributable reserves as a result 
of making a distribution.107 Second, while corporate statutes in the US generally 
do not prohibit capital and share repurchases,108 the CA 2006 provides that 
shares can only be redeemed or repurchased by a company out of the 
distributable profits of the company or proceeds of a fresh issue of shares109 so 
that the share capital will not be reduced by share redemption or repurchase.110 
The exception is that private companies are allowed to repurchase shares out of 
                                         
103  Payne, “Legal Capital in the UK Following the Companies Act 2006,” 5 (above note 77). 
104 ibid., 7.  
105 Distribution under the CA 2006 is a broad conception including dividends, redemption, and 
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capital under some circumstances.111 Third, reduction of legal capital requires a 
special resolution of the members upon confirmation of the courts.112 For private 
companies, a special resolution of the members is still necessary. However, it 
needs to be supported only by a solvency statement signed by directors instead 
of courts’ confirmation.113  
Finally, there is the financial assistance rule in the UK that prohibits public 
companies from giving financial assistance to a person for the acquisition by that 
person of the company’s shares, whether the assistance is given before or after 
the acquisition.114 The CA 2006 removed the financial assistance restriction on 
private companies.115 This rule has reflected a general policy of creditor 
protection in an era where leveraged takovers have become commonplace. 
However, as financial assistance may not affect a company’s legal capital, nor 
will it necessarily reduce the company’s net assets, the UK financial assistance 
rule is criticised for being too broad and not distinguishing between good and 
bad leveraged takovers.116 In contrast, in the US, financial assistance is generally 
not prohibited unless it contravenes the fraudulent transfer law.117  
As discussed above, legal capital is not really effective in protecting creditors 
and can be replaced by creditors’ self-protection and ex post legal rules. As the 
UK has a legal environment similar to that of the US, legal capital is in fact 
redundant for creditor protection. Most importantly, the UK has a range of ex 
post measures for creditor protection, which are aimed at actual instances of 
shareholder opportunism. First, the equivalent of the US fraudulent transfer law 
can be found in sections 238 and 423 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. Sections 238 
and 423 address problems of constructive fraud (undervalued transactions) and 
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actual fraud, respectively.118 Second, directors will be subject to sanctions if 
they engage in fraudulent or wrongful trading under the UK law.119 Finally, as in 
the US, courts in the UK can pierce the corporate veil to hold shareholders liable 
for the company's debts when a company is undercapitalised.120 In a word, given 
the existence of ex post measures in the UK, legal capital seems to be redundant 
for creditor protection. With increasing domestic awareness for flaws of legal 
capital and effective alternatives, it is curious to see that the UK retains most of 
its onerous legal capital rules. The most direct explanation is that the UK has to 
implement the Second Directive.121 
However, there are signs of change in Europe, which may bring about changes in 
the UK. First, there is increasing recognition of the benefits of the US model 
within the EU. For example, the Winter Report, which was produced by the EU 
Commission’s High Level Group of Company Law Experts, points out the 
inadequacy of legal capital in creditor protection and suggests a distribution rule 
similar to the approach under US law. Under the proposed distribution rule, the 
company can make distributions to shareholders only when such distribution 
does not render the company insolvent.122 Second, in a series of cases, the ECJ 
has confirmed that businesses can circumvent the legal capital rules by choosing 
their state of incorporation.123 For example, in Centros,124 the ECJ held that a 
company had the right to incorporate in the UK while operating in Denmark 
through a branch, even though this company did so only to evade the minimum 
capital requirement imposed by Denmark. Further, the ECJ in Inspire Art125 
decided that it was unjustifiable for the Netherlands to impose a minimum 
capital requirement on a company registered in the UK and that doing so was in 
violation of freedom of establishment. Third, in order to prevent their 
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businesses from leaving, other states within the EU may lower their legal capital 
requirements to match Britain.126 Currently, Britain seems to be the most 
attractive incorporation destination in Europe, with the absence of minimum 
capital requirement for private companies and a relaxed capital maintenance 
regime under the CA 2006. However, it is foreseeable that other countries will 
modify their legal capital as an effort of “defensive regulatory competition.”127 
iii. Reform of Legal Capital in China 
(a) Legal capital under Company Law 1993 
Initially, China placed great emphasis on legal capital as a creditor protection 
technique. Legal capital is called “registered capital” in the legal documents, as 
it is a prerequisite for registering a company. The first market-based company 
law in contemporary China, Company Law 1993, provided for stringent capital 
requirements.128 There are two main types of companies under the Company Law 
1993: limited liability companies (private companies) and joint stock limited 
companies (public companies).  
Under Company Law 1993, private companies were classified into four categories 
and had different capital requirements accordingly. Companies doing 
manufacturing and wholesale business were required to have a legal capital of 
RMB 500,000. For those doing retail sales the capital requirement was RMB 
300,000, and for services companies the requirement was RMB 100,000.129 As for 
public companies, they were subject to a capital threshold of 10 million RMB.130 
Such requirements were prohibitively high for private investors given the 
average yearly wage in China was approximately RMB 2,700 in 1992-1993.131  In 
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addition, the financial burden of investors were exacerbated by the requirement 
that legal capital must be fully paid up before a company was registered.132  
Besides being financially burdensome, the minimum capital requirement under 
the Company Law 1993 was unreasonable on other grounds.133 First, capital 
requirements varied for different businesses, but the list of businesses under the 
Company Law 1993 was non-exhaustive. Second, the requirement of fully paid-
up capital as a prerequisite for incorporation imposed heavy burdens on 
investors and led to widespread falsifying of statements of capital in the early 
1990s. As a means to curb the practice, in the redraft of the Chinese Criminal 
Law in 1997, falsifying statements of capital was criminalised and was 
punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.134  
The reason for such onerous and unreasonable legal capital was that the main 
purpose of the Company Law 1993 was to facilitate the restructuring of the SOEs, 
and therefore it did not take into account the needs of small private enterprises.  
Since the 1990s, the majority of SOEs in China have been transformed into joint 
stock companies and the state still retains its control over many SOEs as their 
shareholder. It has been estimated that in sixty per cent of SOEs that have been 
transformed into joint stock companies, the state is the largest shareholder.135 
(b) Legal Capital under the Company Law 2005 and Reform in 2013 
In 2005, an overhaul of the company law was launched, ending in a new 
company law. The Company Law 2005 acknowledged the need for encouraging 
private investment and the development of small enterprises. It has greatly 
reduced the minimum capital requirement for small enterprises. The minimum 
capital requirement was reduced to RMB 30,000 for limited liability companies 
with two or more shareholders136 and RMB 5 million for joint stock companies.137 
The one-person company is formally recognised for the first time under the 
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Company Law 2005. To reflect the higher risks to creditors of a one-person 
company, its capital threshold is set relatively high at RMB 100,000.138   
The payment rule of registered capital has also been changed. Except for one-
person company whose investor is required to pay capital contribution in full,139 
investors are allowed to pay capital contributions by instalments, provided the 
initial contributions are no less than 20% of the total capital and the remainder 
are paid within two years of incorporation or five years in the case of investment 
companies.140 
However, the Company Law 2005 has retained a rigorous capital maintenance 
regime. First, before the company is established, the promoters and subscribers 
shall not withdraw their share capital after making payments for the shares 
unless the company is not established.141 Second, a company is not allowed to 
repurchase its shares except for the legitimate reasons listed in the Company 
Law. The Company Law 2005 has enlarged this list to include capital reduction, 
merging with a shareholder company, rewarding employees, and purchasing 
shares at the request of shareholders who object to merger or split-up 
decisions.142 Third, the Company Law 2005 provides that a company must draw 
at least 10% of its after-tax profits as its reserved funds and can only distribute 
dividends to its shareholders out of the remaining profits. If the reserved funds 
are equal to or greater than 50% of the registered capital, the company is no 
longer obligated to set aside profits as its reserved funds.143 Finally, when the 
company decides on reduction of registered capital, the company must notify 
creditors of the decision within ten days and make a public announcement on a 
newspaper within 30 days. The creditor can demand the company to pay off the 
debt or provide security within 30 days after receiving the notice, or within 45 
days after the issuance of the public announcement if it fails to receive the 
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notice. In addition, the reduced capital cannot be lower than the minimum 
capital mandated by law.144 
There is also a financial assistance rule for listed companies under Chinese law. 
Although the concept of financial assistance is not stated in the company law, 
however, listed companies are actually prohibited from giving financial 
assistance to their purchasers by regulation.145  The financial assistance rule in 
China is principally devised to curb the widespread managerial asset diversions 
in the SOEs. It is not uncommon to see the management in SOEs use the 
corporation’s assets to acquire ownership in the process of restructuring. The 
purpose of the financial assistance rule is to prohibit purchasing an SOE’s shares 
with its assets, leading to depletion of the company’s assets and damage of the 
state’s interests.  
Although China has adhered to a stringent legal capital regime, its recent reform 
has showed a trend toward relaxing the legal capital as an effort to lower the 
entry barrier for new enterprises. At the end of 2013, an amendment to the 
Company Law 2005 was passed to abolish the minimum capital requirement for 
limited liability companies, one-person companies, and joint stock companies.146 
This amendment came into effect on 1 March 2014. Further, the subscribed 
capital regime has replaced the paid-in capital requirement. This means that a 
capital contribution that actually has been paid is no longer a prerequisite for 
registration of a company.  
To summarise, legal capital has become an archaism and should not be extended 
to partnerships with limited liability, as creditors can be protected by covenants 
and a panoply of ex post legal rules. In China, as well as the UK and US, a reform 
has been made on legal capital in the corporate law. The next section will 
                                         
144 ibid., article 178. 
145 Article 8 of Regulations on the Takeovers of Listed Companies 2006. See Weijun, “Prohibition 
of Financial Assistance Under International Perspectives: a Possible Model for Chinese 
Company Law,” 154 (above note 117). 
 
146 “PRC Company Law Amended to Encourage Social Investment Activities,” January 8, 2014, 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/111014/prc-company-law-amended-
to-encourage-social-investment-activities (accessed on January 2, 2014). 
Chapter 3 Creditor Protection Outside Insolvency 
 
 
122 
discuss liability insurance, which is a better alternative to legal capital in terms 
of creditor protection.  
3. 1.3 Liability Insurance 
Liability insurance, also termed as third-party insurance, covers the insured’s 
potential liability to a third party. Common forms of liability insurance include 
drivers’ liability insurance and employers’ liability insurance.147 It is 
instrumental in protecting tort creditors and voluntary creditors who are not on 
an equal footing with the firm, such as employees. In the UK and US, liability 
insurance is a product of the industrial era and has evolved into a range of forms 
corresponding with the mounting liabilities in the society.148 Under 
circumstances similar to industrial Britain and America, liability insurance 
flourishes in today’s China.  
The reasons for considering liability insurance in this thesis are two-fold. First, 
although this thesis principally considers voluntary creditors, especially those 
who invest in businesses in the form of lending, it will tangentially consider tort 
creditors. As discussed above, one argument that supports the legal capital 
regime is that it can protect non-adjusting creditors including tort victims.149 
However, in both the UK and US, employees and tort victims are usually 
compensated by liability insurance. The legal capital regime seems to have 
achieved little in compensating tort victims.  
Second, professional partnerships with limited liability, which are part of the 
focus of this thesis, are usually required to purchase professional liability 
insurance. In the US, some LLC and LLP statutes require firms to purchase 
liability insurance or maintain segregated funds to meet potential liabilities. In 
the UK, although the LLP statute does not provide for mandatory insurance, 
professionals such as lawyers are mandated to purchase professional indemnity 
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insurance. 150 In China, it is mandatory for SGPs, which are restricted to 
professional firms, to carry professional liability insurance.151 
Here an analysis will be made on the function of liability insurance and then it 
will proceed to provide an overview of liability insurance in China.  
i. The Function of Liability Insurance 
The basic function of liability insurance is transferring risk of liability from the 
insured to the insurer, who can effectively reduce risk of liability and predict 
potential losses. To be specific, liability insurance can reduce risks through the 
following ways: 152 
(1) Risk spreading: With liability insurance, economic consequences of 
catastrophic events are spread across social groups. This is because the insurer, 
who has accumulated funds from different policyholders, will absorb the 
economic consequences which would otherwise be borne by individuals.   
 (2) Variance reduction: As the number of independent events increases, the 
variance of the mean value of the losses will decrease. This means a large 
number of insurance policies for independent events will improve the 
predictability of the magnitude of potential losses according to which insurers 
can charge premiums.  
(3) Segregation of risks: Insurers can segregate different classes of policyholders 
according to the extent of risk. They can adjust policy terms and premiums to 
the risks posed by different groups.  
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(4) Encouraging loss reduction measures: Insurers can require potential insureds 
to meet specific loss prevention standards before providing insurance. Also, 
insurers can incentivise insureds to adopt loss reduction measures by offering 
premium reductions to low risk groups, for example, reductions for non-smokers 
in life insurance.  
(5) Monitoring and control: Insurers will vet potential policyholders before 
offering insurance and will continue to monitor their policyholders. 
In summary, because insurers can reduce the risk of liability and predict 
potential losses, it is efficient to allocate risks to them. Another socially 
beneficial aspect of insurance is that insurers can play a quasi-regulatory role.153 
To be specific, they can incentivise the insured to adopt risk-reduction measures 
ex ante and monitor them to comply with legal standards on a continual basis. 
However, in the real world, the function of liability insurance is undermined by 
information asymmetry and general uncertainty.154 Information asymmetry 
occurs when one party of a transaction has more information than the other.155 
When information asymmetry exists, the twin problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection will arise. Moral hazard refers to the risk of dishonest or 
inappropriate behavior by those who possess more information. In the case of 
insurance, the insureds usually know more about the extent of risks they face 
than insurance companies and will have less incentive to take measures to 
reduce risks once they are insured.156   
Adverse selection can be succinctly described as the bad drives out the good. 
The most classic example of adverse selection is the market for “lemons.”157 
“Lemon” is American slang for a defective car. In a second-hand car market, it is 
difficult for buyers to distinguish good cars from bad ones, so they will only pay 
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a price that reflects the average quality of cars. The owners of good cars, 
unsatisfied with the price, will retreat from the market, leaving only bad cars in 
the market. A similar phenomenon can also happen in the insurance market. 
When insurers find the overall risk is rising, they will raise the premiums for all 
potential policyholders. Then insureds with lower risks will find it undesirable to 
purchase insurance, and only those with high risk profiles will remain.  
Even if there is no such information asymmetry between the insurers and 
insureds, the efficiency of liability insurance will be impeded by the general 
uncertainty of the market. Liability insurance can be profitable only if insurers 
can predict the frequency and magnitude of insured losses. As argued by Frank 
Knight, there is a distinction between uncertainty and risks.158 Insurance can 
only work efficiently with risks, or probabilities that can be quantified and 
predicted, while uncertainty, namely unpredictable probabilities, will hinder 
insurers from setting appropriate prices and diversifying risks.159  
Given the imperfections of the market, insurers have to take various means to 
reduce their costs, including ex ante screening of potential insureds, offering 
differentiating rates of premiums based on past claims of the insureds, ex post 
monitoring of the insureds, and offering services to prevent occurrence of 
liability and defense services once the liability arises.160  
ii. Overview of Liability Insurance in China 
Nearly two centuries behind the UK and US, China finally fully embraced the 
power of industrialisation in the twenty-first century. Enterprises are flourishing 
in all sectors and the economy is growing at an unprecedented pace. The dark 
side is heavy pollution, overpacked cities, omnipresent industrial hazards, and 
widening social inequality. Under such circumstances, liability insurance was 
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introduced in China as a means to cope with escalating social conflicts in all 
areas. Since 2003, the government has put frequent emphasis on the function of 
liability insurance as a “pressure reducer.”161  
Currently, liability insurance only accounts for a small proportion of the Chinese 
insurance market.162 However, the range of liability insurance products is 
expanding. Common forms of liability insurance include drivers’ liability 
insurance, employer’s liability insurance, public liability insurance, and product 
liability insurance. Adding to this list are newer products such as professional 
indemnity insurance, directors liability insurance, and environmental liability 
insurance.163 
Like for many industries in China, the decisive factor in the trajectory of liability 
insurance is governmental support. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the types of 
liability insurance supported by the government are the most successful, for 
example, drivers’ liability insurance, which has been mandatory since 2006.164 
Other examples include insurance for school public liability, production safety 
liability in high-risk industries, and medical malpractice.165 Another field of 
potential growth is environmental liability insurance as the environment 
deteriorates. The fog plagued Chinese cities have become a symbol of China’s 
version of industrialisation, echoing the London smog, which cost thousands of 
lives in 1950s.166 To constrain the problems of pollution, environmental liability 
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insurance has been introduced in 2006 and made mandatory for many heavy 
polluting industries in 2013.167 
It is foreseeable that liability insurance will assume an increasingly important 
role in Chinese society. First, as China is a transitional society undergoing rapid 
change, there is great uncertainty about the scope of liability for those who run 
businesses. New legislation is being drafted every year with new liabilities being 
created. For example, the most recent version of tort law, enacted in 2009, 
which allows suing for environmental pollution, pain and suffering, and damage 
to reputation online, could lead to a sharp rise in lawsuits.168 Liability insurance 
can alleviate business people’s fear for overwhelming liability. Second, with 
overemphasis on economic growth, the society is fraught with indifference to 
people’s welfare. Injuries due to product safety defects, medical malpractice, 
environmental pollution, accidents in factories and mines are commonplace. In 
many cases victims are not compensated. Liability insurance certainly will 
improve this situation by offering compensation to the victims who otherwise 
would bear great losses. 
In summary, liability insurance in China is still at a primitive stage. However, it 
will become increasingly important in the future. This is inevitable as the 
economic and social circumstances become more complex and businesses are 
exposed to increasing liabilities.  
Summary of 3.1 
In summary, given the legal and institutional obstacles, it is unrealistic for 
creditors in China to fend for themselves through private contracting. In contrast 
to the UK and US where mandatory rules have gradually given way to creditors’ 
self-protection, in China mandatory rules will continue to play a major role in 
creditor protection. In the past, legal capital is regarded as an indispensible 
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measure for creditor protection. However, its effectiveness now has been cast 
into doubt and even China is making a gradual reform to relax the stringent 
provisions of legal capital. One of the arguments that support the retention of 
legal capital is that it can be used to compensate non-adjusting creditors of 
businesses including tort victims. However, in fact, liability insurance can better 
fulfill this purpose. Therefore, it is advisable for the Chinese government to 
further promote the development of liability insurance while it is axing the legal 
capital provisions. However, the Chinese insurance industry needs to strengthen 
its expertise in monitoring the insureds. Otherwise insured businesses will lack 
the incentive to prevent the occurrence of liability.
Chapter 6 Piercing the Entity Veil  
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3.2 Fiduciary Duties 
3.2.1 Fiduciary Duties in UK-US Corporations and Partnerships 
i. Fiduciary Duties of Partners and Corporate Directors 
Fiduciary duties are produced by equity, which refers to the body of rules 
developed by the English court of equity to temper the rigidity of common law 
and to achieve justice in individual cases.1 Rules of equity are noted for their 
flexibility, fact-sensitivity and open-endedness. However, on the other side of 
the coin is their uncertainty. As a product of equity, fiduciary duties also possess 
these qualities.2  
Fiduciary duties are usually imposed on one party (fiduciary) who act on behalf 
of another (beneficiary) and has discretion to manage critical resources owned 
by the latter.3 The main function of fiduciary duties is to compel the person who 
manages property or affairs on behalf of others to abstain from self-interest and 
put their interests before her own.4 In partnerships, partners are co-owners of 
the partnership and presumed to manage the partnership together.5 Therefore, 
partners owe fiduciary duties to each other6 and the partnership.7  
In the context of corporations, corporate directors are subject to fiduciary 
duties because they manage affairs on behalf of others. As corporate directors 
manage corporate business on behalf of shareholders as a whole, the US 
                                         
1 J E Martin and H G Handbury, Modern Equity, 17 ed., (Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 2005), p 3-4. 
2 Rebecca Lee, “Fiduciary Duty Without Equity: Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under the Revised 
Company Law of the PRC,” Virginia Journal of International Law 47 (2006): 897, 913. 
3 D Gordon Smith, “The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty,” Vanderbilt  L. Rev. 55 (2002): 
1400. 
4 ibid., 1408. 
5 ibid., 1484. 
6 Partner’s duty to each other was described by Justice Cardozo in these words: “Joint adventurers, 
like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length are 
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals 
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then 
the standard of behavior.” See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
7 Sandra K Miller, “The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for 
Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC,” U. of Pennsylvania L. 
Rev. (2004): 1609, 1622. 
Chapter 3 Creditor Protection Outside Insolvency 
 
 
130 
corporate law stipulates that corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders as a whole, however, not to individual shareholders.8 The language 
in the UK company law is slightly different, which states that corporate directors 
owe duties to the company.9 As corporate directors do not owe duties to 
individual shareholders under the Anglo-American company law, they can only 
allege breach of fiduciary duties through derivative suit. Derivative suit was 
developed as an exception to Foss v.Habottle10, which has established that only 
the company can sue against the wrong done to it since the company is a 
separate legal entity from the shareholders. However, as the board may refuse 
to file a suit, especially when the controlling directors have misbehaved against 
the company, shareholders are allowed to file derivative actions against breach 
of fiduciary duties on behalf of the company.11 Although derivative actions are 
developed by case law, it is worth noting that the UK Companies Act (CA) 2006 
has brought derivative action to a statutory basis.12  
There are at least two recognised fiduciary duties imposed on corporate 
directors and partners under common law-duty of care and duty of loyalty.13 The 
duty of loyalty requires directors/partners to act in the best interests of the firm 
and put the interests of the firm before their own.14 Common behaviour 
forbidden by the duty of loyalty including self-dealing and competing with the 
firm.15 The duty of care requires directors/partners to make informed business 
decisions for the firm. In the US, the business judgment rule is frequently cited 
as a constraint on enforcing the duty of care against corporate directors. The 
business judgment rule presumes that corporate directors have exercised due 
care by acting on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
their actions are in the best interests of the corporation unless a rebutting 
                                         
8 R S Karmel, “The Duty of Directors to Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Control Transactions-a 
Comparison of US and UK Law,” Wake Forest L. Rev. 25 (1990): 61, 75. 
9 CA 2006, s 170. 
10 [1843] 67 ER 189 (Ch). 
11 For a discussion on exceptions to the Foss rule, see Ian M Ramsay and Benjamin B Saunders, 
“Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: an Empirical Study of the Australian Statutory 
Derivative Action,” J. Corp. L. Stud. 6 (2006): 397.  
12 CA 2006, part 11. 
13 D C Donald, Comparative Company Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 332-
335; G Morse, Partnership Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 161-169.  
14 Donald, Comparative Company Law, 335 (above note 13). 
15 ibid., 338. 
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evidence can be provided. The justification for the business judgment rule is 
that if directors can be held liable for good faith decisions that result in negative 
results, they may become overly cautious for fear of personal liability. As a 
result of the business judgment rule, it is rare for the US courts to hold directors 
liable for breach of duty of care.16 In the UK, the common law rule that courts 
will not substitute their judgment for that of directors as long as they make the 
judgment in good faith has been preserved in section 172 of the CA 2006. 
However, it has been argued that this subjective standard of good faith 
judgment can be undermined by section 174, which has introduced a mixture of 
subjective and objective criterion17 to determine whether directors have 
exercised the care, skill and diligence expected of a reasonably diligent 
person.18  Section 174 differs from the US business judgment rule in that it has 
no presumption of a directors’ good faith.19  
ii. Fiduciary Duties in Partnerships with Limited Liability 
Partners of partnerships with limited liability are subject to fiduciary duties 
imposed by statutes. Under the UK Limited Partnership Act 1907(LPA), general 
partners of limited partnerships also have duties like those of general partners, 
including a general duty of good faith, duty of partners to render accounts, 
accountability for partners for private profits, duty of partner not to compete 
with firm and the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care.20 Although the UK 
                                         
16 Mary Szto, “Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context,” QLR 23 
(2004): 61, 112. 
17 CA 2006 s 174 (2):  
“This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person 
with— 
(a)the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person 
carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, and 
(b)the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.” 
18 David Cabrelli, “The Reform of the Law of Directors' Duties in UK Company Law,” 
Research.Ed.Ac.Uk, 2008, 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/13215836/CABRELLI_D_PRESENTATION_FOR_UNI
VERSITA_BOCCONI_ON_THE_REFORM_OF_THE_LAW_OF_THE_DIRECTORS_DUTIES_I
N_UK_COMPANY_LAW.pdf, 16. 
 
19 ibid., 27 
20 Partnership Act 1890, ss 27-30. Provisions of Partnership Act apply to limited partnerships 
unless the otherwise has been stated by the LPA. Therefore, fiduciary duties specified by the 
Partnership Act apply to limited partnerships as well.  
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LPA 1907 does not exempt limited partners from fiduciary duties, there is a 
small chance that they will be held liable for breach of fiduciary duties as they 
are usually segregated from management by the provision that they will lose 
their liability shield if they participate in the management of the partnership.21 
The UK LLP, a body corporate distinguished from both the corporation and 
partnership presents a more complicated picture. In F&C Alternative 
Investments (Holdings) Limited v Francois Barthelemy,22 the court distinguished 
the duties of LLP members from partners of a general partnership.23 It is 
observed by the court that positions of partners in a UK LLP are different from 
partners in traditional partnerships so the general principle of partners' fiduciary 
duties does not apply to the UK LLP. Moreover, the UK LLPA 2000 does not 
provide that members of LLPs owe duties to each other. Whether members owe 
fiduciary duties to each other and the LLP should be decided upon specific facts. 
Based on this line of reasoning, the court found representatives of the corporate 
member on the board of the LLP to owe fiduciary duties to the LLP given the 
degree of control they had over the LLP's business.  
The standard the court relied on in deciding the existence of fiduciary duties is 
whether one assumes responsibility for the management of another’s property or 
affairs. Following this logic, the circumstances that cause LLP members' to owe 
fiduciary duties to each other are limited, as it rare for LLP members to manage 
other members' affairs or property. In comparison, members' fiduciary duties to 
the LLP are more likely to arise because such duties arise when members have 
direct control of the LLP's affairs or property. Another point worth noting in this 
UK LLP case is how much emphasis the court put on the authority of the 
governing agreement.  
As to the US LLP, a species of the general partnership, there is no dispute that 
its partners are subject to fiduciary duties similar to partners of a general 
                                         
21 LPA 1907, s 6. 
22 [2011] EWHC 1731, [2012] Ch 613. 
23 For a summary of the case, see “Divided Loyalties - an Overview of Duties in Limited Liability 
Partnerships Following the Decision in F&C v Barthelemy and Culligan , Business Law Firm, 
Fox Williams,” Foxwilliams.com, http://www.foxwilliams.com/news/505 (accesssed on July 15, 
2013).    
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partnership.24 In a US limited partnership, similar to its UK counterpart, only 
general partners are subject to the fiduciary duties as applied to partners of 
general partnerships and limited partners can enforce such duties through 
derivative suits. The ULPA 2001 provides that general partners are subject to 
duty of care and duty of loyalty,25 however, limited partners have no fiduciary 
duties “solely by reason of being a limited partner” and are only imposed with 
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 26 However, in the US, with 
the erosion of the “control rule” in the US, it becomes easier for limited 
partners to interfere with the management.27 Therefore, it is possible that 
limited partners in the US will be held liable for breach of fiduciary duties 
although they are presumed to have none. The US case law has confirmed that 
limited partners will be subject to fiduciary duties as general partners if they 
participate in the management.28  
As hybrids of corporations and partnerships, US LLCs have fiduciary duties with 
mixed features. In the US, LLCs can be divided to be member-managed and 
manager-managed according to their governing agreements. The former 
category of LLCs resembles general partnerships with managerial powers shared 
by partners while the latter is more like limited partnerships or public 
corporations with managerial power vested in the general partner or the board 
of directors.29 The most recent version of Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(ULLCA), promulgated in 2006, also imposes duties of care and loyalty and 
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing30 on LLC managers and 
members of member-managed LLCs.31 However, members of manager-managed 
                                         
24 The UPA 1997 contains special provisions for LLPs and general provisions of partnerships will 
also apply to LLP. The fiduciary duties of partners are provided in section 404, which states that 
“The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty 
of loyalty and the duty of care”. It will be further discussed later.  
25 ULPA 2001 § 408. 
26 ULPA 2001 § 305. 
27 See 1.1.1 (iii). 
28 Larry E Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 175. 
29 J William Callison and Allan W Vestal, “They've Created a Lamb with Mandibles of Death: 
Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms,” Ind. LJ 76 (2001): 271, 275. 
30 The duty of good faith and fair dealing developed under the US contract law prevents one party 
from unfairly taking advantage of the other party and is mainly intended to protect reasonable 
expectations of parties, for a discussion of this duty, see Robert S Summers, “General Duty of 
Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization,” Cornell L. Rev. 67 (1981): 810; Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law,” The Business Lawyer (2005): 1469. 
31 ULLCA 2006 § 409.  
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LLCs and non-managing members of member-managed LLCs, who have the 
position similar to shareholders in corporations, are not subject to these 
duties.32  
iii. Whether Fiduciary Duties can be Opted out 
As flexibility is a major appeal of partnerships with limited liability, questions 
arise as to whether private parties can contract out fiduciary duties in 
partnerships with limited liability. Fiduciary duties have long been criticised for 
the uncertainty caused by judicial discretion and many have argued for allowing 
parties to contract out fiduciary duties.33   
Traditionally, under the Anglo-American law, fiduciary duties imposed on 
directors are more rigid than those on partners. In principle, partners can vary 
their duties to each other although they cannot completely eliminate fiduciary 
duties. The UK Partnership Act clearly states in section 19 that mutual rights and 
duties of partners may be varied by the consent of all the partners while case 
law demonstrates such variation is still subject to judicial scrutiny.34 Similarly, 
the section 103 of the US UPA 1997 provides that although partnership 
agreement can modify fiduciary duties, it cannot eliminate them. In contrast, in 
corporations, traditionally only upward contractual modification of fiduciary 
duties is allowed.35 Although US Delaware has amended its corporate statute to 
allow for opting out duty of care, it still forbids limitation of duty of loyalty and 
good faith or the wholesale elimination of fiduciary duties. In addition, even 
when it comes to elimination of duty of care, the Delaware case law has 
demonstrated a narrow interpretation of duty of care and a restriction to the 
scope of the duty that can be opted out.36  
As partnerships with limited liability are modeled on partnerships in most 
aspects, it is reasonable to grant them the extent of contractual freedom similar 
                                         
32 Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation, 177 (above note 28). 
33 ibid., 203. 
34 G Morse, Partnership Law, (OUP, 2010), 159 (above note 13). 
35 However, in other contexts where contractual and fiduciary relationships coexist, for example, in 
an agency relationship, contracts will determine the scope of fiduciary duties. See Kelly v 
Cooper [1993] AC 205 (Privy Council), 216.  
36 Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation, 170 (above note 28). 
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to ordinary partnerships. However, it is debatable whether it is justified when 
US Delaware started to permit limited partnerships and LLCs to closely mimic 
public corporations and at the same time to completely eliminate fiduciary 
duties.37 
The debates on whether fiduciary duties can be contracted out are related to 
the divided views on the nature of the firm. Theories regarding the nature of the 
firm in the discussion of corporate law are split into two major threads-
contractarian theory and concession or communitarian theory. The arguments 
for permitting eliminating fiduciary duties are usually based on the contractarian 
theory of the firm, which characterises the firm as a creature of contracts and 
only serves the interest of contracting parties and argues for minimum 
government interference. In contrast, the proponents for imposing mandatory 
fiduciary duties see the firm as a concession granted by the state and with a 
public interest function, and therefore they demand more government 
regulation to keep the firm from infringing the interests of the outsiders of the 
firm and the whole community.38 The communitarian theory first gained 
popularity in the early nineteenth century when operating as a corporation was 
truly a concession granted by the state.39 However, after general incorporation 
statutes became available, such theory ceased to conform with the reality. As a 
result, the contractarian theory of the firm, has thrived and lent theoretical 
strength in the deregulatory movement in both the UK and US.40 
This schism on the view of the firm also led to the divided opinions on whether 
directors/partners should be subject to a creditor-regarding duty. Scholars who 
hold the contractarian theory of the firm usually oppose imposing such duty 
through mandatory law, while those who believe in the communitarian theory 
                                         
37 M Manesh, “Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law,” Delaware Journal of Corporate 
Law 34 (2009): 465–517. 
38 For a summary of theories of the firm and debates on fiduciary duties, see David L Cohen, 
“Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and 
Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities 
Regulation for the Limited Liability Company,” Okla. L. Rev. 51 (1998): 427. 
39 Andrew R Keay, “Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency 
and Over‐Protection of Creditors,” The Modern L. Rev. 66, no. 5 (2003): 665, 673. 
40 Sandra K Miller, “Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the Interests of 
Others Beyond the Contracting Parties,” American Business LJ 46, no. 2 (2009): 243, 249. 
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find it indispensable as a means for creditor protection.41 The debates on 
directors’/partners’ creditor-regarding duty will be further discussed in chapter 
4. Here the discussion will proceed to China where a regulatory asymmetry also 
exists between corporations and partnerships in terms of fiduciary duties.  
3.2.2 Fiduciary Duties in Chinese Corporations and Partnerships 
i. Fiduciary Duties in Chinese Corporations 
(a) Legislative History of Fiduciary Duties under Chinese Company Law 
The Company Law 2005 in China imposes duties of diligence42 and loyalty on 
directors.43 Further, shareholders are allowed to bring derivative actions against 
directors on behalf of the company for breach of duties.44 However, under the 
PEL, partners are not subject to duties of loyalty and diligence.45 
Most scholarly discussions on directors’ duties in China have regarded enactment 
of duties of diligence and care as an emulation of fiduciary duties in common 
law, however, an empirical study has found that the cases brought for directors’ 
breach of duty are rare and the judiciary is rather rigid in interpreting directors’ 
duties.46  
The debates on whether fiduciary duties can be contracted and the regulatory 
asymmetry between partnerships and corporations are rarely found in the 
Chinese context. The most critical problem regarding fiduciary duties in China is 
whether they can effectively emulate the fiduciary duties originated in the 
common law system.  Here this problem will be evaluated by an examination of 
the legislative background of fiduciary duties in China and the judicial practice 
in interpreting this rule.  
                                         
41 ibid., 251. 
42 The equivalence of duty of care under common law. 
43 Company Law 2005, articles 148-149. 
44 Company Law 2005, article 152. 
45 Lin Lin, “The Limited Liability Partnership in China: a Long Way Ahead,” International Company 
and Commercial L. Rev. 21, no. 7 (2010): 259, 262. 
46 Guangdong Xu et al., “Directors' Duties in China,” European Business Organization L. Rev. 14, 
no. 1 (2013): 57, 66.This will be further discussed in the following.  
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The Company Law 1993, which was enacted as an effort to restructure Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), imposed duty of diligence, the equivalence of 
duty of care under common law, on directors of corporations. However, the duty 
of loyalty was not incorporated into Chinese company law until the Company 
Law 2005 was enacted.47 As a general statement of duty of loyalty, the Company 
Law 2005 provides that “Directors, supervisors and senior managers of a 
company shall observe laws, administrative regulations and the company’s 
articles of association and shall assume the duties of loyalty and diligence to the 
company. Directors, supervisors and senior managers of a company shall not take 
advantage of their functions and powers to accept bribes or collect other illicit 
earnings, and shall not take illegal possession of the property of the company.”48 
Specific violations of duty of loyalty are enumerated, including: “(1) 
misappropriating the funds of the company;(2) opening an account in his own 
name or in the name of another person to deposit the funds of the company;(3) 
loaning the funds of the company to another person or using the property of the 
company to provide guarantee for another person; (4) entering into a contract or 
conducting transactions with the company; (5) taking advantage of his position 
to seek commercial opportunities, which belong to the company, for himself or 
for another person, or operating for himself or for another person the same kind 
of business as that of the company where he is holding a post; (6) taking into his 
own possession the commissions from transactions conducted by another person 
with the company; (7) disclosing secrets of the company without authorization; 
or (8) other acts committed in violation of the duty of loyalty to the company.”49 
In contrast to the detailed elaboration on duty of loyalty, there is no provision to 
clarify duty of diligence under Company Law 2005.  
In the same year the new company law was promulgated, the Securities Law was 
also enacted in which a personal liability was imposed on directors who are in 
charge of information disclosure of listed companies.50 The China Securities 
                                         
47 ibid., 59. 
48 Company Law 2005, article 148. 
49 ibid., article 149. 
50 Securities Law 2005, article 193. The translation of the Company Law and Securities Law is 
taken from the official website of National People’s Congress 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384125.htm (accessed on March 3, 
2013) 
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Regulatory Commission (CSRC), authorised by the Securities Law to regulate 
issuers, securities and market intermediaries, has issued a number of rulings 
against directors on the ground of breach of the obligation of information 
disclosure. In addition, it introduced duty of diligence and duty of loyalty into 
its Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies and specifies the 
conducts that constitute breach of fiduciary duties for directors of listed 
companies (Article 97 and 98). This regulation defines duty of diligence as 
“treating all shareholders fairly and understanding the operations and 
management circumstances of the company."51  
(b) Judicial Rigidity in Applying Fiduciary Duties 
Here a glimpse into the real operation of fiduciary duties under Chinese law will 
be made through the findings of an empirical study. Based on the cases 
concerned with duties of loyalty and diligence from 2006 to 2012, this study has 
found that the all of them involve limited liability companies (private companies) 
rather than joint stock limited companies (public companies). There are several 
reasons that can account for this phenomenon.52 First, the requirement for 
shareholders in public companies to bring derivative suits alleging breach of 
fiduciary duties against directors is much higher than those in private companies. 
While there is no threshold requirement for shareholders of private companies, 
the company law provides that only shareholders of a listed company who “alone 
or together hold(s) more than 1% of the shares for more than 180 consecutive 
days” can bring a derivative suit,53 an obstacle difficult for minority shareholders 
to overcome. Second, Chinese company law still refuses to allow for class 
actions as it entails political risks. Finally, most companies listed on China's 
security markets are SOEs tightly controlled by the government, which does not 
need to resort to derivative actions. As the majority shareholder of SOEs, the 
state can assert its interests through shareholder meetings.  
Another finding of this study is the judicial rigidity in applying fiduciary duties. It 
has been found that the majority of fiduciary duty cases are concerned with 
duty of loyalty and in most of the duty loyalty cases conflict of interests is 
                                         
51 cited from Xu, Zhou, Zeng, and Shi, “Directors' Duties in China,” 60 (above note 46). 
52 ibid., 74. 
53 Company Law 2005, article 152. 
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alleged.54 This may result from the fact that conflict of interests is unequivocally 
provided in the Company Law 200555 and Chinese judges are more willing to 
apply such clear-cut rules than deducing from the general ones.   
A closer examination on cases regarding duty of loyalty will further reveal the 
judicial rigidity. In cases concerned with directors embezzling company property 
or misappropriating company funds, which are explicitly catetorgised as breach 
of duty of loyalty under the company law,56 judges are found to apply the 
provisions directly without much legal reasoning. For example, the Beijing 
Second Intermediate People’s Court stated in its decision against a company's 
director, 
"As executive director and legal representative of the Zhonghui 
Yachuang Company, Li Jia should obey the laws and the articles of 
association of the company. Nevertheless, Li Jia violated the duty of 
diligence and the duty of loyalty to the Zhonghui Yachuang Company by 
depositing the company’s funds in the Saiwo Online Company, a 
company directly controlled by Li Jia. He should therefore bear the 
corresponding liability."57 
As to cases concerned with non-competition, another form of breach of the duty 
of loyalty, courts tend to refrain from substantively examining whether there is 
conflict of interests and base their decision on whether a specific transaction 
has been approved by shareholder meeting or the board of directors, or whether 
it has been authorised by the company's articles of association. For example, the 
Zhejiang Zhuji City People’s Court voided a transaction on the ground that the 
director defendant could not prove the transaction was in line with the 
                                         
54 Xu, Zhou, Zeng, and Shi, “Directors' Duties in China,” 67 (above note 46). 
55 Company Law 2005, article 149. 
56 Company Law 2005, article 149. 
57 Lijia (李佳)v. Beijing Zhonghuiyachuang (北京中辉雅创) (Beijing Second Intermediate People’s 
Court, 2011, No. 16710), cited from Xu, Zhou, Zeng, and Shi, “Directors' Duties in China,” 67 
(above note 46). 
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company's articles of association or had been approved by the shareholder 
meeting.58  
When the cases cannot fit seamlessly with specific provisions of the statute, 
Chinese courts are usually unwilling to extend the application of duty of loyalty 
as a general principle. For example, in a case where a company's director 
engaged a law firm and a human resource management company when a 
company was in financial difficulty, the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s 
Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the director had breached the duty of 
loyalty since he should have avoided the consulting fees given the company's 
financial situation. The court emphasised that "As the managing director of the 
company, Mr. Kang was obviously authorised to sign consulting contracts with 
other parties and make payments to these parties in accordance with these 
legally binding contracts. Mr. Kang’s activities did not breach any law, 
administrative regulation or article of association of the company."59 However, if 
the court interpreted fiduciary duties in a broader sense, the circumstances of 
this case could have led to the conclusion that the director had breached duty of 
loyalty.  
Despite the general antipathy to a broader interpretation of fiduciary duties, 
some courts, especially those in more developed areas such as Beijing and 
Shanghai, have demonstrated the willingness to stretch the doctrine within the 
bounds of their discretion. In a case where a department manager of a company 
used its confidential information and ran a competing business, the court found 
the department manager amounted to "senior manager" under the company law, 
which has not been defined under the company law, and held the manager liable 
for breach of duty of loyalty. The court stated the reasoning of its decision, 
“To judge whether or not Mr. Yu is a senior manager of the company, 
we should consider the scope of Mr. Yu’s power as a department 
manager and also the importance and influence of his work. We should 
ask whether or not Mr. Yu’s power includes substantially controlling the 
                                         
58 Chen Ju (陈炬) v. Orient Construction Company (东方建设公司) (Zhejiang Zhuji City Court, 2009, 
No. 4058), cited from ibid., 67. 
59 Jishuntong Transport Company (北京极顺通运输有限公司)v. Kangmou (康某)[2011], cited from 
ibid., 68. 
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company’s business management or being authorised to make 
fundamental business decisions of the company or holding important 
confidential business information of the company. Based on the above 
information, we can conclude whether the duty of loyalty is applicable 
in this case.”60 
Another case concerned whether former directors are still bound by duty of 
loyalty. In this case, a former director of a company established a new company 
to develop the same product as the one he was responsible for developing 
before his resignation. Although there is no express provision regarding whether 
duty of loyalty will extend to former directors, the Shanghai Intermediate Court 
ruled that the duty of loyalty was still applicable to directors during a certain 
period after their resignation.61 
Additionally, an echo of the business judgment rule has surfaced in China. The 
business judgment rule, developed by the US court, presumes that corporate 
directors have exercised due care by acting on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that their actions are in the best interests of the 
corporation unless a rebutting evidence can be provided. The underlying 
rationale for this doctrine is that the courts should not judge directors’ business 
decisions ex post since judges are not in a better position than corporate 
directors in making business decisions. Moreover, ex post examination of 
directors’ business decisions will harm their incentive in risk-taking and may 
constrain them from making right business decisions.62 Similar reasoning can be 
found in a decision of an Intermediate Court in Wuhan, which cautioned that a 
balance must be struck between constraining directors' misbehavior and 
facilitating business activities. The court stated that although it was necessary 
to enforce duty of loyalty and diligence, directors could not be held liable for 
                                         
60 Beijing Jinghua Sifang Trading Company (北京京华四方贸易有限公司) v. Yumou (余某(Beijing 
First Intermediate Court, 2009, No. 13800), cited from ibid., 70. 
61Shanghai Dekun International Trading Company (上海德坤国际贸易有限公司) v. Huangyuefeng 
(黄岳峰) (Shanghai Second Intermediate Court, 2008 No. 283), cited from ibid., 71. 
62 See 3.2.1 (i).  
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every loss caused by their decision. Otherwise, they would only make overly 
cautious decisions and cause companies to lose profitable opportunities.63 
Although these courts are making progress, they have not changed the overall 
picture in China. The judiciary as a whole seems to have played a small role in 
refining fiduciary duties. In contrast, the CSRC has been active in sanctioning 
directors of listed companies for breaching their duties, especially the duty of 
information disclosure.64 As many other Chinese government agencies, there is 
no specific limits to CSRC's authority under Chinese law. The benefit of such 
broad discretion is that agencies can respond in a timely fashion to the changes 
of the society. However, a proactive and powerful agency will weaken the 
authority of the judiciary, making shareholders even more unwilling to litigate 
against directors. Moreover, unlike litigation, administrative punishment issued 
by the CSRC will not recover losses for the shareholders and other stakeholders.  
In a nutshell, fiduciary duties under the Chinese company law are still under 
progress and institutional changes are crucial for their further development. This 
will be further discussed in the following.  
(c) Proposing Institutional Changes for Further Development of Fiduciary 
Duties 
The ‘structural transplant’ theory, which has been used to explain the failure of 
fiduciary duties when they are transplanted into a civil law country, can offer 
insights for future development of fiduciary duties in China.  According to this 
theory, when rules under common law are transplanted, the judiciary in the 
recipient country cannot develop and enforce these rules as effectively as their 
common law counterpart. Therefore, it has been proposed that the focus on 
substantive transplant of law must be shifted to structural transplant, namely to 
pay more attention to allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers than 
the contents of law.65 From this theory it can be concluded that a successful 
                                         
63Liquidation Committee of Wuhan Diguang Communication Company (武汉科地光通信有限责任公
司清算小组)v. Liusheng (刘胜) (Wuhan Intermediate Court, 2006, No. 125), cited from ibid., 72. 
64 ibid., 77. 
65 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, “Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions 
Lessons From the Incomplete Law Theory,” ECGI-Law Working Paper, 2002, 168, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343480 (accessed on September 1, 2013). 
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‘structural transplant’ of fiduciary duties to China entails a fundamental 
institutional change in the lawmaking.  
China has a statute-based legal system in which statutes promulgated by the NPC 
is at the center.66 Also, the local congresses and the administrative authorities 
at both the state and local level are authorised to make secondary law.67 The 
decisions of the courts are not a formal source of law. Chinese courts are 
shackled in their discretion and there is no principle of stare decisis under 
Chinese law. This means that fiduciary duties cannot be clarified through 
precedents built up by the courts.  
However, despite the general lack of lawmaking power of the Chinese judiciary, 
the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) can shape law by issuing judicial 
interpretations,68 adjudicating cases and being involved in the statute-making 
process. In recent years, the SPC has gradually strengthened its lawmaking 
power by issuing cases that will guide decisions of the local courts. Since 1985, 
the SPC has published its decisions on its official Gazatte, as an guidance for 
local courts. However, they are refered to as “example case(anli 案例)” rather 
than and different from precedents under the common law and their authority is 
ambivalent.69 In 2005, the SPC started to establish a system of “guiding cases 
(zhi dao xing an li 指导性案例) to improve consistency of judicial decisions.70 
Under the Regulation on Cases Guiding issued by the SPC, it demanded that local 
courts should adjudicate according to the guiding cases.71 Therefore, guiding 
                                         
66 Constitution (promulgated in 1982, most recently amended in 2004), article 3. 
67 Legislation Law 2000, articles 56, 63, 71, 73. For detailed discussion on distribution of law-
making power between central and local governments in China, see 1.3.3. 
The rank of different types of law and regulations depend on the level of authorities that enact them, 
see Chenguang Wang, “Law-Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in a 
Country of Rapid Social Changes,” Frontiers of Law in China 1, no. 4 (2006): 524. 
68 Organic Law of the People’s Courts, article 32: “The Supreme People’s Court gives interpretation 
on questions concerning specific application of laws and decrees in judicial proceedings.” The 
judicial interpretation discussed here is different from that in the common law context, which 
refers to decisions made to specific cases.68 Rather, the SPC’s judicial interpretations are the 
general guidance for the courts in applying vague or complex law and therefore function more 
like statutory law. See Wang, “Law-Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in 
a Country of Rapid Social Changes,” 554 (above note 67). 
69 Cited from Chao Xi, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How Did We Get There?,” Journal of 
Business Law no. 5 (2011): 413, 417. 
70 Wang, “Law-Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in a Country of Rapid 
Social Changes,” 536-544 (above note 67). 
71 Regulation on Cases Guiding, article 7. 
Chapter 3 Creditor Protection Outside Insolvency 
 
 
144 
cases have greater authority than example cases and will play a more important 
role in shaping the Chinese legal system. 
The guiding case system can be seen as an extension of the SPC’s power of 
judicial interpretation and a tentative emulation of stare decisis.72 Through the 
guiding cases, the SPC can offer detailed guidance to local courts in many vague 
and difficult issues. With regard to fiduciary duties, further interpretation can 
be made on the duty of diligence, which is yet to specified. In addition, the SPC 
can absorb the interpretations of fiduciary duties by some local courts and make 
them binding on the whole judiciary. In a word, the SPC is making a change 
facilitative to the development of fiduciary duties. However, the judiciary needs 
to be further strengthened so that open-ended fiduciary duties can really play a 
part.  
At the same time, the over-reliance on the CSRC to enforce fiduciary duties 
should be ended. It has been observed that government agencies have the 
combined advantages of legislatures and courts in that they can make 
regulations to apply to prospective situations and enforce their regulation 
through issuing sanctions. However, they are also criticised for abuse of power, 
suppressing potentially beneficial actions and engaging in rent-seeking.73 In 
China where such problems are widespread it is imperative to curb the power of 
government agencies such as the CSRC.  
In summary, although China has introduced fiduciary duties into its company law, 
the development of fiduciary duties is impeded by the lack of judicial lawmaking 
power. Structural reform must take place before fiduciary duties can be really 
play their part in the Chinese context. The next section will discuss the absence 
of fiduciary duties in Chinese partnerships and consider whether it is necessary 
to extend fiduciary duties to Chinese partnerships, especially limited 
partnerships which have become a popular vehicle for private equity firms.  
                                         
72 Björn Ahl, “Retaining Judicial Professionalism: the New Guiding Cases Mechanism of the 
Supreme People's Court,” The China Quarterly 217 (2014): 121. 
73  Pistor and Xu, “Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions Lessons From the 
Incomplete Law Theory,” 13 (above note 65).   
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ii. Absence of Fiduciary Duties in Chinese Partnerships 
Unlike the company law, Chinese partnership law has not introduced the general 
duties of loyalty and diligence. Partners’ rights and duties to each other are 
mostly decided by the partnership agreement. The duties of partners provided 
by the partnership law are duty of information disclosure74 and duty of avoiding 
conflicts of interests.75  
As the limited partnership has become a popular vehicle for Chinese private 
equity firms, the strains on internal governance of limited partnerships have 
come to the fore. The absence of fiduciary duties compounded by other factors 
has led to a singular situation where limited partners are grappling for power in 
Chinese limited partnerships. Many limited partners are actively involved in the 
decision-making process of private equity funds and effectively control the fund. 
For example, limited partners of Donghai Venture Capital, the first limited 
partnership established in the city of Wenzhou, were effectively the ultimate 
decision-makers of the partnership.76 The highest decision making body of the 
partnership was the partnership’s meeting, which consisted of all partners. 
According to the partnership agreement, two-thirds vote was requisite for an 
investment decision to pass in the partnership’s meeting. As a capital 
contribution of 5 million RMB was entitled to one vote and the general partner 
had little capital contribution, the partnership’s investment strategy was 
effectively decided by limited partners. From the start the limited partners of 
Donghai had displayed great distrust to the general partner and the wariness to 
let others manage their money. Finally, the internal conflicts between limited 
partners and the general partner finally brought the partnership to a lackluster 
end.   
                                         
74 PEL 2006, article 28: “Where partnership affairs are managed by one or more partners, the 
managing partner(s) shall, at regular intervals, report to the other partners the state of 
management and business operations and the financial status of the partnership and the 
incomes derived from management of partnership affairs shall belong to the partnership and the 
expenses or losses entailed shall be borne by the partnership.”  
75 ibid., article 32: “No partner may, by himself or through cooperation with another person, engage 
in business in competition with the partnership in which he is a partner. No partner may conduct 
business transactions with the partnership in which he is a partner, unless otherwise stipulated 
in the partnership agreement or consented by all the partners. No person may engage in any 
activities that harm the interests of the partnership in which he is a partner.” 
76 Lin Lin, “Private Equity Limited Partnerships in China: a Critical Evaluation of Active Limited 
Partners,” Journal of Corporate Law Studies 13, no. 1 (2013): 185,194. 
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The story of Donghai has raised alarm for the whole Chinese private equity 
industry. Besides the absence of fiduciary duties, some other reasons have been 
cited to explain interference of limited partners. The first reason is that 
traditionally, Chinese do not have the practice to put one’s own property 
entirely into the care of others who are outside of the family. The absence of 
the “trust culture” also partly explains the ineffectuality of fiduciary duties in 
constraining directorial misbehaviour in the corporate context. Second, as 
indicated by a 2012 survey, 50.2% of Chinese limited partners are wealthy 
individuals and families, which tend to be more active and less risk-tolerant than 
institutional investors.77 China's fast economic growth has created a new 
generation of super rich who are eager to diversify their investments. At the 
same time, institutional investors in China, for example insurance companies, 
were previously barred from the equity investment market. Third, the scarcity 
of qualified general partners in the private industry has also contributed to 
emergence of active limited partners.78 As China's private equity industry is yet 
to mature, the lack of qualified general partners is not surprising. It has been 
found that few general partners in China have more than 10 years' experience in 
the private equity industry.  Finally, the absence of a national credit system 
means that reputation cannot adequately constrain general partners.79 
Active limited partners not only disrupt running of the limited partnership, but 
also can harm the interests of creditors. It is likely that creditors will regard 
active limited partners as general partners and presume them to be unlimitedly 
liable for the partnership’s debt. Chinese partnership prohibits limited partners 
from managing the affairs of the partnership, with a list of safe harbours that 
fall outside “managing”.80 However, this provision is unlikely to play a significant 
                                         
77 ibid., 199. 
78 ibid., 200. 
79 “Overlapping of Roles of LP and GP in China [Zhonguo LP Yu GP Jiaose Mohu],” pelawyers.cn, 
2008, http://www.pelawyers.cn/old/newshow.asp?id=1703 (accessed on December 1, 2014). 
80 PEL 2006, article 68: 
“A limited partner of a limited liability partnership shall not manage partnership affairs or represent 
the partnership in its relations with people outside the partnership. 
The following acts of a limited partner shall not be deemed to be management of partnership affairs: 
(1) to participate in deciding on a general partner’s entering into or retiring from the partnership; 
(2) to raise suggestions concerning the operation and management of the partnership; 
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role in constraining the activism of limited partners. First, there is no definition 
of “managing” and it is unclear whether the safe habour list is exhaustive. The 
experience of the US has demonstrated the difficulty of articulating a rule to 
segregate limited partners from management.81  
Second, the function of the “management rule” overlaps with the “estoppel 
rule”82 provided by the Chinese partnership law, which states that limited 
partners holding themselves out to third parties as general partners will be liable 
to such third parties for the partnership’s debts.83 Also, limited partners will be 
liable for the losses caused by unauthorised execution of the partnership’s 
affairs84.  
Last and most importantly, rather than the “management rule, the most crucial 
measure to curb limited partners’ over-activism in China is to impose fiduciary 
duties on general partners. In this way, limited partners’ interests will be 
protected through fiduciary duties and they will feel less need to vie for control 
in the partnership. As limited partners are in a position similar to corporate 
directors, they should be subject to duties equivalent to duties of loyalty and 
care provided by the Chinese company law.  
All in all, the rule that prohibits limited partners from management will not 
solve the internal conflicts within Chinese limited partnerships. A more 
                                                                                                                           
(3) to participate in the selection of a public accounting firm responsible for providing auditing 
services to the partnership; 
(4) to obtain the audited financial statements of the partnership; 
(5) where his personal interests are involved, to consult the financial materials of the partnership 
such as the accounting books; 
(6) when his interests in the partnership are infringed upon, to claim his rights from the partners 
who are liable or to initiate a lawsuit; 
(7) when the managing partners neglect to exercise their rights, to urge them to do so, or to initiate 
a lawsuit in his own name for the benefit of the partnership; and 
(8) to provide guaranty for the partnership according to law.” 
81 See 1.1.1 (iii). 
82 The estoppel rule in the limited partnership context means that if creditors of the partnership 
extend credit on the reasonable belief that the limited partner is in fact a general partner, the 
limited partner is estopped from denying personal liability to such creditors. See Carter G 
Bishop, “The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule Unwittingly 
Resurrected Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel Liability as Well as Full General Partner 
Liability?,” Suffolk UL Rev. 37 (2004): 677. 
83 PEL 2006, article 76. 
84 ibid., article 98. 
Chapter 3 Creditor Protection Outside Insolvency 
 
 
148 
fundamental solution is to introduce fiduciary duties to partnership law, which 
can be drafted drawing the experience of the Anglo-American law. Although 
fiduciary duties are developed by case law in the UK and US, in both countries 
there are statutory provisions regarding fiduciary duties, which can be 
instructive for China’s codification of fiduciary duties. 
Summary of 3.2 
In the UK and US, fiduciary duties are built by accumulation of case law. The 
essential feature of the principle of fiduciary duties is its open-endedness and 
flexibility due to the wide judicial discretion. Fiduciary duties exist in both 
corporate and partnership law, and they have also been transported to limited 
partnerships, LLPs and US LLCs. However, with the prevailing contractarian 
theory of the firm, which strongly advocates for freedom of contract, there is a 
trend that partnerships with limited liability will be exempt from fiduciary 
duties through contractual arrangement.  
In China, there is also regulatory asymmetry on fiduciary duties between 
corporations and partnerships. While corporate directors are subject to duties of 
loyalty and diligence, there are no such duties under the partnership law. Unlike 
the regulatory asymmetry in the US underpinned by heated theoretical debates, 
the regulatory asymmetry seems to be out of neglect rather than meaningful 
policy considerations. Due to the absence of effective mechanism for controlling 
general partners, limited partners in private equity partnerships in China are 
usually overly active, interfering with the running of the partnership. To give 
limited partners a sense of security, fiduciary duties should be introduced into 
Chinese partnership law through amendment of legislation.  
It needs to be pointed out that although China can emulate the UK and US by 
imposing duties on directors/partners, unlike the UK and US, China is a statute-
based country and the judiciary has limited discretion. Fundamental structural 
changes are essential for a successful emulation of UK-US law. First, the 
judiciary must be strengthened and given more discretion so that open-ended 
directorial duties can really play a part. At the same time, the rule of stare 
decisis can be emulated so that more coherent interpretation of fiduciary duties 
will be developed by the courts. Second, the legislature or the SPC must 
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formulate specific rules to guide the local courts in applying these duties. 
Otherwise, courts will be uncertain of their discretion and become reluctant in 
citing directorial duties, as demonstrated by the rarity of cases concerned duty 
of care, which remains unspecified under Chinese company law. Finally, the 
judiciary, instead of the governmental agency should be in charge of 
implementing fiduciary duties. The next section will move to the rule of veil-
piercing, which like fiduciary duties, is also open-ended and depends largely on 
the competence of the judiciary.  
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3.3 Piercing the Entity Veil  
The veil-piercing doctrine generally refers to the practice of the judiciary to 
disregard the separate legal personality of the corporation and hold shareholders 
liable for corporate debts. It becomes relevant to the discussion of creditor 
protection in partnerships with the introduction of limited liability into 
partnership law. As discussed above, limited liability encourages directors and 
partners to take excessive risks and behave opportunistically against creditors, 
particularly in private companies and partnerships which are often owner-
managed. 1  When all other measures of creditor protection have failed, piercing 
the entity veil will be the last resort for creditor protection.  
 
Unlike the UK and US where the veil-piercing doctrine was built through case law, 
China introduced a veil-piercing provision into its statutory law with the 
enactment of the Company Law in 2005. The veil-piercing provision has played 
an important role in the Chinese corporate context since it was first written into 
statutory law. However, it is rare to see any discussion on applying veil-piercing 
to partnerships.  
 
The purpose of this subchapter is to compare the UK-US veil-piercing principle 
with its Chinese equivalent and examine whether it is necessary and possible to 
extend the corporate veil-piercing rule to partnerships. In 3.3.1, the general 
picture of veil-piercing in the UK and US will be presented, and the theory and 
practice of applying veil-piercing to non-corporate entities will be discussed. In 
3.3.2, the development of the veil-piercing rule in China and the role of the 
Chinese judiciary in shaping this doctrine will be examined. It is worth noting 
that although the veil-piercing doctrine was not formally established in China 
until it was written into statute, the judiciary has played an instrumental role in 
its creation and development. Also, the issue of applying the veil-piercing 
provision to Chinese partnerships will be explored.  
 
                                         
1 See 2.2.2 (iii). 
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3.3.1 Veil Piercing in the UK and US 
i. UK-US Veil Piercing in the Corporate Context 
(a) Corporate Veil Piercing in the UK 
The veil-piercing doctrine developed by the common law courts exemplifies the 
fundamental role of the judiciary in remedying wrongs unforeseeable to 
legislators. As the opportunistic abuse of the corporate form has become more 
and more sophisticated over the time, legislators cannot foresee and forestall 
every instance of opportunism. Therefore, the judiciary developed the rule of 
piercing the corporate veil to disregard the separate personality of a corporation 
under specific circumstances and hold its controlling shareholders or directors 
liable for corporate liability. 
 
However, it is worth noting that piercing the corporate veil does not necessarily 
lead to piercing the limited liability shield of shareholders or directors. A British 
scholar has classified the common instances of piercing the corporate veil (or 
lifting the corporate veil, as it is called in the UK) into peeping behind the veil, 
penetrating the veil, extending the veil, and ignoring the veil.2 Peeping behind 
the veil is used by the judiciary to obtain information about the controllers of 
the company and will not necessarily result in personal liability of shareholders 
or directors. Penetrating the veil, on the other hand, is the judicial practice of 
reaching beyond the corporate veil and imposing liability on controlling 
shareholders/directors for the company's acts. Extending the veil is when a 
corporate veil is extended to other corporations within a corporate group, 
namely, a group of companies is regarded as a single going concern. Finally, 
there is ignoring the veil, which is the most severe type of veil-piercing. The 
judiciary will ignore the corporate veil when it finds that the company is formed 
to defraud creditors or to circumvent law. The result is that shareholders will be 
liable for the company's debts. Besides these four types of veil-piercing cases, 
there is reverse veil piercing, a special form of veil piercing used to hold the 
                                         
2 Smadar Ottolenghi, “From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring It Completely,” The 
Modern L. Rev. 53, no. 3 (1990): 338, 340. 
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company liable for debts of its shareholders.3 Related to the concerns for the 
risks of limited liability, the discussion on veil piercing in this article will focus 
on the judicial practice of stripping the corporate veil to attribute a 
corporation’s liabilities to its shareholders. 
 
Although there are lots of cases compiled under the title of piercing the 
corporate veil, neither the UK nor the US has established an overarching theory 
of veil piercing, and the application remains open-ended and fact-based. This 
causes the veil piercing doctrine to be one of the most confusing in corporate 
law. Some have even commented that it “seems to happen freakishly. Like 
lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.”4 The following discussion will not 
attempt to present a thorough explanation of the veil piercing theories in the US 
and the UK, but it will consider the most significant ones. 
 
In Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd.,5 a milestone in British company law, it was 
confirmed that even small businesses can take advantage of the separate 
personality and limited liability provided by the corporate form.6 The separate 
personality established by Salomon became so entrenched in English law that it 
is rare for English courts to disregard the corporate legal personality or to lift 
the corporate veil. Subsequent courts have shown a high deference to Salomon 
and steadfast adherence to the doctrines of separate personality and limited 
liability. The result is that not only can individuals shield their risks by 
incorporating their business but a company can also limit its liability by setting 
up subsidiaries.7 
 
However, there are exceptional situations where the courts feel compelled to 
disregard the separate personality of a company. The main test that the UK 
courts developed for piercing the corporate veil is the "façade" or "sham" test. 
This test is the most developed reason for veil piercing in the UK. It has been 
                                         
3 See D Cabrelli, “The Case Against Outsider Reverse Veil Piercing,” Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 10, no. 2 (2010): 343. 
4 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 
52 (1985): 89. 
5 [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
6 For detailed discussion on Salomon, see 2.1.1. 
7 Daniel D Prentice, “Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the United 
Kingdom,” Conn. J. Int'l L. 13 (1998): 305, 309. 
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constantly reasserted that the courts will prevent the corporation from being 
used for purposes of fraud or evasion of contractual or other legal obligations.8 
Two leading cases can give an illustration of how the courts will apply this test. 
In Gilford Motor Co. Ltd v Horne,9 the defendant set up a new company through 
which he solicited customers from his former employer, allegedly in 
contravention of his contractual obligations not to solicit customers from his 
former employer. Finding that the company was "formed as a device, a 
stratagem, in order to mask the effect carrying on of a business of Mr. EB 
Horne,"10 the Court of Appeal pierced the corporate veil and issued an injunction 
against the defendant and his company. In Jones v. Lipman,11 the defendant sold 
a property to a company he owned and controlled for the purpose of 
circumventing his contractual obligation to sell the property to the plaintiff. 
Based on the observation that the company failed to observe formalities and had 
no share capital or any physical premise, the court concluded that the company 
was "the creature of the first defendant, a device and a sham, a mask which he 
holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of 
equity,"12 and then ordered specific performance against the defendant and the 
sham company.  
 
Besides the façade test, the British courts have formulated some special tests in 
corporate group settings. The first one is the agency test articulated in Smith, 
Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corp.13 In this case, a parent company claimed 
compensation for business disturbance after its subsidiary’s estate was 
compulsorily purchased. Judge Atkinson developed a six-prong test to determine 
whether the subsidiary was acting as the agent of its parent company.14 Relying 
on the test, the court held that the subsidiary was actually carrying on business 
of its parent company, and therefore the latter was the real occupier of the 
                                         
8 Jennifer Payne, “Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception,” The 
Cambridge LJ (1997): 284, 284; M T Moore, “A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations: Piercing 
the Corporate Veil and the Legacy of Salomon v Salomon,” Journal of Business Law (2006): 
180, 182. The façade test is also referred to as “fraud” by Payne and some other scholars.  
9 [1933] Ch 935 (CA). 
10 ibid., 969. 
11 [1962] 1 All ER 442 (Ch). 
12 ibid., 445. 
13 [1939] 4 All ER 116 (KB). 
14 ibid., 121. 
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estate and had entitlement to the compensation. However, this test was rarely 
used by subsequent courts because of the exceptional factual circumstances of 
this case.15 
 
Another test invented by the UK courts to disregard the separate personality 
when corporate groups are concerned is the “single economic unit” theory. 
Decades after Smith, Stone and Knight, the question of whether a parent 
company could claim for governmental compensation for losses suffered by its 
subsidiary resurfaced in DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v Tower Hamlets London 
Borough Council.16 In this case, Lord Denning, a leading judge in the twentieth 
century, proposed the "single economic unit" theory to determine whether a 
group of companies should be treated as the same entity under the law. The gist 
of the theory is that the separate legal personality of subsidiaries should be 
ignored if they are “bound hand and foot to the parent company and must do 
just what the parent company says.”17 Despite following a different line of 
reasoning from Smith, Stone and Knight, this case also ended with a veil-
piercing decision, allowing the parent company to be the appropriate claimant 
of governmental compensation. The “single economic theory” was subject to 
wide criticism because of its vagueness and a flaw in its reasoning. Under the 
“single economic unit” theory, all wholly owned subsidiaries will face the risk of 
losing their separate legal personality, since this theory identified control by the 
parent company as the primary ground for piercing the corporate veil of 
subsidiaries.18  
 
As a matter of fact, both the agency test and the single economic theory have 
been largely ignored since their first appearance. When considering the liability 
of individual shareholders as well as corporate shareholders, the UK courts 
usually stick to the façade test. Later in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional 
Council,19 Lord Keith observed in opposition to the reasoning in DHN that the 
                                         
15 Moore, “A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations: Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Legacy of 
Salomon v Salomon,” 183 (above note 8). 
16 [1976] 3 All ER 462 (CA). 
17 ibid., 467. 
18 T K Cheng, “The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: a Comparative Study of the English and the 
US Corporate Veil Doctrines,” BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 34, no. 2 (2011): 329, 403. 
19 [1978] SC90 (HL). 
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corporate veil could only be pierced when the corporation was used as "a mere 
façade concealing the true facts."20  
 
The authority of the façade test was further acknowledged in the leading case of 
Adams v. Cape Industries plc,21 which concerned whether a judgment relating to 
asbestos injuries made by a US court should be enforced against a UK company 
(Cape Industries plc) and its subsidiary (Capasco). The pivotal issue was whether 
the UK company had presence in the US through two subsidiaries (AMC and 
CPC). Three arguments had been considered and rejected by the court in 
deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil and regard the UK company and its 
subsidiaries as the same entity. The first was the single economic unit theory. 
On examination of the factual aspects of the case, the court found it 
indisputable that Cape and its subsidiaries were separate legal entities in law. It 
also distinguished the circumstances of DHN from Adams on the ground that in 
DHN the corporate veil was pierced so that the true owner of the company could 
claim for compensation. In rejecting the application of the single economic unit 
theory to Adams, the court stated that it would not disregard the principle in 
Salomon “merely because it considered it just to do so” and said that it was 
“concerned not with economics but with law. The distinction between the two is, 
in law, fundamental and cannot here be bridged.”22 
 
Next, the court moved to consider the façade test in Woolfson, which was “one 
well-recognised exception to the rule prohibiting the piercing of the corporate 
veil.”23 The court stated that it would only lift the veil when the defendant used 
the corporate structure to evade existing legal obligations or liabilities.24 The 
court found that Cape set up subsidiaries to carry out its sales in the US and 
concealed its connections with them. However, the arrangements did not involve 
any actual or potential illegality and were not intended to deprive anyone of 
their existing rights. The court added that it was entirely appropriate for the 
defendant company to use the corporate structure to limit future liability, since 
                                         
20 ibid., 96. 
21 [1991] 1 All ER 929 (Ch). 
22 ibid., 1020. 
23 ibid., 1022.  
24 ibid., 1026. 
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“the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is inherent in our 
corporate law.”25 
 
The last argument raised was agency. On this point, the court found that 
although CPC acted on behalf of Cape under some circumstances, it could not be 
established that there was an agency relationship between the two without an 
express agreement. The court concluded that Cape was carrying on its own 
businesses and Cape did not have presence in the US through it.26 
 
In distinguishing appropriate uses of the corporate form to limit potential 
liabilities from malicious and dishonest evasions of preexisting liabilities,27 the 
Adams case has set a high bar for piercing the corporate veil. It stresses the 
façade test as the only accepted test for veil piercing. Furthermore, it restricts 
the application of the façade test to evasion of preexisting liabilities, namely 
where the company is established specifically to shield shareholders from their 
preexisting liability, as exemplified by Gilford Motor and Jones.28  
 
The decision in Adams prohibits tort victims from reaching the parent company 
of the corporate tortfeasor and runs counter to intuitive notions of justice. On 
closer examination, it is also theoretically problematic, as it fails to specify any 
standards to determine what are preexisting liabilities. Although one of the 
subsidiaries of Cape was formed after asbestos injuries occurred, the court 
concluded that there were no preexisting liabilities.29 The court seemed to 
assume that a legal obligation exists only when it is established. It has been 
argued by a scholar that during the long lapse between occurrence and 
establishment of legal liabilities, many opportunistic measures can be taken to 
evade liabilities. Therefore, “the best rule seems to be that a legal obligation is 
incurred when the event that gives rise to potential liability takes place, and the 
                                         
25 ibid., 1026. 
26 ibid., 1027-1030. 
27 Moore, “A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations: Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Legacy of 
Salomon v Salomon,” 184 (above note 8). 
28 Payne, “Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception”, 287-288 (above 
note 8). 
29 Cheng, “The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: A Comparative Study of the English and the US 
Corporate Veil Doctrines”, 369 (above note 18). 
Chapter 3 Creditor Protection Outside Insolvency 
 
 
157 
company knows, or has reason to know, that the event may expose it to 
liability.”30 
 
Following the reasoning in Adams, the UK Supreme Court distinguished pre-
existing obligations from future ones in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd in 2013.31 
In this case, Mrs. Prest applied to transfer several properties registered to seven 
offshore companies that were owned and controlled by Mr. Prest, in order to 
satisfy part of a divorce settlement. The Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Prest's 
argument for piercing the corporate veil. 
 
In considering the arguments for piercing the corporate veil, the Supreme Court 
reasserted that the veil could only be pierced in exceptional circumstances, 
namely, when a person was using the company under his control to evade an 
existing legal obligation or liability. By this standard, the principle of veil-
piercing can only apply to limited circumstances because “in almost every case 
where the test is satisfied, the facts will in practice disclose a legal relationship 
between the company and its controller which will make it unnecessary to 
pierce the corporate veil…. If it is not necessary to pierce the corporate veil, it 
is not appropriate to do so….”32 
 
Based on the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Prest 
incorporated the offshore companies long before the breakdown of the marriage 
and that they were intended for wealth protection and tax avoidance rather 
than to evade Mrs. Prest's matrimonial claims.33 Therefore, the court decided 
not to pierce the corporate veil. However, it effectively ordered the transfer of 
the properties by concluding that they were held in trust for Mrs. Prest.34 By this 
decision, the Supreme Court seemed to encourage courts to look for alternative 
                                         
30 Cheng, “The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: A Comparative Study of the English and the US 
Corporate Veil Doctrines”, 370 (above note 18). 
31 [2012] EWCA Civ 1395, [2013] UKSC 34. 
32 ibid., at para 35.  
33 ibid., at para 36. Also see Christopher Hare, “Family Division, 0; Chancery Division, 1: Piercing 
the Corporate Veil in the Supreme Court (Again),” The Cambridge LJ 72, no. 3 (2013): 511, 513. 
34 ibid., at para 55.  
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solutions in other well-established principles under English law rather than to 
use the broad and unpredictable veil-piercing rule.35 
 
To summarise, as the case that encapsulates the contemporary judicial stance 
on veil piercing in the UK, Adams has restricted the application of veil-piercing 
to very limited circumstances. Since Adams, the façade test, defined as using 
the company to evade preexisting duties, seems to have become the only ground 
for veil piercing in the UK. Further, as demonstrated by Prest, the courts are 
inclined to look for alternative solutions rather than to use the veil-piercing rule.  
 
(b) Corporate Veil Piercing in the US as Compared with UK 
In contrast to the reluctance to use the veil-piercing rule by the UK courts, the 
US courts seem to be more willing to exercise their discretion in veil piercing in 
order to achieve justice. In the US, veil piercing is the most litigated issue in 
corporate law.36 An empirical study carried out by Thompson in 1990 found that 
US courts upheld over 40% of the veil-piercing claims,37 and this result was 
confirmed by another study by Oh in 2010.38 
 
The most cited factors by US courts in veil-piercing cases include: (1) fraud or 
injustice; (2) failure to comply with corporate formalities, such as failures to 
keep records of shareholder or director meetings; (3) undercapitalisation of a 
company; and (4) improper domination of an entity described by the courts as 
instrumentality or alter ego.39 This list is non-exhaustive because, as in the UK, 
the US judiciary has failed to develop an overarching and consistent rule of veil 
                                         
35 Wayne McArdle and Gareth Jones, “Prest v. Petrodel Resources and VTB Capital v. Nutritek: A 
Robust Corporate Veil,” Bus. L. Int'l 14 (2013): 295, 297. 
36 Robert B Thompson, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,” Cornell L. Rev. 76 (1990): 
1036. 
37 ibid. 
38 P B Oh, “Veil-Piercing,” Texas L. Rev. 89, no. 1 (2010): 91. 
39 R J Huss, “Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law 
Doctrine Into the Statutory Age,” U. of Cinclinati  L. Rev. 70 (2001): 95, 112. 
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piercing. The veil-piercing law in the US has been described to be “enveloped in 
the mists of metaphor.”40 
 
Some US courts have attempted to construct a comprehensive test for veil 
piercing around the notion of “instrumentality” or the “alter ego.” The 
instrumentality theory was first articulated by Judge Powel in 1931 to address 
the liability of a parent corporation for its subsidiaries,41 but it is also cited in 
cases concerned with individual shareholders. The most authoritative statement 
of the instrumentality test is found in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.,42 
which declared that a corporation would be regarded as an instrumentality if 
three elements could be found: First, the corporation had no independent 
existence due to control of the defendant. Second, the defendant used such 
control to commit fraud, wrong or other breaches of the plaintiff's legal rights. 
Third, the injury of the plaintiff was proximately caused by the aforesaid 
"control and breach of duty." Sometimes the US courts use “agency” as a 
synonym for instrumentality, although it does not mean the same thing as the 
agency relationship under the common law.43 
 
As the instrumentality test is apt to slide into vagueness and unpredictability, 
some US courts instead adopt a "laundry list" approach, under which they take 
into consideration various weighted factors. These factors include gross 
undercapitalisation, nonobservance of formalities, non-payment of dividends, 
non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and 
“the fact that the corporation is merely a façade for the operations of the 
dominant stockholder or stockholders.”44 The laundry list approach cannot be 
said to be a better alternative to the instrumentality test due to the uncertainty 
                                         
40 Justice Cardozo used this phrase in Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926), 
cited in C S Krendt and J R Krendl, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry,” Denv. LJ 
55 (1978): 1, 7. 
41 Frederick Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations: Liability of a Parent Corporation for the 
Obligations of Its Subsidiary, (Chicago: Callaghan, 1931). 
 Cited from C S Krendt and J R Krendl, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry,” Denv. 
LJ 55 (1978): 1, 1. 
42 Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936). 
43 Ottolenghi, “From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring it Completely,” 345 (above note 
2). 
44 DeWitt v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).  
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over the weight of each factor, the variance of the list in different cases,45 and 
the absence of a principled approach to assessing the factors on the list.  
 
Despite the apparent divergence in their approaches, courts in the UK and US 
have showed convergence in their reasoning and even language in cases involving 
veil piercing. Under the case law in both the US and UK, the concepts of façade, 
instrumentality, or alter ego imply not only control of a company but also using 
the company for an unjustified purpose.46 Control of the company is not 
adequate for piercing the veil and imposing personal liability on directors or 
controlling shareholders. This is reasonable because if control becomes the only 
condition to pierce the corporate veil, shareholders of private companies and 
parents of wholly owned subsidiaries, who are usually active in the management, 
will all be exposed to unlimited liability. Therefore, use of control for a wrongful 
purpose is the ultimate test for abuse of corporate form.  
 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by empirical studies, the UK and US courts have 
demonstrated similar patterns in their veil piercing decisions. First, it has been 
found that all veil-piercing cases in both the UK and US involve private 
companies, and no veil of public companies has ever been pierced.47 This is 
consistent with the theory that limited liability is more justified in public 
companies than private companies.48 Second, empirical studies have also found 
that in both the UK and US, contractual claims are more likely to cause veil 
piercing than tort claims.49 This finding is in conflict with the theoretical analysis 
because compared with contractual creditors, tort creditors are more likely to 
                                         
45 See DeWitt v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976); Lowendahl v. Baltimore 
& O.R. Co., 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936); Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 
1978); Walkovszkyv. Carlton, 223N.E2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). For a discussion of these cases, see 
Sandra K Miller, “Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European 
Community and in the US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German, and UK Veil-Piercing 
Approaches,” American Business LJ 36, no. 1 (1998): 73, note 224. 
46 D J Morrissey, “Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business 
Order,” Journal of Corporation Law 32, no. 3 (2007): 530–562, 562. 
47 Thompson, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,” 1047 (above note 36); Oh, “Veil-
Piercing,” 144 (above note 36). 
48 See 2.2.2 (iii). 
49 J Freedman, “Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms,” The Modern L. Rev. 63, 
no. 3 (2000): 343; Thompson, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,” 1058; Oh, 
“Veil-Piercing,” 144 (above note 36). 
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suffer from excessive risk taking and shareholder opportunism, as they cannot 
protect themselves by contract.50  
 
The major difference between veil-piercing cases in the UK and US is that veil-
piercing decisions are rarer in the UK. In other words, the UK courts are more 
likely to adhere to the principles of separate legal personality and limited 
liability established by Salomon. One implication of this is that the UK courts are 
more scrupulous than their US counterparts in citing the open-ended “justice” as 
the rationale for veil piercing. In the US, justice has been recognised by the 
courts as the paramount goal being considered in veil-piercing cases. For 
example, in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway,51 Justice Cardozo remarked that 
when the degree of control failed to establish a subsidiary was the agent of its 
parent corporation, the court would turn to the test of justice. In contrast, the 
UK courts are reluctant to give justice a decisive role in veil piercing cases. 
Although in some cases, the UK courts have referred to “justice” in their 
decisions,52 the House of Lords unequivocally stated in Adams that it would not 
pierce the corporate veil merely because it considered it just to do so.53  
 
The relative unwillingness of UK courts to strip away the corporate veil 
demonstrates a divergence of the judicial role in the UK and the US. While the 
former usually follows its tradition of judicial deference and assumes a more 
formalistic pattern in its decisions,54 the latter plays a more active role in 
shaping legal rules.  Another reason that may explain the rarity of veil-piercing 
cases in the UK is that the UK insolvent law already provides for many 
circumstances under which personal liability will be imposed on directors and 
                                         
50 See 2.2.2 (ii). 
51 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926). 
52 In Re A Company Ltd. [1985] BCLC 333 (CA), the court observed that the court would pierce the 
corporate veil "if it is necessary to achieve justice irrespective of the legal efficiency of the 
corporate structure." In Creasey v. Breachwood Motors [1993] BCLC 480 (QB), the court stated 
that it would exercise the power of veil-piercing to achieve justice. However, the decision in 
Creasey was later overruled by Ord & Anorv. Belhaven Pubs [1998] B.C.C. 607 (A.C.). For a 
discussion of these cases, see Miller, “Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies 
in the European Community and in the US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German, and UK 
Veil-Piercing Approaches,” 114 (above note 45). 
53 See the above section discussing Adams. 
54 Prentice, “Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the United Kingdom”, 322 
(above note 7).  
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shareholders, like the fraudulent and wrongful trading provisions that will also 
apply to LLP members.55 
 
In summary, the veil-piercing doctrine has been developed by the judiciary in 
both the UK and US. In order to achieve justice, judges have used their 
discretion to decide what constitutes the proper circumstances for veil piercing. 
The result is that the veil-piercing doctrine seems to be exercised in an erratic 
and inconsistent way. The next section will focus on the US practice of piercing 
the veil of partnerships, as the US courts are more willing to exercise veil 
piercing than their UK counterparts and have already applied it in the non-
corporate context. 
 
ii. Extending Veil Piercing to Partnerships with Limited Liability 
In both LLPs and limited partnerships under the Anglo-American law, there are 
exceptions to the liability shield, which can be viewed as the functional 
equivalents of the veil-piercing rule in the corporate setting.56 First, in limited 
partnerships, limited partners will lose their liability shield if they take part in 
the control of the business.57 Second, a partner of an LLP will not be shielded 
from the liability caused by her own misconduct and neglect. In the US, LLP acts 
usually provide that partners are also liable for the conduct of those under their 
direct control or supervision.58 In the UK, the member who directly causes a 
debt can be held liable through a tort action,59 while other members will be 
required to contribute to the LLP’s assets if their withdrawal of capital has 
rendered the LLP insolvent.60 
 
Given these exceptions to limited liability in partnerships, the question arises as 
to whether it is necessary to introduce corporate-style veil piercing into these 
entities. In the UK, there are few arguments for applying veil-piercing to 
                                         
55 Fraudulent and wrongful trading provisions are provided for in IA 1986, ss 213, 214. Its 
application to LLP is mandated by UK LLP Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090). For more 
discussion on fraudulent and wrongful trading, see 4.3.1. 
56 For detailed discussion of liability rule of partnerships with limited liability, see 1.2.2 (ii).  
57 LPA 1907, s 6. 
58 J S Naylor, “Is the Limited Liability Partnership Now the Entity of Choice for Delaware Law Firms,” 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 24 (1999): 145,149. 
59 LLPA 2000, Explanatory Notes. 
60 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214A. 
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partnerships with limited liability. It is also unlikely for the UK courts to extend 
veil piercing to partnerships, considering their circumspection in applying this 
rule. In the US, it has been argued that the liability shield of limited 
partnerships, LLPs, and LLCs has become similar to that of corporations. 
Therefore, it is necessary to extend the veil-piercing doctrine to these entities, 
or else there will be a great regulatory asymmetry between corporate and non-
corporate entities.61 The counter-argument is that partnerships and LLCs are of 
contractarian origins and should embody freedom of contract with minimum 
state interference.62 However, on closer examination, there are valid grounds 
for applying veil piercing to limited partnerships, LLPs, and LLCs, and in practice, 
some US courts have already pierced the veil of non-corporate entities that have 
extensive liability shields. Here, discussions will be made on each of these 
entities.  
 
In US limited partnerships, there is still the principle that limited partners will 
lose their liability shield if they take part in the control of the business. 
Although the ULPA 2001 has abolished the control rule,63 many states have not 
adopted this version of the model law. Therefore, in these states, the control 
rule will still be one way in which limited partners may be held liable for 
partnership debts. Also, the estoppel rule under the common law can continue 
to constrain limited partners. The estoppel rule in the limited partnership 
context dictates that if creditors of the partnership extend credit on the 
reasonable belief that the limited partner is in fact a general partner, the 
limited partner is estopped from denying personal liability to such creditors. 
While the ULPA 2001 eliminates the control rule, it does not abolish the estoppel 
rule.64  
 
                                         
61 Morrissey, “Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business Order” 
(above note 46). 
62 Cohen, “Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and 
Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities 
Regulation for the Limited Liability Company” (above note 38). 
63 ULPA (2001) § 303. 
64 Carter G Bishop, “The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule 
Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel Liability as Well as Full General 
Partner Liability?,” Suffolk UL Rev. 37, no. 667 (2004): 677. 
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Although there are already rules restricting the liability shield of limited 
partners, the veil-piercing doctrine is necessary for US limited partnerships. First, 
there are states that have abolished the control rule and give limited partners a 
liability shield almost equivalent to that of corporate shareholders. Second, 
general partners of limited partnerships should also be subject to the veil-
piercing doctrine if they obtain limited liability protection. Although 
traditionally general partners assume unlimited liability, some US states have 
adopted the new form of limited liability limited partnership (LLLP), in which all 
partners have limited liability protection.65 Finally, even when state law does 
not provide for the LLLP, the real controller of the limited partnership can 
obtain limited liability by setting up a corporation to act as the general partner. 
In this way, the real controller is protected by the limited liability shield of the 
corporation. This form of arrangement is common in the private equity setting. 
For such limited partnerships, the veil-piercing doctrine can be used against its 
corporate general partner to hold the real controller, who stands behind the 
corporation, to be liable for the partnership debts when there are circumstances 
of abuse.   
 
In the US, the scope of limited liability protection of partners of LLPs has been 
extended from tort liability caused by malpractice to ordinary business debts in 
many states.66 However, even under such a wide shield of liability, the liability 
of partners of LLPs is not unrestricted. Partners are liable for their own 
negligence and misconduct as well as the conduct of those under their direct 
control or supervision.67 The supervision or control exception is consistent with 
Rule 5.1 (c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the 
American Bar Association,68 which states that: 
 
“A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct if: 
                                         
65 See 1.1.1 (iii).  
66 See  1.1.1 (ii). 
67 Naylor, “Is the Limited Liability Partnership Now the Entity of Choice for Delaware Law Firms,” 
157 (above note 58). 
68 Model Rules of Professional Conduct was adopted by the American Bar Association in 1983 and 
has been adopted by most states. It is available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pro
fessional_conduct.html (accessed on May 3, 2013).  
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(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, 
ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in 
the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct 
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct 
at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails 
to take reasonable remedial action.” 
 
Furthermore, this supervision or control exception has been confirmed by 
judicial practice in the US.69 In a New York case, Lewis v. Rosenfeld,70 the court 
confirmed that LLP partners would not be held liable just because of their 
membership in the LLP. The plaintiff sued the partners of a law firm on the basis 
that a partner's advice induced him to make a loan to a borrower who failed to 
repay. The court observed that under the New York LLP statute, LLP partners 
were not liable for the liabilities of the partnership, including tort and contract 
liabilities, and the only grounds to hold individual partners liable were the 
liabilities incurred by themselves or those under their direct control or 
supervision.  
 
In a Connecticut case, Kus v. Irving,71 the plaintiff attempted to sue the lawyer 
(Irving) who directly represented her and the two other lawyers in the LLP law 
firm. The court decided that the two innocent partners shared no benefit in the 
fee received by Irving and did not have supervision or control of Irving. 
Therefore, they were not responsible for the liability caused by the actions of 
Irving.  
 
Besides the statutory exceptions to the liability shield, US case law has indicated 
that it is also possible for partners of LLPs to lose their limited liability when the 
court decides to apply the veil-piercing doctrine to the LLP. For example, 
in Middlemist v. BDO Seidman,72 the plaintiff sought to hold her supervisor 
personally liable for breach of her employment contract on the ground that her 
                                         
69 Kelly L Jones, “Law Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships: Determining the Scope of the Liability 
Shield: A Shield of Steel or Silk,” Duq. Bus. LJ 7 (2005): 7, 21. 
70 736 A.2d 946, 947 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999). 
71 736 A.2d 946, 947 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).  
72 958 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). 
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supervisor was responsible for the LLP's personnel policies. The court observed 
that “[a] party seeking to hold a partner of a limited liability partnership 
personally liable for alleged improper actions of the partnership must proceed 
as if attempting to pierce the corporate veil.” However, the court did not 
articulate how to apply veil piercing to LLPs and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim 
on the ground the personnel policies were policies of the LLP, not of the 
supervisor. 
 
Unlike limited partnership statutes and LLP statutes, most LLC statues are silent 
on when the liability shield will be disregarded. The language of LLC statutes of 
different states vary on the liability shield. However, under all statutes, passive 
investors of LLCs have a liability shield similar to corporate shareholders, and 
active participants are shielded from liability caused by acts of others.73 As the 
LLC has the liability shield that most resembles that of a corporation, US courts 
are more ready to apply the corporate veil-piercing doctrine to LLCs than to 
other non-corporate entities. In a case in 1997, Ditty v. CheckRite,74 piercing the 
veil of an LLC was requested by a plaintiff for the first time.75 Since then until 
August 5, 2005, the number of rulings on LLC veil piercing has reached sixty-
one.76  
 
In Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive,77 a widely-cited Wyoming case, the court 
considered the question whether to pierce the veil of an LLC and hold its 
managing member liable for environmental damage caused by the LLC. In 
deciding this question, the court commented: “We can discern no reason, in 
either law or policy, to treat LLCs differently than we treat corporations. If the 
members and officers of an LLC fail to treat it as a separate entity as 
contemplated by statute, they should not enjoy immunity from individual 
                                         
73 Robert B Thompson, “The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities,” Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 32 (1997): 1, 21. 
74 973 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Utah 1997). 
75 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, “Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge,” J. Corp. 
L. 31 (2005): 1603. 
76 ibid., 1608. 
77 46 P.3d 323 (Wyo. 2002). This judicial opinion is available at 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/200236946P3d323_1366.xml/KAYCEE%20LAND%20AND%20
LIVESTOCK%20v.%20FLAHIVE (accessed on 3 July, 2014) 
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liability for the LLC's acts that cause damage to third parties.”78 However, the 
court acknowledged that “the various factors which would justify piercing an 
LLC veil would not be identical to the corporate situation for the obvious reason 
that many of the organizational formalities applicable to corporations do not 
apply to LLCs. The LLC's operation is intended to be much more flexible than a 
corporation's.”79 
 
An empirical study in 2005 has confirmed that the veil-piercing case law of LLCs 
shows traits similar to that of corporations, despite the fact that the likelihood 
of veil-piercing is slightly lower in the LLC cases.80 First, all veil-piercing 
decisions have been made against closely held LLCs and not publicly traded LLCs. 
Second, it is more likely for the courts to pierce the veil of LLCs in contract 
cases than tort cases.  
 
All in all, the theoretical analysis and judicial practice in the US has confirmed 
that the veil-piercing doctrine can be applied to partnerships with limited 
liability. However, as stated by the court in Kaycee Land & Livestock, the factors 
that lead to veil-piercing decisions should be different in the cases of corporate 
and non-corporate entities. Accordingly, the courts have to modify the corporate 
veil-piercing theory according to the characteristics of partnerships with limited 
liability. First, undercapitalization and non-compliance with formalities will be 
less relevant in the partnership context, as LLCs and partnerships are not 
generally subject to the stringent capital requirements and formality rules.81 For 
example, lack of legal capital should not be grounds for piercing the veil of 
professional firms, as they are usually thinly capitalised. Instead, lack of 
professional insurance can be a factor considered for veil-piercing decisions 
against professional firms. Second, the two basic elements of veil-piercing — 
control and use of control for a wrongful purpose — will have disproportionate 
weight in cases regarding partnerships with limited liability. As owners of LLCs 
and partnerships are usually involved in the management, the control element 
                                         
78 ibid., 328. 
79 ibid., 329. 
80 Rapp, “Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge,” 1077 (above note 75). 
81 Morrissey, “Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business Order,” 
559 (above note 46). 
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itself does not imply abuse, and veil piercing should depend on discovering of a 
wrongful purpose.  
 
To summarise, in the US, the corporate veil-piercing doctrine has already been 
applied to partnerships with limited liability. The next section will turn to the 
statutory veil-piercing rule in China and compare it with the veil-piercing rule 
under Anglo-American law. Then it will discuss whether it is necessary and 
possible to apply the corporate veil-piercing rule to Chinese partnerships.  
 
3.3.2 Veil Piercing in China 
i. Judicial Role and Development of Corporate Veil-Piercing in China 
The article 20 of the Chinese Company Law 2005 states: “Where the shareholder 
of a company abuses the independent status of the company as a legal person or 
the limited liability of shareholders, evades debts and thus seriously damages 
the interests of the creditors of the company, he shall assume joint and several 
liability for the debts of the company.” This provision is generally regarded as 
the statutory equivalent to the veil-piercing doctrine in the UK and US. To 
highlight the particularity of the Chinese veil-piercing rule, here a discussion will 
be made on its development.  
 
(a) Judicial Interpretations Before the Promulgation of Statutory Veil Piercing 
Although the veil-piercing doctrine in China is not developed through case law as 
in the UK and US, the judiciary, especially the SPC, has played an instrumental 
role in its development. Before the veil-piercing provision was written into 
Chinese company law, the SPC had already begun to formulate rules to curb the 
abuse of the corporate form. It is true that there is no system of stare decisis in 
China and therefore courts cannot make law by establishing precedents. 
However, the SPC is exceptional as it can shape law by issuing judicial 
interpretations,82 adjudicating cases, and being involved in the statute-making 
                                         
82 Organic Law of the People’s Courts, article 32.  
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process.83 The development of the veil-piercing doctrine in China is evidence to 
this point.  
 
In the case of the veil-piercing doctrine, before it was introduced into statutory 
law with the promulgation of the Company Law 2005, the SPC had issued three 
judicial interpretations that had in fact provided for circumstances of veil 
piercing. Under the Company Law 1993, a corporation as an autonomous legal 
person liable to its own debts with its own assets.84 The entity status provided 
by the Company Law 1993 was essential for  SOEs to transform from government 
affiliates to modern companies. However, very soon cases of abusing the 
corporate form began to emerge. In response to the requests of the lower courts, 
the SPC issued judicial interpretations regarding the conditions under which a 
corporation would lose its separate personality and incur liability for its 
shareholders. The first one was issued in 199485 to address the liability of a 
parent company that failed to meet the minimum capital requirement when 
setting up a new company. The capital contributed by shareholders to a 
company is called “registered capital” under the Company Law 1993, as 
shareholders must pay in full the requisite capital before they can register a 
company. To strengthen the minimum capital requirement, the interpretation in 
1994 provided that if the parent company failed to pay in full the registered 
capital required of its wholly owned subsidiary, it would be liable for the 
shortfall between the paid-up capital and the requisite capital. Also, if the 
parent company did not contribute any capital to its subsidiary, the subsidiary's 
separate legal personality would be disregarded, and its parent would be held 
liable for its debts.  
 
In 2001, the SPC started to apply the veil-piercing rule to constrain transfers of 
corporate assets within a corporate group. In a judicial interpretation issued by 
                                         
83 For detailed discussion on the lawmaking power of the SPC, see 3.3.2 (i).   
84 Company Law 1993, article 3. 
85  Reply on the Assumption of Civil Liability after Enterprises Established by An Enterprise Have 
Been Closed Down or Have Terminated Business Operation 1994 [关于审理与企业改制相关的
民事纠纷案件若干问题的规定 Guanyu Qiye Kaiban de Qita Qiye bei Chexiao Huozhe Xieye hou 
Minshi Zeren Chengdan Wenti de Pifu]. See Chao Xi, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: 
How Did We Get There?,” Journal of Business Law no. 5 (2011): 413, 415-416. 
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the SPC in 2001,86 it was stated that if the controller of a company transferred 
the assets of the company to itself, it would be required to return the assets to 
satisfy the debts of the company. Further, an SPC judicial interpretation issued 
in 200387 declared that in the restructuring process of SOEs, if the parent 
company fraudulently transferred assets of its subsidiaries to evade debts,88 it 
would be liable for the debts of the subsidiary. Noticeably, unlike the 
interpretation in 2001, the interpretation in 2003 did not limit the shareholder's 
liability to the amount of assets that it transferred from its subsidiary.  
(b) SPC’s Decisions Before the Promulgation of Statutory Veil-Piercing 
Besides judicial interpretations, the SPC has also shaped the Chinese veil-
piercing doctrine through its decisions. In US Minmetals Inc v Xiamen United 
Development (Group) Co Ltd (2004),89 the appellant sought to hold the 
defendant liable for the debts incurred by its wholly owned subsidiary, Xiamen 
United Development Import & Export Trading Co (U&D Trading Co). The 
appellant made its claim on the ground that the defendant had violated 
regulations by setting up U&D Trading Co as a Sino-Foreign joint venture but 
failing to meet certain requirements for doing so. After pointing out that there 
was no direct legal relation between the appellant and the defendant, the SPC 
identified the main purpose of the appellant was to deny the separate 
personality of the defendant. The SPC considered whether the defendant's 
conduct would constitute abuse of the corporate personality and lead to veil-
piercing. It observed that circumstances of shareholder abuse included 
transferring the corporate assets, evading debts by setting up a new company, 
                                         
86 Regulations on Several Issues of Adjudicating Disputes Involving the Enterprises Handed Over 
or Closed Down by the People's Liberation Army, the Armed Police Force, and the Political-
Legal Organs and the Enterprises Separated from the Party and Government Organs 2001 [关
于企业开办的其他企业被撤销或者歇业后民事责任承担问题的批复 Guanyu Shenli Jundui, 
Wujing, Budui, Zhengfa Jiguan Yijiao, Chexiao he yu Dangzheng Jiguan Tuogou Qiye 
Xiangguan Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Guiding]. See ibid.,416.  
87 Regulations on Several Issues of Adjudicating Civil Dispute Cases in Relation to Enterprise 
Restructuring 2003 [关于审理与企业改制相关的民事纠纷案件若干问题的规定 Guanyu Shenli yu 
Qiye Gaizhi Xiangguan de Minshi Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Guiding]. See ibid.,417. 
88 The intention of restructuring the SOEs is to adapt them into modern corporations as provided by 
the company law. See B C Reed, “Clearing Away the Mist: Suggestions for Developing a 
Principled Veil Piercing Doctrine in China,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2006): 
1643. 
89 Judgment No.4 (2004) of the SPC Fourth Civil Division, published in (2005) 12 SPC Gazette 24. 
Cited from Chao Xi, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How Did We Get There?”, 421 
(above note 85). 
Chapter 3 Creditor Protection Outside Insolvency 
 
 
171 
commingling the corporate and shareholder assets, or arbitrarily interfering with 
the corporate business to the extent that the company has no real independent 
operation. By such standards, the defendant, upon examination of the SPC, did 
not abuse the corporate personality to evade debts, despite the flaws in its 
establishment.  
 
In another case, Chengdu Municipality Jinhe Sub-Branch v Sichuan 
Communications Services Co, Sichuan Jinzu Industrial Co and Sichuan Financial 
Leasing Joint Stock Co (2003),90 the SPC applied a similar line of reasoning.  In 
this case, the parent company was found to commingle its assets and personnel 
with its subsidiary and use the loans secured by the subsidiary to finance its own 
project. Based on the facts, the SPC decided to pierce the corporate veil and 
hold the parent company liable for the debts of the subsidiary.  
From the above discussion, it can be observed that the SPC’s judicial 
interpretations on veil-piercing and its veil-piercing decisions have been 
confined to the corporate group context. Furthermore, the factors for veil 
piercing considered by the SPC, namely failure to contribute to the registered 
capital, transfer of assets within a corporate group, and commingling of assets 
and personnel between parent company and subsidiary, reflect the SPC’s 
concern for problems in the restructuring of large numbers of SOEs during the 
1990s.91 When transforming from governmental affiliates to modern corporations, 
it was common to see insolvent SOEs set up subsidiaries in order to conceal 
assets from their creditors. The fundamental reason for the limited scope of the 
SPC’s guidance on veil piercing is that it does not have power to enact a full-
fledged veil-piercing provision to override the separate legal personality 
provided under the company law. The following section will consider the 
statutory provision of veil piercing in China.  
 
                                         
90 Judgment No.111 (2003) of the SPC Second Civil Division, published in Xiaoming Xi, ed., Guide 
on Civil and Commercial Trial [民商事审判指导 Minshangshi Shenpan Zhidao], (People's Court 
Press, 2005), p 192. Cited from ibid., 422. 
91  Reed, “Clearing Away the Mist: Suggestions for Developing a Principled Veil Piercing Doctrine 
in China,” 1657 (above note 88).  
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(c) Statutory Veil Piercing in China  
A fully-fledged veil-piercing doctrine did not exist in China until the Company 
Law was enacted in 2005. The task of drafting the new company law was 
assigned to the Law Affairs Office (LAO) of the State Council.92 During the 
drafting process, the LAO received many calls for adopting the veil-piercing rule 
into Chinese company law. One of the most vocal advocates was the SPC, which 
expressed the necessity of formalising such a rule, drawing on its experience 
with cases of shareholder opportunism.93  Under Chinese law, the SPC can 
participate in the legislative process by submitting legislative bills to the NPC 
and its standing committee,94 requesting the standing committee of the NPC to 
issue law interpretations,95 and expressing opinions regarding legislative bills 
under contemplation. 
 
In response to the request for a veil-piercing doctrine, the LAO wrote in the 
Consultation Draft of the Amendment Bill (Draft) that a controlling shareholder 
would be jointly liable for the debts of its subsidiary if their personnel, finance, 
and business were commingled. However, this veil-piercing provision in the draft 
was met with strong opposition from the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), which supervises and represents the 
interests of China's large SOEs.96 As a result, the proposed veil-piercing doctrine 
was not adopted in the end. If the proposed veil-piercing doctrine was adopted, 
SOEs would be exposed to high risks of veil piercing, given their common 
practice of commingling assets and personnel with subsidiaries.  
 
The ultimate version of the veil-piercing doctrine, as discussed above, only 
vaguely states that shareholders will be liable for the company debts if they 
abuse “the independent status of the company as a legal person or the limited 
liability of shareholders.”97 Such vague phrasing enables courts to accommodate 
                                         
92 Chao Xi, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How Did We Get There?,” 423-424 (above note 
85). 
93 ibid., 425. 
94 Legislation Law, articles 12 and 24. 
95 ibid., article 43. 
96 Chao Xi, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How Did We Get There?”, 426 (above note 85). 
97 Company Law 2005, article 20. 
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veil-piercing to specific circumstances of each case. However, it also gives rise 
to concerns that Chinese courts will produce cases even more inconsistent than 
those in the UK and US, given the inherent flaws of the Chinese judicial system.  
 
First, the open-ended nature of the veil-piercing doctrine in the Chinese 
Company Law 2005 means that the courts have to apply it on a case-by-case 
basis. Due to lack of direction and sophistication, Chinese courts often find it 
difficult to adapt existing law to new circumstances. It is common for Chinese 
courts to refuse to accept cases on the ground that they do not fall within the 
circumstances as prescribed by the law. 98 The result is that cases with novel 
circumstances are largely ignored unless noticed by the SPC or the legislature. 
Lack of discretion of Chinese courts will lead to lack of flexibility of the veil-
piercing doctrine and its delay in adjusting to new circumstances. In contrast, in 
the UK and US, although the veil-piercing doctrine has been criticised for being 
inconsistent and problematic, it has the advantage of being able to respond 
incrementally to changing social conditions, as judges can make decisions based 
on specific facts that will be binding on future cases.99 The practice of some US 
courts to extend veil piercing to LLCs and LLPs is evidence to the flexibility of 
the veil-piercing doctrine under the common law.  
 
Second, even if a court decides to adjudicate on new circumstances, its 
decisions (except for decisions of the SPC) will not be followed by other courts in 
the absence of stare decisis. This leads to greater possibility for inconsistency of 
veil piercing in China than in the UK and US. Therefore, in addition to giving 
wider discretion to judges, China also needs to emulate stare decisis in order to 
increase the consistency of cases. The guiding cases of the SPC can be viewed as 
a good start in establishing stare decisis, and the binding effect of cases can be 
extended to those adjudicated by local courts.100   
 
Finally, Chinese courts are far from independent. They have to stay in line with 
party policy, and they are financially101 and politically controlled by local 
                                         
98 Benjamin L Liebman, “China's Courts: Restricted Reform,” The China Quarterly 191 (2007): 620. 
99 Thompson, “Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem,” 624 (above note 73). 
100  See 3.2.2 (i).  
101 Chinese local courts are funded by local governments. However, there is reform on this under 
way, see Yiwei Zhang, “Judicial Reform Plan to Be 'Released Soon',” globaltimes.cn, March 13, 
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governments.102 In cases where veil-piercing claims are made, the local 
government may force the regional court not to pierce the veil if the company 
concerned is a major taxpayer or an SOE in which the local or central 
government is the principal shareholder. 
 
In summary, China did not formally establish the veil-piercing doctrine until it 
was written into statutory law. Although the veil-piercing doctrine is not 
developed through case law as in the UK and US, the Chinese judiciary, 
especially the SPC, has shaped the doctrine in a significant way. Furthermore, 
the judiciary will continue to play an important role in the further development 
of veil piercing. However, the development of veil piercing is impeded by the 
lack of independence, lawmaking power, and professional sophistication of the 
Chinese judiciary. Due to lack of discretion, the judiciary is unlikely to apply veil 
piercing to partnerships unless it is explicitly permitted by statutory law. The 
next section will consider the possibility that the judiciary will extend the veil-
piercing rule to partnerships, first by looking at the judicial practice of veil-
piercing in China, and then by discussing whether it is necessary to apply veil 
piercing to Chinese partnerships.  
 
ii. Chinese Veil Piercing in Practice and its Application to Partnerships 
(a) Empirical Findings on Chinese Veil-Piercing 
A review of Chinese literature reveals that the theory of veil-piercing in China 
has been heavily influenced by scholarly discussions in the US.103 Despite so many 
articles on how to draw on the theory and practice in the US, one has to wonder 
how the veil-piercing rule really works in China, given such dramatic differences 
between the legal systems in China and the US. An empirical study, modeled on 
a US veil piercing study and based on veil piercing cases in China from 2006 to 
                                                                                                                           
2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/848083.shtml#.UynDuK1_s2U (accessed on March 29, 
2014). 
102 Randall Peerenboom, “Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded 
Assumptions,” La Trobe Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 2008/11, 2008, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1283179 (accessed on July 20, 2014). 
103 Two examples are Hangfeng Ke, “A Comparative Study of Standards of Piercing the Corporate 
Veil [Bijiao Kaocha Cipo Gongsi Miansha Biaozhun],” Law and Society (Fazhi Yu Shehui) no. 6 
(2009): 322; Qilin Ma, “An Empirical Study on Factors in US Veil-Piercing and Lessons for 
China [Meiguo Fayuan Cipo Gongsi Miansha Kaoliang Yinsu Zhi Shizheng Yanjiu Jiqi Dui 
Woguo De Qishi],” Legal Study [Fazhi Yanjiu] no. 6 (2013): 62.  
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2010, has found that the application of the veil-piercing provision under the 
Chinese company law shows some trends similar to veil-piercing case law in the 
UK and US.104 First, all veil-piercing cases in China involve private companies 
(limited liability companies), and no claim has ever been made to pierce the veil 
of a public company (joint stock limited company). Second, the veil piercing 
rate in contract cases is close to but slightly higher than that in tort cases. Third, 
individual shareholders are more likely to be subject to veil-piercing decisions 
and be exposed to corporate liability than corporations acting as shareholders of 
other corporations. 
 
However, there are also dramatic singularities in the Chinese context.105 First, 
the veil piercing rate in China is 63.64%,106 which is much higher than those 
under the Anglo-American law, and there has been a steady increase in the rate 
every year since it was first measured in 2006.107 This demonstrates that Chinese 
courts are ready to protect creditors with the veil-piercing provision. Second, 
the veil piercing rate in less developed regions of China is generally higher than 
that in developed regions. For example, the veil piercing rate has reached 93.75% 
in Henan Province and 80% in Sichuan Province, while the rate is only 62.07% in 
Zhejiang Province and 41.67% in Guangdong Province.108 This may be explained 
by the fact that abuse of corporate form and failure to comply with corporate 
formalities is more prevalent in less developed regions. Third, it is very rare for 
the courts to disregard the separate personality of SOEs.109 This is consistent 
with the analysis above, that the local governments have strong incentives to 
prevent the corporate veil of SOEs from being pierced. 
 
Finally, the factors that lead to veil-piercing decisions in China are different 
from those in the UK and US context.110 The major factors considered by Chinese 
                                         
104 Hui Huang, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where is it Now and Where is it Heading,” 
American Journal of Comparative Law 60, no. 3 (2012): 752. 
105 ibid., 757. 
106 ibid., 749. 
107 In the US, the veil piercing rate is about 40%. See 3.3.1 (i).  
108 Huang, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where is it Now and Where is it Heading,” 750 
(above note 104). Zhejiang and Guangzhou are China’s most developed regions, while Sichuan 
and Henan are relatively less developed.  
109 ibid., 773. 
110 ibid., 760. 
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courts include commingling of assets, business, or personnel, fraud, undue 
control, and undercapitalisation. Among these factors, commingling is the most 
common complaint alleged by plaintiffs. This can be explained by the fact that 
cases issued by the SPC have confirmed and stressed commingling as a valid 
ground for veil piercing.111 Fraud is second to commingling in the frequency of 
appearance, but it has the highest success rate among all the factors. 
Undercapitalisation only appeared in one case (which did not result in veil 
piercing) out of the 118 cases examined by the study.  
 
All in all, this study has indicated an active role of veil piercing under the 
Chinese company law. However, it is unlikely for the courts to apply veil piercing 
to Chinese partnerships, as ordinary partners assume unlimited liability and the 
liability shield of partners in LLPs and limited partnerships is very restricted. 
This will be further discussed below.  
(b) Applying Veil Piercing to Chinese Partnerships? 
In limited partnerships, the PEL provides that a limited partner “shall not 
manage partnership affairs or represent the partnership in its relations with 
people outside the partnership.”112 Besides this management rule, the liability 
shield of limited partners is also restricted by the “estoppel rule” under the 
PEL.113 The PEL estoppel rule is similar to the estoppel rule under the common 
law.114 It provides that limited partners holding themselves out to third parties 
as general partners will be liable to such third parties for the partnership’s debts. 
Also, limited partners will be liable for losses caused by unauthorised execution 
of the partnership’s affairs.115 On the other hand, partners of SGPs are shielded 
from liability only when other partners incur debts by intentional acts or gross 
negligence in the course of business of the partnership.116  As to SGP debts 
incurred in other circumstances, partners still assume unlimited liability.117 
                                         
111 See previous discussion on the SPC’s veil piercing decisions 3.3.2 (i).  
112 PEL 2006, article 68. See 1.1.2 (iii). 
113 PEL, article 76. 
114 See Chapter 1, note 115 and the accompanying texts.  
115 PEL, article 98. 
116 PEL, article 57. 
117 For a discussion on the liability rule of Chinese limited partnerships and SGPs, see Chapter 1.  
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Therefore, it is currently unnecessary to apply veil piercing to SGPs and limited 
partnerships because partners of SGPs are liable for partnership debts under 
most circumstances. As to limited partnerships, if there is a need to pierce the 
liability shield of limited partners, courts can do so under the provisions of the 
“management rule” and “estoppel rule.” Due to lack of discretion, it is unlikely 
that Chinese courts will apply the veil-piercing doctrine to partnerships before it 
is extended to partnerships by statute or by SPC judicial interpretation.  
 
However, it is not to say the veil-piercing doctrine is irrelevant for Chinese 
partnerships. First, the veil-piercing doctrine can be relevant for limited 
partnerships when its general partner is a company. A corporate general partner 
is usually designed to shield true controllers from unlimited liability. Many 
private equity partnerships are organised in this form. When the true controllers 
engage in fraud or other misbehaviour, courts can use the corporate veil-
piercing provision to hold true controllers liable.   
 
Second, in the future, it is possible that Chinese limited partnerships and SGPs 
will be given broader liability shields, and then veil piercing will be necessary to 
constrain abuse of those partnerships. Currently, the liability shield of these 
partnerships is vague and restricted. There is no provision specifying what 
constitutes management and triggers loss of the liability shield for limited 
partners, and it is also unclear whether the safe harbour list provided by the PEL 
is exhaustive. However, the narrow liability shield of SGPs cannot fully meet the 
demand of Chinese law and accounting firms, which are expanding rapidly both 
domestically and internationally. When a firm has operations in different cities, 
it is unreasonable to require a partner to be liable for the mistake of others who 
work far away and whom she cannot directly control or oversee. Therefore, in 
the future, it is possible that China will amend partnership law to clarify and 
provide for broader liability shields for both limited partnerships and SGPs. When 
the partners have acquired liability shields similar to those of corporate 
shareholders, as is the case in the US, it will become necessary to apply the veil-
piercing doctrine to the partnership setting.  
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Summary of 3.3  
In the UK, US, and China, veil piercing is the last resort under the corporate law 
after other means of creditor protection have failed. The most significant 
difference between the veil-piercing rule in China and in the UK and US is that 
while the former was formally established by statute, the latter was developed 
through case law. This reflects a fundamental institutional difference between 
China and common law jurisdictions. Based on a civil law model, China has its 
national legislature, the NPC, at the center of its lawmaking. Therefore, a legal 
rule that permits overriding the separate personality of a company is not 
formally established until it is promulgated by the NPC.  
However, although the Chinese judiciary lacks the lawmaking power of their 
common law counterparts, they have nevertheless played an instrumental part 
in shaping the veil-piercing doctrine. Before the veil-piercing provision was 
written into law, the SPC had already provided for circumstances that justify 
piercing the corporate veil, through its judicial interpretations and guiding cases.  
 
Since the veil-piercing provision was written into the company law, the Chinese 
courts have been active in using it to constrain abuses of the corporate form. It 
can be concluded that the Chinese courts will continue to shape the veil-piercing 
doctrine through their adjudication of cases. However, like fiduciary duties, the 
effectiveness of the veil-piercing rule depends on the competency of the Chinese 
judiciary due to its open-endedness. Further, owing to lack of lawmaking power,  
it is unlikely for Chinese courts to apply veil piercing to partnerships, due to lack 
of lawmaking power. It is also unnecessary for courts to pierce the veil of 
partnerships under current law because the liability shield of Chinese limited 
partnerships and SGPs is very restricted. However, as demonstrated by the 
practice in the US, if China gives partners a liability shield similar to that of 
shareholders in the future, it will become necessary for courts to apply veil 
piercing to partnerships.  
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Conclusion of Chapter 3  
This Chapter has examined the measures for creditor protection that fall outside 
the formal insolvency procedure. It has been argued that Chinese creditors will 
continue to rely on mandatory rules for protection due to the existing legal and 
institutional obstacles to self-protection. The legal capital rule, one of the 
mandatory rules that are aimed at creditor protection, has found to be 
ineffective for this purpose and has grown out of fashion in the UK, US and China. 
In fact, liability insurance is a more cost-effective substitute for legal capital in 
order to provide compensation for creditors. Therefore, there is no reason to 
introduce corporate-style legal capital into partnerships with limited liability 
and instead, a mandatory liability insurance can be imposed. This is the practice 
for professional partnerships in many jurisdictions including the UK and China.  
Further, fiduciary duties and the veil-piercing rule, two measures that can 
directly impose liabilities on directors and partners have been examined. 
Fiduciary duties are relevant to creditors’ protection to the extent that they 
reduce the internal conflicts between owners and managers of the businesses. 
Therefore, a minimum level of fiduciary duties should be preserved in 
corporations as well as in partnerships. In China, fiduciary duties in partnerships 
should be promulgated and clarified. As to the rule of veil-piercing, it is a 
drastic measure for creditor protection and should not be applied when there 
are alternatives. However, it can be particularly useful in China where the law 
always lags behind the fast-changing facts and it can be applied to partnerships 
when limited liability further expands into the partnerships.  
Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that the effectiveness of these open-ended 
rules is limited. In both the UK and US, their uncertainty and theoretical 
confusion has been sufficiently noticed. Due to the lack of judicial law-making 
power in China, the application of fiduciary duties and the veil-piercing rule is 
likely to be more problematic. To improve the effectiveness of fiduciary duties 
and veil-piercing, Chinese judiciary should be further strengthened. More 
importantly, open-ended rules such as fiduciary duties and veil-piercing should 
only assume a complementary role in creditor protection. The main task of 
creditor protection should be bestowed on the more specific rules in the 
insolvency procedure. This will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Creditor Protection in Insolvency 
Introduction to Chapter 4 
With the promulgation of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) in 2006, China 
made another leap in its institutional transition into market economy. The law’s 
purpose is stated in the first article as “regulating the procedure for enterprise 
bankruptcy, fairly settling claims and debts, safeguarding the lawful rights and 
interests of creditors and debtors, and maintaining the order of the socialist 
market economy.” 
 
However, the Chinese bankruptcy law still cannot accurately be described as 
market-oriented. It still contains inconsistent rules and sometimes sacrifices 
efficiency in individual cases for political considerations. Bankruptcy cases are 
still subject to widespread state interference.1 On the other hand, bankruptcy 
law in China is not fundamentally different from its counterpart in the UK and US. 
However, the differences in specific rules and their application in practice make 
bankruptcy law in the UK and US more likely to achieve a fair and efficient 
distribution for creditors as a whole.  
 
This chapter will assess Chinese bankruptcy law with a comparison to its UK-US 
counterparts, with a focus on the partnership bankruptcy regime. In subchapter 
4.1, an overall inquiry will be made into the perceived flaws of Chinese 
bankruptcy law, and suggestions will be made based on a comparison with the 
UK-US bankruptcy law. Discussions will be focused on partnerships in subchapter 
4.2. Chinese partnerships are permitted to use the bankruptcy liquidation 
procedure as provided by the bankruptcy law. However, current rules regarding 
partnership bankruptcy are mostly vague, and detailed rules for applying 
bankruptcy law to partnerships have not been formulated. Finally, the issue of 
directors’/partners’ direct duties to creditors, which are enforced in the 
bankruptcy procedure, will be discussed in 4.3.  
 
Before embarking on any discussion of insolvency, a clarification of the meanings 
of “insolvency” and “bankruptcy” needs to be made. In the US context, 
                                         
1 See 4.1.3. 
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“insolvency” is usually used to describe a financial state and has two 
connotations. First, it can refer to the inability to pay debts as they fall due 
(equity or cash-flow insolvency).  Second, it can refer to the situation where a 
debtor’s liabilities exceed its assets (balance sheet insolvency).2  The generic 
term for the legal procedure of being declared insolvent for both enterprises and 
individuals is “bankruptcy.”3 In the UK, the formal procedure of being declared 
insolvent is referred to as “insolvency” for enterprises and “bankruptcy” for 
individuals. It is worth noting that in Scotland, the insolvency procedure for 
individuals is referred to as “sequestration.” As the UK bankruptcy regime as 
discussed here mostly refers to the English bankruptcy regime, Scots law will 
only be tangentially considered.  
 
China has used Pochan (破产) as the generic term for the legal procedure to 
declare insolvency and has translated it as “bankruptcy” in all legal documents. 
With the absence of individual bankruptcy under current Chinese law, 
“bankruptcy” in China refers only to enterprise bankruptcy.  
4.1 Chinese Bankruptcy Regime and Recommendations Based on UK and US 
Experiences 
4.1.1 Introduction to Chinese Bankruptcy Law  
i. From the Bankruptcy Law 1986 to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 
The current bankruptcy legislation in China, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL), 
promulgated in 2006, is a statute that recognises the basic principles embodied 
in Anglo-American bankruptcy law and bankruptcy law in the developed world as 
a whole. Specifically, creditors should be treated equally, and the debtor should 
have a fresh start.4  
 
The predecessor of the EBL, the Interim Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986, was 
totally different. The central aim of the Bankruptcy Law 1986 was to serve the 
                                         
2 Bryan A Garner, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 8 ed., (Thomson West, 2004), 2331. 
3 Roy Miles Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4 ed., (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011), 1. 
4 John J Rapisardi and Binghao Zhao, “A Legal Analysis and Practical Application of the PRC 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,” Bus. L. Int'l 11 (2010): 49. 
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state policy of closing loss-making SOEs and shifting resources to the private 
sector.5  It only applied to SOEs while the bankruptcy of private and foreign-
invested enterprises were subject to another set of rules. Sacrificing efficiency 
and fairness for political aims could be found both in the language and 
application of the Bankruptcy Law 1986. For example, it placed employees at 
the top of the creditors’ ranking as a way of maintaining social stability while 
and shutting down SOEs with large layoffs.6  
 
The study on bankruptcy of Chinese SOEs carried out by the World Bank in 2000 
found that the bankruptcy process under the Bankruptcy Law 1986 was 
unfriendly to creditors and that creditor banks commonly recovered only 3-10% 
of their claims.7 Furthermore, the bankruptcy procedure seemed to fail to 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources, and the procedure was prone to 
irregularities. Finally, laid off employees of large SOEs were usually entitled to a 
substantial amount of compensation, which may exhaust the firm’s assets 
available to creditors.  
 
With the rapid development of China’s socialist market economy, the Bankruptcy 
Law 1986 clearly could no longer cope with the circumstances a decade on from 
its enactment. The EBL 2006 came at a right time when the world was faced 
with a drastic economic downturn and the economic growth of China was slowing 
down, leading to soaring business failures and job cuts. On its face, the EBL 
made great progress from the Bankruptcy Law 1986. First, it unified the 
bankruptcy law of state-owned and private enterprises into one bankruptcy 
regime. Second, Under the EBL, for the first time financial institutions were 
permitted to go bankrupt.8 Third, the EBL adopted three bankruptcy procedures 
that corresponded to the bankruptcy procedures of sophisticated legal 
jurisdictions, including the UK and US. In particular, it introduced the new 
procedure of reorganisation. It also mandated that an independent administrator 
                                         
5 “Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: A Case and Agenda for Reforming the Insolvency 
System,” Documents.Worldbank.org, September 20, 2000, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/09/14451105/bankruptcy-state-enterprises-
china-case-agenda-reforming-insolvency-system (accessed on September 1, 2013). 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 
8  EBL 2006, article 134. 
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supervise bankruptcy procedures.9 The bankruptcy procedures under the EBL 
2006 will be further discussed in the following subsection.  
 
ii. The Bankruptcy Procedures under the EBL 2006 
There are three bankruptcy procedures under the EBL: liquidation, 
reorganisation, and conciliation (or compromise). All of these can be initiated by 
a debtor’s voluntary filing and creditors can apply for procedures except for 
conciliation.10 Liquidation is the procedure to sell the company’s assets and 
distribute its proceeds to creditors. Although in China bankruptcy is usually used 
only by companies, partnerships are permitted to use the bankruptcy liquidation 
procedure.11 Conciliation is a voting system under which the debtor and its 
creditors can reach an agreement regarding restructuring of its debts. It does 
not require involvement of an administrator. A conciliation agreement must be 
accepted by a majority of creditors who are present and have the right to vote 
at a creditors’ meeting; such creditors must represent more than two-thirds of 
the total unsecured debt, and the agreement must subsequently be approved by 
the court.12  
 
Reorganisation is a process designed to restructure the debtor’s debt under the 
control of an administrator.13 The debtor may manage its property by itself 
under the supervision of an administrator upon approval by the court.14 The 
central document of the reorganisation procedure is the reorganisation plan. The 
reorganisation plan must include: (1) the debtor’s plan for business operations; 
(2) classification of the creditors’ claims; (3) the plan for the adjustment of the 
claims; (4) the plan for payment of the claims; (5) the period of time for 
implementing the reorganization plan; (6) the period of time for supervising the 
implementation of the reorganization plan; and (7) other plans conducive to the 
                                         
9 However, as discussed later, officials are still in control of the bankruptcy process.  
10 EBL 2006, article 7. 
11 PEL 2006, article 92, see 5.2. 
12 EBL 2006, articles 97, 100. 
13 Steven J Arsenault, “Westernization of Chinese Bankruptcy: An Examination of China's New 
Corporate Bankruptcy Law Through the Lens of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to Insolvency 
Law,” Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 27 (2008): 45, 52. 
14 ibid., article 73. 
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debtor’s reorganization.15 Debts are classified into secured debts, employee 
claims, taxes, and common claims.16 Creditors are classified into different 
groups based on their type of debt. The reorganisation plan must be approved by 
a majority of each of the voting groups attending the creditors’ meeting, and 
they must represent more than two-thirds of the total amount of each category 
of debt.17 Upon passing the creditors’ meeting, the reorganisation plan must be 
approved by the court. The court can approve the plan even if not all voting 
groups accept the plan, if the plan meets following conditions:18 (1) secured 
creditors, employees, and taxes will be fully paid; (2) unsecured creditors will 
be paid at a ratio not lower than what they would have been paid in a 
liquidation procedure; (3) the interests of capital contributors are adjusted in a 
fair manner; (4) creditors of the same voting group are treated equally, and 
creditors are paid in accordance with the priority rank as provided by Article 113; 
and (5) the plan of business operation is practicable. As will be discussed in the 
following subsection, the procedures under the Chinese bankruptcy law are 
similar to those in the UK and US. 
iii. The Convergence of Chinese Bankruptcy Procedure 
The bankruptcy procedures under the Chinese bankruptcy law are similar to 
those under the US Bankruptcy Code (BC) 1978. The main provisions for 
bankruptcy procedures of companies, non-farming partnerships, and LLCs are 
contained in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the BC. Chapter 7 provides for the 
liquidation procedure, which is overseen by a court-appointed trustee. Under 
Chapter 7, the debtor firm will be closed and its management displaced. The 
trustee will sell the debtor’s assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors. 19 
Chapter 11 provides for the reorganisation procedure, and it does not require 
firms to be insolvent to use the procedure.20 Unlike under Chinese reorganisation, 
which is largely controlled by the administrator, Chapter 11 permits a firm to 
work out a reorganisation plan with creditors and remain in operation. During 
this process, directors will remain in control and the firm will be referred to as 
                                         
15 ibid., article 81. 
16 ibid., article 82.  
17 ibid., article 84. 
18 ibid., article 87. 
19 D G Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy, 4 ed., (New York Foundation Press, 2006), p 12. 
20 ibid., p 9. 
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the debtor-in-possession (DIP). The DIP will pay its pre-bankruptcy debt with 
post-bankruptcy income.21 The purpose of Chapter 11 is to rescue businesses 
that are worth more as a going concern than being liquidated.22 
 
The UK bankruptcy procedures are also similar to those provided by the Chinese 
bankruptcy law. In the UK, the key statutes for bankruptcy are the Insolvency 
Act (IA) 1986, Enterprise Act (EA) 2002, and Companies Act (CA) 2006. Under 
these laws, there are five forms of insolvency procedure available to insolvent 
companies: (1) liquidation, (2) administration, (3) administrative receivership 
(receivership), (4) company voluntary arrangement (CVA), and (5) scheme of 
arrangement (scheme).23 Partnerships, including limited partnerships and 
general partners, can choose among liquidation, administration, and partnership 
voluntary arrangement (PVA). The UK LLP has an additional option of 
receivership, since the corporate insolvency regime applies to LLPs. 
 
Similar to the Chinese conciliation procedure, voluntary arrangements and 
schemes are two voting systems aimed at facilitating out-of-court negotiation.24 
These two mechanisms are used to restructure a company’s debts with the 
favorable vote from the majority of the creditors and the court approval. Both 
administration and receivership are formal rescue procedures that can achieve 
reorganisation and are controlled by a licensed insolvency practitioner (either an 
administrator or receiver). However, these two procedures are fundamentally 
different due to the fact that receivers and administrators are in different legal 
positions with different duties. An administrator “must perform his functions in 
the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole”25 and “must perform his 
functions as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable.”26 In contrast, 
the primary duty of a receiver, appointed by floating charge holders, is to 
                                         
21 ibid., p 12-13.  
22  Stephen Ware, “An Overview of Bankruptcy Law in the United States,” International Corporate 
Rescue 9 (2012): 320, 325. 
23 John Armour, Audrey Hsu, and Adrian Walters, “Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: 
the Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002,” European Company and Financial L. Rev. 5, no. 2 
(2008): 148, 156. 
24 ibid., 157. 
25 IA 1986, Sch B1, paras 3. 
26 ibid., para 4. 
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recover the debt for her appointing creditor.27 The corollary of this is that 
receivership tends to lead to piecemeal liquidation and high administrative costs, 
as receivers have few incentives to pursue a going concern sale or reduce costs 
as long as their appointing creditors are repaid.28  The limitation placed on 
secured creditors’ rights to initiate a receivership by the EA29 has greatly 
strengthened UK bankruptcy law as a collective procedure for the interests of all 
creditors.  
 
Summary of 4.1.1 
In summary, the Chinese EBL is a sophisticated statute that embodies the basic 
principles of modern bankruptcy law, that creditors should be treated equally 
and that debtors should have a fresh start. It has provided for procedures similar 
to those under UK and US bankruptcy law. The following section will describe 
the central rules of the Chinese bankruptcy law so that there will be a basis for 
further discussion.   
 
4.1.2 Central Rules of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law 
i. Financial Standard for Applying For Bankruptcy 
The EBL provides two circumstances under which companies can voluntarily file 
for bankruptcy. First, when a debtor is unable to pay off debts that fall due 
(cash flow insolvency) and lacks the assets to meet debts (balance sheet 
insolvency), the debtor can choose among the liquidation, reorganisation, or 
conciliation procedures. Second, when a debtor clearly lacks the ability to pay 
off debts, it can file for reorganisation.30 The first option, the simultaneous 
                                         
27 Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 282 (above note 3). 
28 Armour, Hsu, and Walters, “Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the 
Enterprise Act 2002,” 158 (above note 23). 
29 The EA limits the secured creditor's right to appoint a receiver to a few exceptional cases. See IA 
1986, s 72. 
30 EBL 2006, Article 2: “Where an enterprise legal person cannot pay off his debts due and his 
assets are not enough for paying off all the debts, or he apparently lacks the ability to pay off his 
debts, the debts shall be liquidated according to the provisions of this Law. Where an enterprise 
legal person is under the circumstances as specified in the preceding paragraph or he has 
clearly lost the ability to pay off his debts, he may undergo reorganization according to the 
provisions of this Law.” An enterprise legal person refers to a corporation under current Chinese 
law. 
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satisfaction of both cash flow insolvency and balance sheet insolvency, is 
relatively stringent. Perhaps to encourage firms to use the reorganisation 
procedure to revive before they fall into insolvency, the EBL adds a second 
option for companies to use the reorganisation procedure. However, it is unclear 
what it really means by “clearly lost the ability to pay off debts.” As to 
involuntary bankruptcies filed by creditors, only the cash-flow standard is 
required. The EBL provides that creditors can file for reorganisation or 
liquidation when the debtor cannot pay debts due.31  
 
Compared with company bankruptcy, partnership bankruptcy is more 
straightforward. The partnership law stipulates that the condition for a 
partnership to file for bankruptcy is its inability to pay off the debts due.32  
While both creditors and the debtor company can file for company bankruptcy, 
only creditors can file for partnership bankruptcy.  
 
ii. Start of Bankruptcy Case and Automatic Stay 
Under the EBL, a bankruptcy case commences only when the court accepts it. 
The court will have fifteen days to decide whether to accept a bankruptcy 
application and can extend the time for another fifteen days under special 
circumstances upon approval by the court at the next higher level.33 The 
acceptance of a bankruptcy case will trigger a stay on creditors’ actions against 
the debtor started before the commencement of the bankruptcy case34 and 
execution of the debtor’s property.35 Payments to individual creditors after the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case are invalid.36 However, the stay has only 
limited effects. When the administrator takes over the bankruptcy estate, 
actions against the debtor will continue. Also, new actions filed against the 
                                         
31 EBL 2006, article 7. 
32 PEL 2006, article 92: “Where a partnership is unable to pay off the debts due, its creditors may, 
according to law, apply to a people’s court for bankruptcy liquidation of the partnership, or 
demand that the general partners pay off such debts.” 
33 ibid., article 10. 
34 ibid., article 20. 
35 ibid., article 19. 
36 ibid., article 16. 
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debtor after commencement of the bankruptcy are permitted as long as they are 
filed with the court that accepts the bankruptcy case.37  
 
iii. Control of the Bankruptcy Procedure 
Under the EBL, the court-appointed administrator is in control of the bankruptcy 
process.38 The exception is that in the reorganisation process, the debtor may 
manage its property by itself under the supervision of an administrator upon 
approval by the court.39   
 
The administrator may be a professional selected from qualified law firms or 
accounting firms or an interim liquidation committee usually consisting of 
government officials.40 The administrator has a wide range of powers to 
manage41 and recover the bankruptcy estate of the debtor company.42 The 
administrator is subject to duties of diligence and loyalty.43 If the administrator 
fails to fulfill these duties and causes losses to a creditor, the debtor, or a third 
party, the administrator is liable for compensation.44   
 
The administrator will report to the court and is supervised by the creditors’ 
meeting and the creditors’ committee.45 Creditors whose debts have been 
declared have the right to attend creditors’ meetings and are entitled to vote.46 
Besides supervising the administrator, creditors’ meetings will resolve on the 
reorganisation plan, conciliation agreement, management plan of the debtor’s 
assets, and distribution plan of assets, among other issues.47 The creditors’ 
meeting can decide to establish a creditors’ committee, which must include a 
                                         
37 ibid., article 21. 
38 ibid., article 24. 
39 ibid., article 73. 
40 ibid., article 24. 
41 ibid., article 25. 
42 ibid., chapter four. 
43 ibid., article 27. 
44 ibid., article 130. 
45 ibid., article 23. 
46 ibid., article 59. 
47 ibid., article 61. 
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representative of employees and has no more than nine persons.48 The creditors’ 
committee will monitor the management and distribution of the debtor’s assets, 
propose to convene a creditors’ meeting, and exercise other powers delegated 
by the creditors’ meeting.49 The administrator must report to the creditors’ 
committee for important actions of disposing the debtor’s assets.50 In the 
absence of a creditor’ committee, the administrator must report these actions 
to the court.  
 
iv. Void and Voidable Actions 
To preserve the debtor’s assets available to creditors, the EBL has introduced 
concepts of voidable and void transactions. Article 31 states that an 
administrator shall have the right to request the court to void the following 
actions taken by the debtor within one year before the court accepts the 
application for bankruptcy: (1) transferring assets for no consideration; (2) 
trading at an obviously unreasonable price; (3) setting a charge on its assets for 
an unsecured creditor; and (4) abandoning claims. Further, article 32 provides 
that payments to creditors within six months before the court accepts the 
application for bankruptcy and when the debtor is insolvent are also voidable. 
Two actions that can severely undermine interests of creditors are deemed as 
void under the Article 33: (1) concealing or transferring assets to evade payment 
of debts and (2) fabricating debts or acknowledging debts that do not exist. It is 
necessary to distinguish between voidable and void actions, although both can 
nullify actions of the debtor and restore its property. The most important 
difference is that voidable actions are binding unless voided by the court while 
void actions are deemed to have no legal effects from the start. In addition, 
voidable actions must be challenged within a time limitation, while void actions 
have no such limitation. 
 
                                         
48 ibid., article 67. 
49 ibid., article 68. 
50 ibid., article 69. 
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v. Executory Contracts51 
Under the EBL, the administrator can decide whether to terminate or perform a 
contract that contains obligations that remain to be fulfilled by the debtor and 
the other contracting party.52 The administrator is required to notify the other 
party of the decision within two months from the date when the bankruptcy 
application is accepted or 30 days from the date when the other party requests a 
reply. The contract shall also be deemed terminated when the administrator 
fails to provide guarantee for the continued performance of the contract at the 
request of the other party.  
 
vi. Priority  
Under the EBL, secured creditors will be paid first, to the extent of the value of 
their security.53 Then come creditors who are granted priority by law. The order 
of priority claims under the EBL is: administrative costs, debts incurred after 
commencement of the bankruptcy procedure for the common benefit of 
creditors, claims of employees, and tax claims.54 Other unsecured creditors will 
only be paid after secured creditors and priority creditors are paid. However, 
article 132 provides that employees' claims that occurred prior to the 
promulgation of the EBL in 2006 and existed until the EBL went into effect in 
2007 shall be paid from the specific assets in priority to creditors that are 
secured by those assets.55 
 
Summary of 4.1.2 
In summary, the EBL contains rules that are essential to a modern bankruptcy 
statute. Similar provisions can also be found in the UK and US bankruptcy law. 
                                         
51 An executory contract is “a contract that remains wholly unperformed or for which there remains 
something still to be done on both sides.” See Garner, Black's Law Dictionary, 977 (above note 
2). 
52 EBL 2006, article 18. 
53 EBL 2006, article 109. 
54 EBL 2006, articles 41, 42, 43 and 82. 
55 Rakhi I Patel, “A Practical Evaluation of the People’s Republic of China’s 2007 Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law,” UC Davis Business LJ 10 (2009): 109, 122. 
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However, as will be discussed below, its operation in reality sets it far apart 
from the UK and US bankruptcy law.   
 
4.1.3 Assessment of Chinese Bankruptcy Law and Lessons from the UK and US 
i. The Aims and Objectives of Bankruptcy Law 
Formal bankruptcy procedure in essence is a collective mechanism for individual 
creditors to collect their debts. Without such mechanism, individual creditors 
will pursue their debts on their own, and they will cause damages to the value of 
the debtor firm and consequently their own interests.  
 
Bankruptcy law can produce extra value for creditors in three ways.56 First, it 
can reduce the strategic costs of individual creditors pursuing their debts. When 
creditors cannot reach a collective solution, they will race to the courthouse and 
attempt to beat others in order to be repaid. This will not only result in costs for 
individual creditors but also may cause the firm to liquidate prematurely. 
Second, bankruptcy law can increase the aggregate pool of assets. Individual 
collection of debts may cause the firm to sell its assets piecemeal and reduce 
the value of the firm's assets. In comparison, a statutory procedure that ensures 
organised collection of debts is more likely to keep the firm's assets together and 
get a higher value for the firm's assets. Third, bankruptcy law can improve 
administrative efficiencies by determining the amount of the debtor's assets and 
claims on its assets in a collective way. Without the bankruptcy law, every 
creditor trying to collect her debts will need to investigate these issues.  
 
The role of bankruptcy law as a collective mechanism for debt collection has 
been recognised internationally. For example, with the aim to foster effective 
and efficient bankruptcy law, the Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law 
promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) in 2004 has stressed the aims of bankruptcy law to maximise the 
                                         
56 Thomas H Jackson, “Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,” 
Yale LJ 91, no. 5 (1982): 857, 861. 
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value of assets available to creditors and to achieve an efficient and equitable 
distribution of assets.57 
 
Promulgated after the UNCITRAL guide, the Chinese EBL 2006 has assimilated 
the notion that bankruptcy law is a collective procedure to settle debts fairly 
and to protect the rights and interests of both creditors and debtors.58 With the 
advent of the EBL, Chinese bankruptcy law no longer serves only political goals. 
This is a milestone in China’s market-oriented legal reform. However, the 
Chinese bankruptcy law is still far from the “efficient and effective” bankruptcy 
regime envisaged by the UNCITRAL guide.   
 
As China is moving into a market-based economy, it is imperative to establish a 
bankruptcy regime that defers to efficiency, private interests, and the law of 
the market. Here, an assessment will be made on the Chinese EBL against the 
standards of efficient and effective bankruptcy law proposed by the UNCITRAL 
guide. At the same time, the bankruptcy rules in the UK and US that can be 
drawn on by Chinese bankruptcy law will be discussed. 
 
ii. Assessment of Chinese Bankruptcy Law Against the UNCITRAL Guide  
(a) Timely, Efficient, and Impartial Resolution of Insolvency 
The most basic requirement for timely and efficient insolvency law is a clear and 
objective criterion of insolvency, so that non-viable and inefficient businesses 
can be liquidated in time and viable businesses can be saved.59 However, the 
financial standard for initiating the bankruptcy procedure is confusing under 
Chinese bankruptcy law. While voluntary filing for bankruptcy requires passing 
both the balance sheet and cash flow standards, involuntary filing only requires 
the debtor to be unable to pay its debts. At the same time, the law provides 
that the debtor can file for reorganisation when it “clearly lacks the ability to 
pay off debts.”60 Clearly, these rules need to be clarified and simplified. 
                                         
57 “UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law,” uncitral.org, 2005, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (accessed on September 
1, 2013). 
58 EBL 2006, article 1. 
59 "UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law” (above note 57). 
60 See 4.1.2 (i). 
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Bankruptcy statutes in the US and UK provide good examples when it comes to 
defining the financial standard for entering the bankruptcy process. Under the 
US Bankruptcy Code, the concept of insolvency is defined in terms of balance 
sheet insolvency. It refers to the financial condition that the sum of an entity’s 
debts is greater than all of its property.61 Under the UK insolvency law, 
insolvency is defined both in the sense of cash flow insolvency and balance sheet 
insolvency. A company is deemed to be insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts 
when the debts fall due or if its liabilities exceed its assets.62 Either the US or 
the UK criterion of insolvency would be more reasonable than the current 
insolvency criterion in China.  
 
Another flaw that undermines the timeliness of Chinese bankruptcy procedure is 
that a court will refuse to contemplate a bankruptcy case if it finds that the 
case cannot be accepted.63 Unlike in the US and UK where a bankruptcy case 
formally starts upon filing with the court, in China a bankruptcy case commences 
only when the court decides to accept it. The court has fifteen days to decide 
whether to accept the bankruptcy case and can prolong the time for decision 
                                         
61 BC § 101 (32):  
“The term ‘insolvent’ means— 
(A) with reference to an entity other than a partnership and a municipality, financial condition 
such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair 
valuation, exclusive of— 
(i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such 
entity’s creditors; and 
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate under section 522 of this title; 
(B) with reference to a partnership, financial condition such that the sum of such partnership’s 
debts is greater than the aggregate of, at a fair valuation— 
(i) all of such partnership’s property, exclusive of property of the kind specified in subparagraph 
(A)(i) of this paragraph; and 
(ii) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner’s non-partnership property, 
exclusive of property of the kind specified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, over such 
partner’s non-partnership debts….” 
62 IA 1986 s 123:  
“(1) A company is deemed unable to pay its debts—(a) if a creditor (by assignment or 
otherwise) to whom the company is indebted in a sum exceeding £750 then due has served 
on the company, by leaving it at the company’s registered office, a written demand (in the 
prescribed form) requiring the company to pay the sum so due and the company has for 3 
weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for it to the 
reasonable satisfaction of the creditor … 
(2) A company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the 
court that the value of the company’s assets is less than the amount of its liabilities, taking 
into account its contingent and prospective liabilities.” 
63 EBL 2006, article 10. See 4.1.2 (ii).  
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upon approval of the court on a higher level.64 During the time when the court is 
considering whether to accept the case, new transactions may be created 
between the debtor and third parties and there are also chances for the debtor 
to hide or fraudulently transfer its assets. To preserve the bankruptcy estate in 
the interests of creditors, the start of a bankruptcy procedure should have 
retrospective effects to the date that the petition of bankruptcy is filed. To be 
specific, provisions such as automatic stay and voidable transactions should be 
applied retrospectively to transactions after the petition for bankruptcy is filed 
and before it is accepted.65 However, the retrospectivity of the bankruptcy 
procedure will be unfair to third parties who enter into transactions with the 
debtor without knowledge of the bankruptcy petition. To balance the interests 
between creditors and third parties, a petition for bankruptcy should be 
registered in a publicly-accessible registry once it is filed.66 In this way, third 
parties will be able to make an informed decision on whether to take risks with a 
potential bankruptcy debtor. 
 
Finally, the criteria for the court to decide whether to accept a bankruptcy 
application are unclear. Only one thing is certain: the government has great 
influence on the court’s decision whether to accept the bankruptcy case. First, 
bankruptcies of listed companies need to be approved by related provincial 
governments and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) prior to 
acceptance by the courts.67 Second, bankruptcy cases are governed by the court 
at the place where the debtor resides.68 As local governments are often 
unwilling to see enterprises within their jurisdiction going to bankruptcy, they 
will try to influence the courts, which are financially69 and politically controlled 
                                         
64 EBL 2006, article 10.  
65 Provisions of automatic stay and voidable actions will be further considered in the next section.  
66 In the UK, the public can already check if a company is in the insolvency procedure online. See 
https://www.gov.uk/find-out-if-a-company-is-in-financial-trouble; https://roi.aib.gov.uk/roi.  
67 Roman Tomasic and Zinian Zhang, “From Global Convergence in China's Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law 2006 to Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation in China,” Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 12, no. 2 (2012): 295. 
68 EBL 2006, article 3 
69 Chinese local courts are funded by local governments, however, there are reform on this under 
way. See Yiwei Zhang, “Judicial Reform Plan to Be 'Released Soon',” globaltimes.cn, March 13, 
2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/848083.shtml#.UynDuK1_s2U (accessed on March 29, 
2014). 
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by local governments.70 Therefore, Chinese courts may reject bankruptcy cases 
simply because of the influence of the local government. 
 
Besides control over the start of bankruptcy, the state also has a strong presence 
in the process of bankruptcy cases, which undermines the impartiality and 
efficiency of the bankruptcy procedure.71  In the case of state-owned or state-
controlled companies, local governments of the region where the debtor 
company is located usually organise liquidation committees to act as 
administrators. The government can also be involved in an insidious way by 
organising interim working teams to interfere with the work of court-appointed 
administrators. In many cases, the interim working teams, rather than the 
administrators, are actually in control of the bankruptcy cases. Even 
bankruptcies of private companies may be subject to governmental interference 
if they are regarded critical to the local economy. In practice, an interim 
liquidation committee consisting of governmental officials is often in charge of 
bankruptcy cases. 
 
To sum up, the Chinese bankruptcy law has failed to meet the standard of 
“timely, efficient, and impartial” due to the lack of reasonable rules on 
initiating the bankruptcy procedure and the state interference with bankruptcy 
cases. It is necessary for China to provide for simpler and clearer requirements 
for entering into the bankruptcy procedure, following the example of Anglo-
American bankruptcy law. Further, the state should gradually retreat from the 
bankruptcy process and let the courts adjudicate bankruptcy cases based on 
efficiency and fairness, rather than on political considerations. Finally, China 
should devote more resources to the cultivation of insolvency practitioners, who 
can supervise bankruptcy cases professionally and independently. The problem 
of state interference and the lack involvement of professional administrators 
will be further considered in 4.1.4.  
 
                                         
70 Randall Peerenboom, “Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded 
Assumptions,” La Trobe Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 2008/11, 2008, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1283179 (accessed on July 20, 2014), p 14.  
71 Tomasic and Zhang, “From Global Convergence in China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 to 
Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation in China,” 316-317 (see above note 67).  
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(b) Preservation of Bankruptcy Estate and Equitable Treatment of Creditors 
A key function of bankruptcy law is to preserve the debtor’s estate and ensure 
equitable distributions to creditors. Two mechanisms in bankruptcy law are 
essential to the preservation of the debtor’s assets. First, a stay on creditors’ 
individual actions against the debtor can allow breathing space for the debtor 
and ensure equitable distribution to creditors.72 Second, avoidance of actions 
such as fraudulent transfers and preferences that are aimed at fraud and 
favoritism can recover assets for the benefit of all creditors.  
  
Under Chinese bankruptcy law, a stay on creditors’ actions against the debtor 
will only be triggered by acceptance of the court. As the court has fifteen days 
to decide whether to accept the bankruptcy case and can prolong the time for 
decision upon approval of the court on a higher level,73 creditors may act 
individually to seize the debtor's assets when the decision of the court is still 
pending. The fifteen-day interval may also allow the management to behave 
opportunistically against creditors, for example, concealing assets or fleeing.74 
Further, the stay has only limited effects. When the administrator takes over the 
bankruptcy estate, actions against the debtor will continue. Also, new actions 
filed against the debtor after commencement of the bankruptcy are permitted 
as long as they are filed with the court that accepts the bankruptcy case.75 
 
A more effective automatic stay provision should be introduced into the Chinese 
bankruptcy law. One example of a powerful automatic stay provision can be 
found in the US BC. Under the BC, a petition for bankruptcy will trigger an 
automatic stay on claims of creditors.76 The automatic stay will stay all litigation 
and enforcement of judgments and security. The stay is effective during the 
time the case is pending, except for limited cases where the court allows to lift 
the stay.  
 
                                         
72 “UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law” (above note 57). 
73 EBL 2006, article 10.  
74 Patel, “A Practical Evaluation of the People's Republic of China's 2007 Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law,” 117 (above note 55). 
75 EBL 2006, article 21. 
76 BC §362. 
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Under the Chinese bankruptcy law, the function of preventing concealment of 
assets and favoritism is performed by the provisions of voidable and void 
transactions.77 However, the list of voidable transactions is rather limited and 
cannot encompass all the situations of fraud and favouritism. In comparison, the 
provisions that are designed to address fraud and favouritism under the Anglo-
American bankruptcy law are more powerful.  
 
In the US, section 547 of the BC states that the trustee may void any transfer of 
an interest of the debtor in property that constitutes a preference. The 
preference provision is aimed at the problem of favouritism, namely, that a 
debtor firm can selectively pay some of its creditors, including directors or 
shareholders who are creditors, to the detriment of other creditors. The purpose 
of the preference provision is to ensure the equal distribution to creditors and 
prevent creditors racing to the courthouse to collect their debts.78 A transfer is 
deemed as a preference if it is: (1) to the benefit or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such 
transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made on or 
within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition or between ninety 
days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor 
at the time of such transfer was an insider; (5) a transfer that enables the 
creditors to receive more than they would otherwise receive in a Chapter 7 
liquidation.79 The debtor’s insolvency is presumed during the ninety days 
preceding filing of the petition, while in the case of insider transactions, 
although the debtor’s insolvency is not presumed, the retrospective period is 
between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition.80 
As an attempt to balance the interests of transferees and of the trustee acting 
on behalf of all the creditors, transfers that are not actually made on account of 
                                         
77 See 4.1.2 (iv). 
78 Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy, 180-181 (above note 19). 
79 BC § 547 (b), also see John Ames, Chip Bowles, and Gregory R Schaaf, “Preferences and 
Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Primer in Pain,” Americasrestructuring.com, 
2008, http://www.americasrestructuring.com/08_SF/p107-
115%20Preferences%20and%20fraudulent%20transfers.pdf (accessed on September 1, 2013). 
80 BC § 547 (f), also see ibid., 108.  
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an antecedent debt are not regarded as preferences.81 A list of specific 
exceptions has been provided by the BC.82 
 
When a firm is approaching insolvency, sometimes its directors or shareholders 
will transfer or conceal its assets before entering the formal bankruptcy 
procedure so that not all assets will go to the creditors. To constrain such 
opportunism, the fraudulent transfer provision under the BC83 provides that the 
trustee can avoid any transfer of property or obligations incurred that 
constitutes fraudulent transfer and is made or incurred on or within 2 years 
before the date of the filing of the petition.84 A transfer will be deemed as 
fraudulent if it is made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor or without receiving reasonably equivalent value in return.85 Absent the 
"actual intent" element, a transaction can also be deemed as 
"constructive fraud" when the debtor transfers an asset or incurs an obligation 
without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange and thus the debtor 
is rendered insolvent or left with unreasonably small capital.86 The fraudulent 
transfer provision differs from the preference provision in that it is not 
restricted to transfer to creditors. It applies to any transaction in which debtors 
intentionally hide their assets to evade liability or transfer assets for less than 
reasonable consideration, resulting in a decrease in the value of the bankruptcy 
estate. 
 
Similar provisions of preference and fraudulent transfer can also be found in the 
UK context. The preference provision is stipulated in section 239 of the UK IA, 
which defines preference as anything the debtor does or suffers to put a creditor 
into a position that, in the event of the debtor going into insolvent liquidation, is 
better than the position he would have been in if that thing had not been 
                                         
81 Morris W Macey, “Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978,” Emory LJ 28 (1979): 685, 691. 
82 BC § 547 (c). 
83 BC § 548; In the US, fraudulent transfer law also exists at the state level. The state law on 
fraudulent transfer is similar to that under the Bankruptcy Code and is usually modelled on the 
model uniform law.   
84 BC § 548 (a)(1). 
85 BC § 548 (a)(1)(A). 
86 BC § 548(a)(1)(B). 
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done.87 If the court finds a preference, it will make an order as it thinks fit to 
restore the position to what it would have been if the preference had not been 
given.88  
 
The difference of the UK preference provision from its counterpart under the US 
Bankruptcy Code is that it requires a subjective element, that the debtor was 
influenced by a desire to put a creditor in a better position.89 However, if the 
preference is given to a person connected with the debtor at the time the 
preference was given, the debtor is presumed to have been so influenced.90 A 
preference must occur within relevant time to be challenged, namely, six 
months from the onset of insolvency, or two years prior to the onset of 
insolvency when the beneficiary of the preference is a connected party.91 
Further, it must be proved that the debtor must be insolvent at the time when a 
preference was made or become insolvent as a result of the preference. 
 
The equivalents of the US fraudulent transfer law can be found in sections 238 
and 423 of the UK IA. The function of section 238 is similar to the constructive 
fraud provision in the US BC. It allows a transaction to be challenged in which a 
debtor receives no consideration or a consideration of significantly less than 
market value. An undervalued transaction must take place within relevant time 
to be challenged, namely two years before the onset of insolvency. Further, the 
debtor must be insolvent at the time of the transaction or as a result of it. 
However, in the case of persons connected with the company, insolvency is 
presumed.92 
 
Section 423 functions in a way similar to the actual fraud provision under the US 
BC. Its primary difference from section 238 is that it requires proving an intent 
to defraud creditors. As the intent element is difficult to prove, this provision is 
                                         
87 IA 1986, s 239 (4). 
88 ibid., s 239 (3). 
89 ibid., s 239 (5). See Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 472 (above note 
3). 
90 ibid., s 239 (6). 
91 ibid., s 240. 
92 IA 1986, s 240. see also Edward Bailey and Hugo Groves, Bailey and Groves: Corporate 
Insolvency - Law and Practice, 4 ed., (LexisNexis, 2014), at para [36.179]. 
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rarely used in the UK. However, it also has some advantages over section 238. 
First, it does not have the time limits applied to section 238. Second, it does not 
require proving that the debtor was insolvent. 
 
The preference and fraudulent transfer provisions in the UK and US provide good 
examples for China to amend its current provisions of voidable and void 
transactions and to stipulate a formula for determining fraud and favouritism. 
First, the Chinese law should stipulate preference and fraudulent transfer in 
separate provisions. It should be set out that the preference provision is aimed 
at restoring a creditor to the position what it would have been in without a 
preference given by the debtor, while the fraudulent transfer provision is 
intended to address concealing of assets by the debtor. Second, both actual 
fraud and constructive fraud should be provided. While actual fraud needs a 
subjective intent to defraud, it does not require proving that the debtor is 
insolvent when the transaction is made or is rendered insolvent by the 
transaction. These two types of fraud complement each other, and both are 
necessary to preserve the assets available to creditors. Third, as shown by the 
bankruptcy law in the US and UK, actions against preference and fraudulent 
transfer that benefit “insiders” should have a longer retrospective period and 
have a lower standard of proof.  
 
(c) Transparency of Bankruptcy Procedure  
In China, as government officials are usually in control of the bankruptcy 
procedure, the transparency of the procedure has become a source of concern 
for creditors. Under the EBL, the administrator reports to the court and is 
supervised by the creditors’ meeting or the creditors’ committee.93 However, 
the administrator has wide powers in managing the bankruptcy estate and only 
needs to report to the creditors’ committee or court for a limited list of 
important disposals.94 This leaves much room for manipulation, to the detriment 
of creditors.  
 
                                         
93 EBL 2006, article 23. See 4.1.2 (iii). 
94 ibid., article 69. 
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Further, the judicial records of bankruptcy cases, like those of other court cases, 
are only partly disclosed in China. It is difficult for creditors as well as the 
general public to access information on bankruptcy cases. In contrast, in the US, 
most important decisions in disposing a bankruptcy estate need to be approved 
by the court.95 Also, the public’s right to access information on bankruptcy cases 
is substantiated by section 107 of the BC.  
 
To increase the transparency of bankruptcy procedure, China should expand the 
scope of information that an administrator needs to disclose to the court and to 
creditors. Moreover, a record of court cases should be available to creditors as 
well as to the public.  
(d) Maximising the Value of Assets  
In recent years, the rescue culture, which emphasizes that a firm is often worth 
more as a going concern than being sold piecemeal,96 has been the theme of 
bankruptcy law in Britain,97 and jurisdictions across the globe. China has also 
recognised the importance of rescue and introduced the reorganisation 
procedure, aimed at maximising the value of assets available to creditors.  
 
However, the reorganisation procedure in China has flaws that may compromise 
the goal of maximising the value of the bankruptcy estate. First, although the 
EBL allows the administrator to decide to terminate or perform any outstanding 
contract that contains obligations of the debtor,98 it fails to specify the 
consequences of terminating the executory contract. Second, there is no 
provision in the EBL providing whether new financing to a debtor under the 
reorganisation procedure can obtain a super priority status. Due to such 
uncertainty, it is difficult for companies in reorganisation to raise new funds.  
 
In contrast to the vague phrasing of the EBL, the US BC contains specific 
provisions on executory contract and refinancing. Under the US BC, the trustee 
                                         
95 Rapisardi and Zhao, “A Legal Analysis and Practical Application of the PRC Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law,” 53 (above note 4). 
96 “UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law” (above note 57). 
97 Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 314 (above note 3). 
98 EBL 2006, article 18. 
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or DIP can choose to assume or reject executory contracts. Rejecting the 
contract amounts to a breach of the contract and will result in damages payable 
to the other party to the contract.99 This allows the debtor to weigh between 
the benefits of assuming the contract and the costs of rejecting it. As the claim 
for damages is regarded as unsecured and ranks pari passu with other unsecured 
claims under the US BC, many debtors choose to default in order to avoid 
contracts that are no longer beneficial.100 Further, the US BC provides that new 
borrowings incurred by the debtor-in-possession (DIP)101 in the reorganisation 
procedure are superior to existing debts.102 This provision can facilitate the 
refinancing of the debtor firm and improve the chances of its revival. In order to 
facilitate the rescue function of reorganisation and maximise the assets 
available to creditors, China can introduce US-style provisions to provide 
consequences for rejection of executory contracts and the super priority of new 
borrowings. 
 
(e) Priority Rule 
If the priority rule in bankruptcy is decided by social and political considerations 
rather than the commercial bargains between creditors and the debtor, 
creditors will feel uncertain about their rights, and consequently they will be 
less willing to offer credit. Therefore, clear priority rules based on commercial 
bargains should be promulgated, and the influence of other considerations 
should be minimised.103  
 
However, in China political and social considerations supersede commercial 
bargains in many aspects of law. This has been reflected in the priority rule in 
bankruptcy law. Although the EBL has amended the rule under the Interim 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986 so that employees are paid before secured 
                                         
99 BC § 365. 
100 Marcus Cole, “Limiting Liability Through Bankruptcy,” U. of Cinclinati  L. Rev. 70 (2001): 1245, 
1284. 
101 During the reorganisation process provided by the Chapter 11 of the US BC, directors will 
remain in control and the company will be referred to as the debtor-in-possession (DIP). See 
Ware, “An Overview of Bankruptcy Law in the United States,” 320 (above note 22). 
102 BC § 364 (c)(1). 
103 “UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law” (above note 57). 
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creditors, Chinese bankruptcy law is still subject to the government's fear of 
large layoffs, due to their disruptive effects to the society. First, article 6 of the 
bankruptcy law provides that the court shall protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of the employees of the enterprise and hold managers accountable for 
legal liabilities. Second, article 132 provides that employees' claims that have 
occurred prior to the promulgation of the EBL in 2006 and exist until the EBL 
goes into effect in 2007 shall be paid from specific assets in priority to creditors 
that are secured by those assets. Finally, local governments usually interfere 
with the payment arrangement of bankrupt enterprises, leading to deviation 
from the priority rule, as local governments represent the state interests in SOEs 
and are willing to “buy social stability.”104  
 
In the US, the priority rule is based on commercial bargains rather than political 
considerations. Creditors will be paid in accordance with the rank of their 
priority. The first in rank are creditors with a lien. Among holders of different 
liens, secured creditors rank highest. The second in priority are holders of 
priority claims, which are unsecured claims but granted priority due to policy 
considerations. Priority claims come in the following order: (1) administrative 
expenses, (2) claims that have arisen between the filing and the order for relief, 
(3) wage claims, (4) employee benefit claims, and (5) tax claims.105 The third in 
rank are ordinary unsecured creditors. And last, shareholders will be paid only if 
there is a surplus after creditors are paid.  
 
In the UK, creditors with a fixed charge over the firm’s assets will be paid first 
out of the sale proceeds of those assets. The remaining assets will be distributed 
in the following order: (1) expenses of the liquidation, (2) preferential debts, 
including employees’ remuneration and social security contributions, (3) the part 
of assets subject to a floating charge, (4) ordinary unsecured creditors, and (5) 
deferred creditors.106  
 
The priority rule in both the US and UK reflects a concern for the interests of 
employees. However, it accords the highest priority to secured creditors who 
                                         
104 Tomasic and Zhang, “From Global Convergence in China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 to 
Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation in China,” 315 (above note 67). 
105 BC § 507(a); see also Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy, p 98 (above note 19). 
106 Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 212 (above note 3). 
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have negotiated such status by contracts. It is true that bankruptcy law should 
consider and balance the interests of all parties, including employees. However, 
if secured assets go to employees, secured creditors may increase their interest 
rates and tighten the conditions of loans. This  is counteractive to the financing 
of enterprises, especially of small and private enterprises.  
 
In China, although secured creditors rank highest in the claims on the 
bankruptcy estate under the EBL 2006, it is possible that the court will distribute 
a large amount of assets to employees, to the detriment of other creditors, if 
such distribution can suppress social unrest. Compared with this approach, a 
better solution to ameliorate the effects of layoffs is to establish a social 
security scheme for employees. And at the same time, commercial bargains 
should be respected and security creditors should get what they have bargained 
for.  
 (f) Private Negotiation 
As formal bankruptcy procedure may be lengthy and involve high costs, in the US 
and UK, creditors usually attempt private negotiation outside the formal 
insolvency procedure and only use the formal insolvency procedure as the last 
resort.  
 
In the US, an out-of-court workout come in the forms of an exchange offer for 
outstanding debts, renegotiation of bond covenants, or the negotiation of a 
reduction in interest payment and an extension of loan maturities.107 
Reorganisations through workouts generally involve shorter time spans and lower 
direct costs than reorganisations under Chapter 11 of the BC. In addition, in a 
workout, the court does not supervise the affairs of the distressed firm, unlike 
Chapter 11, under which the firm’s affairs are under the scrutiny of its creditors 
and the court. Companies can also combine a workout with Chapter 11 by 
negotiating a reorganisation plan with creditors before entering into the formal 
reorganisation process. This is called a pre-packaged bankruptcy (pre-pack).  
 
                                         
107 Julian R Franks, Kjell G Nyborg, and Walter N Torous, “A Comparison of US, UK, and German 
Insolvency Codes,” Financial Management (1996): 86, 89. 
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Similarly, UK creditors will also attempt negotiation outside the formal 
insolvency procedure and only use the formal insolvency procedure failing such 
attempt.108 Usually, UK banks will rescue their borrowers outside the formal 
procedure whenever possible. This is because banks want to preserve the 
customer relationship with their borrowers. Also, when a firm enters into a 
formal insolvency procedure, the value of its business is bound to plunge when 
its financial difficulty is known to the public. There is also a “pre-pack” in the 
UK context. A pre-pack in the UK refers to a pre-packaged administration, which  
usually involves an agreement of sale of the company’s assets before entering 
insolvency.109 In the UK, private negotiation between the debtor and creditors 
can also be achieved through a corporate voluntary arrangement (CVA) or 
scheme of arrangement (scheme), two voting systems aimed at facilitating out-
of-court negotiation.110 These two mechanisms are used to restructure a 
company’s debts with favorable votes from the majority of the creditors and 
with court approval. Although voluntary arrangements and schemes may have 
the advantage of avoiding costs of going through the court procedure, they also 
have the downside of lack of stay or moratorium, which is provided in the 
liquidation and administration procedure.111 The exception is that a small 
company may obtain a moratorium when a CVA is proposed.112 
 
The Chinese EBL also provides for a voting system aimed at facilitating private 
negotiation, namely, the conciliation procedure. The debtor may apply for the 
commencement of a conciliation procedure with the court and propose a 
conciliation agreement to settle its debts with creditors.113  A conciliation 
agreement must be accepted by a majority of creditors who are present at the 
meeting and have the right to vote; such creditors must represent more than 
two-thirds of the total unsecured debt, and the agreement must subsequently be 
                                         
108 Armour, Hsu, and Walters, “Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the 
Enterprise Act 2002,” 157 (above note 23). 
109 John Armour, “The Rise of the ‘Pre-Pack’: Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for 
Reform,” Published in RP Austin and Fady JG Aoun (Eds.), Restructuring Companies in 
Troubled Times: Director and Creditor Perspectives (2012): 43. 
110 Armour, Hsu, and Walters, “Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the 
Enterprise Act 2002,” 156 (above note 23). See also 4.1.1 (iii), discussing the UK insolvency 
procedures.  
111 Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 348 (above note 3). 
112 IA 1986, Schedule A1. 
113 EBL 2006, article 95. 
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approved by the court. Failing this, the court will declare the debtor to be 
bankrupt and initiate liquidation.114 The main difference of conciliation from 
reorganisation is that it requires no administrator and involves less interference 
from the court. The court cannot force a conciliation agreement to pass, and its 
scrutiny of the agreement is restricted to fraud and unlawful behaviour.115 It has 
been found that conciliation under the old bankruptcy law was rarely used and it 
does not become more popular under the EBL 2006.The conciliation procedure 
should be further developed and promoted in China, as it can save time and 
resources for both the courts and private parties. This will be further discussed 
in 4.1.4.  
 
Summary of 4.1.3 
In summary, this section has evaluated the basic principles of the Chinese 
bankruptcy law against the criteria proposed by the UNCITRAL for “efficient and 
effective” bankruptcy law. Although the EBL 2006 is more sophisticated and 
market-oriented than its predecessor, it contains many flawed provisions, and 
some stipulations still reflect a priority on political considerations at the cost of 
efficiency and fairness. Further, the bankruptcy procedure is still permeated 
with state interference that undermines transparency and equality of the 
procedure. This section has also discussed how to draw on the experience of the 
UK and US to further improve the Chinese bankruptcy law. The focus in the next 
section will turn to the problems of Chinese bankruptcy law in practice, which 
are likely to be more detrimental to creditors’ interests than the flaws of its 
formulation.  
 
4.1.4 Persisting Problems in Practice  
i. Underuse of Bankruptcy Procedures  
Almost a decade has elapsed since the Chinese EBL was promulgated. However, 
bankruptcy application is still a rare option for businesses to exit the market. 
                                         
114 EBL 2006, articles 97－99.  
115 ibid., article 103. 
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According to a research,116 there are only 2,955 bankruptcy cases going through 
the court bankruptcy procedure in the 2008 while the total number of corporate 
dissolution is about 800,000 in that year. This means that bankruptcy cases 
considered by courts only account for approximately 0.37% of all company 
dissolutions in China in 2008. In contrast, in the same year, court-based 
bankruptcy cases account for 8.17% of all company dissolutions in the US and 
10.16% in the UK. In addition, there were only 23 the reorganisation cases 
accepted by Chinese courts in 2008 and this amounts to 0.78% of all in-court 
bankruptcy cases. (see Table 1) 
Table 1: Chinese Corporate Bankruptcy Statistics in 2008117  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
116 Tomasic and Zhang, ‘From global convergence in china's enterprise bankruptcy law 2006 to 
divergent implementation: Corporate reorganisation in China’ , 304 (see above note 67). 
117 The statistics are cited from ibid., 304-308. 
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The rarity of reorganisation cases in China has also been indicated by the White 
Paper on Bankruptcy Cases issued by the Intermediate Court of Shenzhen in 
2011.118 The Paper states that from 2006 to June 2011, the court has accepted 
172 bankruptcy liquidation cases compared to only eight reorganisation cases. 
However, the Paper has shown some promising trends in Shenzhen, the front of 
economic reform in China. First, it stresses that the reorganisation procedure is 
preferred if it is possible to rescue enterprises that are financially distressed. 
Second, as indicated by the Paper, the proportion of SOEs in bankruptcy cases is 
decreasing. From 1993 to 2006, the Court has accepted 167 bankruptcy cases 
concerned SOEs. However, only seven SOE bankruptcy cases have been accepted 
from 2006 to June 2011. The Paper points out that the reason for this is 
deepened reform of SOEs, reduced special favours to SOEs and gradual 
withdrawal of governmental intervention. The Paper also identifies the trend of 
diversified types of enterprises going into the bankruptcy procedure, especially 
the increase in the number of small and medium enterprises.   
 
Two reasons can account for the overall underuse of bankruptcy procedures. 
First, the financial standards for initiating bankruptcy procedures in China are 
demanding and confusing.119 Second, bankruptcy cases will only start when 
accepted by the courts, which are subject to governmental influence.120 The 
infrequent use of reorganisation can be attributed to the problematic phrasing 
of the financial standards of initiation. On its appearance, the financial standard 
for applying for reorganisation is lower than liquidation and conciliation, as a 
debtor can file for reorganisation when it “clearly lacks the liability to pay off 
debts.”121 However, there is no clear definition of this phrase. As the court has a 
broad discretion regarding whether to accept a bankruptcy case, it can reject 
the application for reorganisation based its interpretation of the phrase. 
Additionally, under the EBL 2006, it is unclear how liquidation can be converted 
to reorganisation. It is not uncommon for creditors to reach an understanding 
                                         
118 “White Paper on Bankruptcy Cases Issued by the Intermediate Court of Shenzhen[深圳市中级
人民法院破产审判白皮书 Shenzhenshi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Pochan Shenpan Baipishu],” 
Szcourt.Gov.Cn, December 20, 2011, http://www.szcourt.gov.cn/shenwu/view.aspx?id=4207 
(accessed on June 21, 2015). 
119 See 4.1.3 (ii).  
120 ibid.  
121 EBL 2006, articles 2 and 7. Also see 4.1.3 (ii).  
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with the debtor in the process of liquidation and want to revive the company. 
Therefore, bankruptcy law usually contains rules for converting liquidation to 
reorganisation.122 According to article 70 of the EBL 2006, “a debtor or creditor 
may, according to the provisions of this Law, directly apply with the people’s 
court for having the debtor reorganised. Where a creditor applies for putting his 
debtor into bankruptcy liquidation, the debtor or his capital contributors whose 
capital contribution makes up one-tenth or more of the debtor’s registered 
capital may, after the people’s court accepts the application for bankruptcy and 
before it declares the debtor bankrupt, apply with the people’s court for 
reorganisation”. However, there are no clear rules regarding how to convert 
liquidation into reorganisation and in some cases, for example East Star 
Airline,123 the court has declined to allow the conversion of liquidation into 
reorganisation on application of a creditor.  
 
Compared with reorganisation, conciliation is even more of a rarity. It has been 
found that the conciliation procedure provided by the old bankruptcy law had 
almost never been used.124 An empirical study conducted in 2011 found that 
there had not been a single case of conciliation since the EBL 2006 was 
promulgated.125 Although conciliation is intended for restructuring of a 
company's debt, this is usually achieved through reorganisation in China.126 
 
The underuse of the conciliation procedure can be attributed to an array of 
defaults in its design.  First, the initiation of conciliation requires the same 
financial standards as liquidation.127 This is unreasonable since conciliation is a 
contractual arrangement between the debtor and creditors and usually involves 
restructuring of debts such as writing off the debts or postponement of payment. 
                                         
122 Yujia Jiang, “The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: a Comparative Study 
of US and Chinese Bankruptcy Law,” Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 34 (2013): 559, 568. See the 
discussion on the US BC regarding the rules on the conversion of liquidation into reorganisation.  
123 See the following 4.1.4 (ii).  
124 Lijie Qi, “The Corporate Reorganization Regime Under China's New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,” 
International Insolvency Review 17, no. 1 (2008): 13–32, 16. 
125 Shuguang Li and Zuofa Wang, “Empirical Study on Chinese Bankruptcy Law in Its Third Year of 
Application[中国破产法实施三年的实证分析 Zhongguo Pochanfa Shishi Sannian De Shizhen 
Fenxi],” 2011, file:///Users/weichuyi/Desktop/20121217103813.pdf (accessed on June 16, 2015), 
68. 
126 ibid., 65. 
127 EBL 2006, articles 2 and 7.  
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It can be more instrumental before the company becomes insolvent in the eyes 
of the bankruptcy law. When the company has reached the state of insolvency in 
the legal sense, reorganisation is usually more useful for the company’s rescue. 
Second, compared with reorganisation, the effects of conciliation are limited. 
The conciliation procedure does not stay execution of claims by secured 
creditors,128 and the conciliation agreement is only binding on unsecured 
creditors.129 Third, the conciliation procedure excludes the participation of an 
administrator and requires minimum judicial involvement. Without adequate 
monitoring, creditors are vulnerable to the opportunism of the debtor, such as 
preference payments and transfer of assets. To safeguard the interests of 
creditors, the creditors’ committee can be vested the with power to monitor the 
debtor in the conciliation procedure; however, such rules are absent in the EBL 
2006. Also, there are no rules for dissented creditors to challenge the 
conciliation agreement. Fourth, once the conciliation procedure is initiated, 
there is no provision in the bankruptcy law regarding the conversion of 
conciliation to reorganisation and this remains a controversial issue.130 This 
means when creditors find reorganisation a better way of saving the company in 
the process of negotiating a conciliation agreement, they may not be able to 
transfer into a reorganisation procedure and the failure of reach a conciliation 
agreement will result in a bankruptcy liquidation.131  
 
Given the lack of utilisation of the conciliation procedure, some scholars have 
argued for its eradication.132 However, as demonstrated by the experience in 
both the UK and US, voluntary arrangements between the debtor and creditors 
can be a cost-effective way of saving a company.133 The conciliation procedure 
                                         
128 ibid., article 96. 
129 ibid., article 100. 
130 Qinyu Zhang, “The ‘Death’ of Conciliation in Bankruptcy [破产和解之殇 Pochan Hejie Zhi 
Shang],” Pkulaw.Cn, 2014, 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=1510131563&Db=qikan (accessed on June 16, 
2015). 
131 EBL 2006, article 99.  
132 Li and Wang, “Empirical Study on Chinese Bankruptcy Law in Its Third Year of Application[中国
破产法实施三年的实证分析 Zhongguo Pochanfa Shishi Sannian De Shizhen Fenxi].”, 69.  
133 Julian R Franks, Kjell G Nyborg, and Walter N Torous, “A Comparison of US, UK, and German 
Insolvency Codes,” Financial Management (1996): 86–101; John Armour, Audrey Hsu, and 
Adrian Walters, “Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: the Impact of the Enterprise Act 
2002,” European Company and Financial L. Rev. 5, no. 2 (2008): 148–171. 
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should be preserved and further improved to facilitate the out-of-court 
negotiation between the debtor and creditors.  
 
ii. Prevalent State Interference  
As many bankruptcy cases are administered by liquidation committees consisting 
of governmental officials, the state can directly interfere with the bankruptcy 
procedure.  It has been estimated that 45% of administrators are liquidation 
committees.134 Further, one study has found that out of twenty-five 
reorganisation cases of special treatment (ST) listed companies,135 twenty-four 
cases are found to have liquidation committee serving as the administrator and 
only one case a professional administrator.136 Also, all the liquidation 
committees are exclusively comprised of governmental officials without 
professionals and are usually headed by a vice major or other senior official. 
 
There are many reasons for the active governmental involvement in bankruptcy 
cases. First, local governments are concerned with social and political 
repercussions in the local community caused by bankruptcy of large enterprises, 
especially SOEs. In the past, SOEs not only were the main employers in the 
country, but they also provided a bundle of housing and welfare services to its 
employees.137 For employees in the SOEs, unemployment is not just loss of job, 
rather, it is loss of a status and the security associated with such status.138  
Therefore, shutting down of SOEs can result in violent protests of workers.139 
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Second, although private investors have acquired ownership in the process of 
restructuring of SOEs, the central or local government remains the major 
shareholder of SOEs. Therefore, the state has a critical interest to protect in the 
bankruptcy procedure. Finally, closure of a large SOE or an important private 
enterprise will lead to disturbances of the local economy. As Chinese officials 
are gauged according to their caliber in promoting economic development and 
stability, bankruptcies can lead to negative appraisal of their work if not 
handled delicately. 
 
Governmental involvement in the bankruptcy process can be instrumental in the 
bankruptcy process. Local governments of the region where the debtor is located 
can take action to protect a debtor's assets from creditors including unpaid 
employees who would seize anything valuable when the business is closed. In 
some cases, the local governments even paid outstanding wages in order to 
suppress potential upheavals. Also, local governments can introduce new 
investors into the distressed business.140   
 
An example that can illustrate the positive effects of governmental involvement 
is the reorganisation of five subsidiaries of FerroChina Lt, one of the largest 
bankruptcy cases in China with more than 1400 creditors from both within and 
outside of the country and the debt claimed by creditors amounting to 11 
billion.141  
 
In 2008, hit by the global economic meltdown, five subsidiaries of the Singapore-
listed steel make, FerroChina Lt, slumped into dire situation. On October 7th 
2008, directors of all of these subsidiaries suddenly left for their native Taiwan, 
leaving creditors and employees in anxiety and bewilderment. In order to 
prevent creditors from grabbing the assets and causing instability to the local 
community, Changshu people's court, the local court in the place where the five 
subsidiaries were based, established an ad hoc group to handle the case and 
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took immediate action to preserve the corporate assets on October 8th 2008 
with the assistance of the local government officials.142  
The local government of Changshu and governments on higher level have been 
instrumental in this bankruptcy case. Although the court appointed a law firm as 
the administrator, government officials were actively involved in the process in 
the form of a working team. In 2009, with the joint efforts of the court, 
administrator and governmental officials, the two biggest creditors of the 
FerroChina subsidiaries, the China Minmetals Corp. and Zhejiang Materials 
Industry Group were persuaded to inject 1 billion to the subsidiaries in exchange 
for shareholding to facilitate their reorganisation. Under the reoganisation plan, 
the money injected to the subsidiaries  would be used to repay part of debts and 
restart the manufacturing operations. The rest of the debts will be paid in 
installments from 2010 to 2013.143 
 
At the end of 2013, the Changshu court declared the end of the FerroChina 
reorganisation case. The case has been remarked to be an example of successful 
collaboration of administrator, the court, and the government, with enterprises 
remaining going concerns, employees retaining their jobs and creditors getting 
back their money.144  
 
However, although the governmental involvement can be positive in some 
bankruptcy cases, it disrupts the functioning of the market mechanism and can 
conflict with the principle of fairness and equality enshrined by the bankruptcy 
law. First, governmental interference encourages excessive risk taking and can 
lead to overcapacity of policy-supported industries. As the state backing is 
always presumed, there will the moral hazard of excessive risk-taking on the 
part of both enterprises and their creditors. For enterprises, they will take 
excessive risks, for example expanding ambitiously with high leverage, and they 
will rip the benefits once they succeed. If they fail, they expect the government 
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to bail them out and pacify angry creditor and employees. For creditors, they 
may lend to highly risky enterprises, especially SOEs, just because they assume 
them to be implicitly guaranteed by the government. The example of the solar 
panel manufacturer, Suntech, is evidence to such problem.145 
 
Chinese solar industry is heavily supported and encouraged by the government 
with generous subsidy and bank loans. As the first Chinese solar enterprise to go 
public in 2005, the Wuxi-based Suntech once was regarded as a one of the most 
sterling achievements on the record of the Wuxi Government.146 However, the 
successful story of Suntech did not last long and soon its problems of over-
expansion surfaced as the solar industry was experiencing the dual predicaments 
of overcapacity and anti-dumping sanctions of EU and US.  Finally, in 2013, it 
declared bankrupt with debts estimated to be as high as 9.5 billion RMB and 
most of its creditors are banks which would lose six billion under the 
reorganisation plan.147 As demonstrated by the Suntech case, the governmental 
interference not only encourages excessive risk taking, it can also lead to 
overcapacity, which has already become evident in the solar industry.  
 
Second, the government may sacrifice the interests of creditors in order to 
preserve the government’s interests as the major shareholder of SOEs, or just to 
prevent a large enterprise from falling apart and causing disruptions to the local 
society. A common scenario is the local government forces creditors to accept 
an unfair organisation plan through its influence on the court. Under the EBL, 
the reorganisation plan must be approved by the creditor meeting and then 
approved by the court.148 If the reorganisation plan is opposed by some class of 
creditors, the court can force through the plan,149 namely "cram down" the plan 
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using the expression in the US context.150 Several conditions must be met if the 
court wants to approve the reorganisation plan without consent of all classes of 
creditors: (1) under the plan, secured creditors must be fully paid to the extent 
of the value of their security (2) employees and tax claims must be fully paid (3) 
the rate of repayment for common creditors must not be lower than what they 
would obtain in the liquidation procedure (4) the plan is fair to capital 
contributors (namely, shareholders) (5) the plan has treated creditors of the 
same voting group (namely, has the same ranking) in a fair way and does not 
conflict with the priority rule under the article 113 of the EBL (6) the plan for 
business operations is feasible.151  
 
However, in reality creditors' interests are often sacrificed. It has been found 
that the use of cram-down in the reorganisation procedure is relatively common 
in China and the reorganisation cases usually involve a high reduction of 
creditors' claims to the benefit of shareholders.152 One case in example involves 
the reorganisation of Tianyi, a large producer of vegetable oil based in Jinzhou, 
Hubei province.153 In this case, the court approved the reorganisation plan 
despite of the opposition from the unsecured creditors. The reorganisation plan 
successfully restored the debtor, however, the rate of repayment for unsecured 
creditors was only 10.07%, not higher than the estimated repayment rate under 
the liquidation procedure, which was between 8.62% and 12.62%.  
 
Finally, in contrast to the governmental efforts of withholding some enterprises 
from exiting, the government can also prompt the early death of others. East 
Star Airline, a private regional carrier based in Wuhan, was one of the few 
private players in the Chinese airline industry and the only airline company that 
has been declared bankrupt in China. The airline became cash-strapped in 2008 
and was suspended from operations on March 15, 2009, the day after it 
announced its refusal to the takeover bid from the state-owned giant, Air China. 
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The chairman of East Star, Lan Shili, was then detained on March 17. On March 
30, 2009, the Wuhan intermediate court accepted the involuntary bankruptcy 
application filed by the airline's creditors including GECAS (GE Capital Aviation 
Services).154 
 
Instead of a professional administrator, the court appointed a liquidation team 
to be the administrator, which consisted of various governmental authorities, 
including the Wuhan Transportation Commission, the Legislative Affairs Bureau, 
the Wuhan Labor Union, and the Public Safety Bureau.155 On June 12, the Wuhan 
Intermediate Court denied the application for reorganisation of East Star filed by 
China Aviation Oil Group (CAOG), one of its largest creditors. The court stated 
that based on examination of facts, there was no possibility for Eastern Airline 
to resume operations. Moreover, there was no legal ground for CAOG to apply 
for reorganisation after other creditors, including GECAS had applied for 
bankruptcy liquidation. In its appeal with the Wuhan High Court, the provincial 
level of court, CAOG cited article 70 of the EBL as its legal ground for applying 
for reorganisation, which permits creditors to apply for reorganisation during the 
liquidation procedure before the bankruptcy of the debtor is formally declared. 
However, CAOG's appeal was not supported.156 
 
In August 2009, China Equity Group, an investment company proposed a 
reorganisation plan in which the company would offer funds to East Star in 
exchange for 70%-80% of the equity shares of the airline and its creditors would 
convert their debt into 20%-30% of the shareholding.157 This reorganisation plan 
was also rejected by the Wuhan intermediate court. Throughout the whole 
process, although the airline, and some of its major creditors made repeated 
efforts to revive the company, however, the liquidation team had always been 
of the opinion that the company could not be reorganised and liquidation was 
the only option. Finally, the Wuhan intermediate court announced bankruptcy 
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liquidation of East Star Airline in August 27, 2009, only five months after the 
initiation of the bankruptcy case. Lan Shili, the chairman of the airline was 
convicted of tax evasion and sentenced to four years in prison.158 
 
The effects of the East Star Airline case are far-reaching. It chills private 
investors' ambition to go into the airline business and gives rise to the criticism 
of "advancement of the state and retreat of the private sector".159 It is hard to 
determine whether the Wuhan government, represented by the liquidation team, 
and supported by the court, had the intention to force the liquidation of East 
Star and let its business gobbled by its state-owned competitors. However, the 
result is that Air China acquired the assets of Easter Star, took over its flight 
routes in Wuhan and recruited 600 of its employees. In many industries in China, 
private companies are squeezed out because their state competitors are backed 
by generous state subsidies and easy credit from state-owned banks. The 
downfall of East Star demonstrates yet another treat: a forced liquidation. 
 
iii. Muddled Role of Administrator 
From the above discussion, it can be observed that bankruptcy procedures are 
frequently interfered by governmental officials by acting as the administrator. 
To exacerbate this problem, the role of administrator is ill-defined under 
Chinese bankruptcy law and there is a shortage of professionals to act as 
administrators. This will be further explained in the following.  
 
The court will appoint an administrator at the same time that it accepts a 
bankruptcy case.160 An administrator can be a person “who has the necessary 
professional knowledge and has obtained the qualifications for the practice to 
serve as an administrator”.161 Alternatively, it can be a liquidation team of 
persons from governmental authorities, “a certified public accountant firm, a 
bankruptcy liquidation firm or any other public intermediary agency that is 
                                         
158 Sarah Eaton, “China’s State Capitalist Turn: Political Economy of the Advancing State,” 
Tspace.Library.Utoronto.Ca, (University of Toronto, 2011), 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/31739 (accessed on June 16. 2015),186-187. 
159 ibid., 186. 
160 EBL 2006, article 13.  
161 EBL 2006, article 24.  
Chapter 4 Creditor Protection in Insolvency                                                     
 
 
218 
established according to law may serve as an administrator”.162 There is also a 
list of people who are prohibited from acting as administrators.163 The 
administrator is usually randomly selected from a roster of eligible 
administrators.164 However, the court may make an open invitation to compete 
for the position of administrator when financial institutions or important 
enterprises are involved.165    
 
The administrator has wide powers under Chinese bankruptcy law is responsible 
for the management of the debtor’s property and recovery of the bankruptcy 
estate.166 Even in the reorganisation procedure, the administrator is usually in 
charge of the management although the EBL has provides that the debtor may 
manage its property by itself under the supervision of the administrator upon 
approval of the court.167 Given this, it is highly inaccurate when some scholars 
refer to reorganisation under the EBL as a “modified debtor-in-possession” 
approach.168 As demonstrated by the discussion in the last section, 
reorganisation of companies is usually dominated by the administrator, which is 
often assumed by governmental officials and as a result, reorganisation has 
frequently deviated from its essential purpose of rescue.  
 
The administrator’s broad power is only checked by the court and the creditors’ 
meeting or creditors’ committee.169 However, as there are no detailed rules 
regarding administrator’s duty, the debtor and its creditors are vulnerable to 
neglects or misbehaviours of the administrator. Article 25 of the EBL has listed a 
range of things that falls within the administrators’ duties, including the duty to 
dispose and manage the property of the debtor. However, it describes the 
function and power, rather than the duties of an administrator. A more hopeful 
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recourse against the administrator can be found in article 27 which provides that 
the administrator is subject to duty of diligence and loyalty, which are the same 
language used to describe fiduciary duties of corporate directors in the Company 
Law 2005.170 Further, article 130 provides that if the administrator fails to fulfill 
these duties and causes losses to creditors, the debtor or a third party, the 
administrator is liable for compensation. However, as demonstrated by the case 
law of fiduciary duties in the Chinese company law, the courts are unlikely to 
apply these vague provisions or to interpret them further.171 It is even more 
unlikely for the debtor or its creditors to litigate against officials who act as the 
administrator and causes losses to them.  
 
Noticeably, the EBL contains a requirement for an individual person, who serves 
as the administrator, to purchase liability insurance.172 Liability insurance can 
provide compensation for the debtor, its creditors or third parties who have 
suffered losses from the neglect or misbehavior of a administrator. Further, 
insurance companies can play an instrumental role in monitoring the 
administrator.173 However, as there are no clear rules in implementing 
mandatory liability insurance for administrators and there seems to be no 
company offering such insurance,174 the effects of the liability insurance for 
administrators are questionable.  
 
The unclear scope of duty and liability for administrators has undermined the 
incentive for professionals to be enrolled as potential administrators and 
contributed to the shortage of professional administrators. To make things worse, 
there is great uncertainty over how much administrators should be paid.175 
According to the judicial interpretation issued by the SPC, the court shall decide 
the compensation for administrators on a sliding scale depending on the value of 
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the bankruptcy estate.176 In reality, administrators are usually underpaid.177 
These factors together have discouraged skilled professionals from acting as 
bankruptcy administrators, and thus further exacerbate the problem of state 
intervention in bankruptcy cases, as officials are more likely to assume the role 
of administrator.   
 
Summary of 4.4.1  
In summary, several problems have been identified in the Chinese bankruptcy 
law in practice: First, bankruptcy procedures, particularly reorganisation and 
conciliation, are underused for dissolution of companies in China. Second, the 
bankruptcy procedure is still permeated with state interference that undermines 
the efficiency and fairness of the procedure. Third, the role of administrators in 
the bankruptcy procedure is ill-defined and professionals are discouraged from 
acting as administrators by the uncertainty over their liability and remuneration. 
This further exacerbates the problem of state intervention by increasing the 
likelihood for officials to act as administrators. These problems in the 
implementation of Chinese bankruptcy law are likely to have more deleterious 
effects on creditors than the defaults in its formulation The following sections of 
this chapter will be focused on partnerships and a partnership bankruptcy 
regime will be proposed based on the experience of the UK and US.
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4.2 Partnership Bankruptcy and Partner Bankruptcy 
4.2.1 Establishing a Partnership Bankruptcy Regime in China 
i. Absence of Partnership Bankruptcy Regime in China 
According to the Partnership Enterprise Law 2006, “Where a partnership is 
unable to pay off the debts due, its creditors may, according to law, apply to a 
people’s court for bankruptcy liquidation of the partnership, or demand that the 
general partners pay off such debts.”1 Further, the EBL provides that the 
bankruptcy liquidation of organisations other than corporations, if permitted by 
other laws, shall be governed, mutatis mutandis, by the procedure as prescribed 
by the EBL.2 Read together, these provisions mean that partnerships can apply 
for bankruptcy liquidation but cannot apply for reorganisation or conciliation. 
However, in reality, it is unlikely to see filings of partnership bankruptcy in the 
absence of detailed rules for applying bankruptcy law to partnerships.  With the 
increasing number of limited partnerships and professional SGPs, it has become 
imperative to promulgate a sound partnership bankruptcy regime.  
 
First, as discussed above, a bankruptcy regime can prevent creditors from acting 
individually and grabbing the assets of the debtor. In this way, it saves costs for 
individual creditors and preserves the aggregate value of the debtor’s assets.3 
The automatic stay on creditors’ individual actions can allow breathing space for 
the debtor and ensure equitable and orderly distribution for creditors. In 
addition, avoidance of fraudulent transfers and preferences can recover assets 
for the benefit of all creditors.4 However, it must be admitted that for 
professional partnerships, these benefits of bankruptcy are limited as 
professional partnerships are relatively thinly capitalized and do not have many 
physical assets for creditors to grab. The most valuable asset in professional 
partnerships is the human capital of each partner, which cannot be seized by 
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3 See 4.1.3 (i).  
4 See 4.1.3 (ii).  
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creditors.5 Therefore, for professional partnerships, the major benefit of 
bankruptcy lies in a reorganisation procedure that allows partners to continue 
their business and pay the creditors with their revenue. A reorganisation 
procedure for partnerships, as demonstrated by the US case law, can be 
instrumental in maximising the value of a partnership as a going concern and 
increase the chance of repayment for its creditors.6 
 
Second, a partnership bankruptcy regime can designate the assets of 
partnerships and facilitates the rule that partnership’s debts will first be paid off 
with its own assets. Chinese partnership law provides that a partnership shall 
first pay off its debts with all of its property,7 and then the partners shall bear 
unlimited joint and several liability for the unpaid part of the partnership 
debts.8 This provision is the equivalence to the “exhaustion rule” in the US 
partnership law9 and is consistent with the de facto entity status of Chinese 
partnerships.10 However, it is in conflict with the provision that allows creditors 
to directly apply for bankruptcy or demand general partners to pay off debts 
when the partnership cannot pay off its debts.11 To implement the “exhaustion 
rule” in Chinese partnership law, a partnership bankruptcy regime should be 
established and the provision that allows creditors to go after partners directly 
should be abolished.  
 
Third, consistent with the reasoning above, a partnership bankruptcy regime can 
reinforce the limited liability rule that has been introduced into Chinese 
partnership law. Although the limited liability rule has been established in 
limited partnerships and SGPs, it is difficult to distinguish the assets of a 
partnership from personal assets of its partners without a formal bankruptcy 
procedure to determine the assets owned by a partnership. Even with a limited 
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liability protection, partners can find their own assets grabbed by creditors when 
the partnership comes to a chaotic ending.  As limited partnerships have become 
a popular choice for private equity firms, and SGPs for professional firms, it has 
become increasingly important to promulgate a partnership bankruptcy regime 
in order to effectively implement the limited liability rule. Particularly, the 
fragility of limited liability for limited partner in private equity partnerships can 
send ripples to the entire society with the soaring amount of private equity 
investments and an ever-wider range of participants including the Chinese 
National Pension Fund.12 In a word, a partnership bankruptcy regime is becoming 
increasingly indispensible in China. In the following, detailed rules for 
partnership bankruptcy in China will be proposed based on examples of the UK 
and US. 
 
ii. Available Procedures for Partnership Bankruptcy 
As a matter of policy, partnerships should have access to all bankruptcy 
procedures as provided by the partnership bankruptcy law. In contrast to China, 
where partnerships are only permitted to use the liquidation procedure, both 
the UK and US allow partnerships to access all bankruptcy procedures. In the US, 
partnerships and LLCs can apply for both the liquidation procedure and the 
reorganisation procedure provided by the BC. Since LLCs are not directly 
mentioned in the BC, courts deal with LLCs by making analogies to both 
corporations and partnerships.13  In the UK, partnerships, including limited 
partnerships and general partnerships, can choose among liquidation, 
administration, and partnership voluntary arrangement (PVA). Since the 
corporate insolvency regime applies to the UK LLP, the LLP has an additional 
option of receivership.14 In a word, there seems to be no ground for denying 
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35. 
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partnerships procedures that can facilitate their rescue. Like companies, 
partnerships can also become insolvent while having the potential to be rescued. 
It is only reasonable to allow Chinese partnerships to have access to 
reorganisation and conciliation procedures.  
 
iii. Who Can File for Partnership Bankruptcy? 
Partners should be allowed to file for bankruptcy of partnerships. Both creditors 
and partners can apply for bankruptcy under the US bankruptcy law.15 Similarly, 
in the UK, ordinary and limited partnerships can be wound up as an unregistered 
company with or without any petitions against partners or formal partners on 
petition of creditors or partners.16 As an LLP is wound up as a company, both its 
members and creditors can apply for insolvency. 17 However, under the PEL, only 
creditors can file for bankruptcy liquidation of partnerships. This ignores the 
fact that partners are more privy to the financial information of the partnership. 
Therefore, partners should be allowed to file for partnership bankruptcy, but 
there should be some limitation on bankruptcy petitions filed without agreement 
of all partners. For example, the US BC provides that a general partner that did 
not join in the bankruptcy petition may file an answer to the petition to prevent 
the partnership from going into bankruptcy.18  Without such restriction, some 
partners may file for partnership bankruptcy as a way of exiting the partnership. 
This would destroy a partnership’s going concern value, to the detriment of 
creditors and other partners.  
 
iv. The Standard for Partnership Bankruptcy  
The test of partnership insolvency should take into account the assets of the 
general partner, who assumes unlimited liability for the partnership’s debts. 
Under the US BC, insolvency of partnerships refers to the financial condition that 
the sum of its debts is greater than the sum of its property plus the excess of 
                                         
15 USC § 303 (b)(3).  
16 Insolvent Partnership Order 1994 (SI 1994/2421), articles 7-10. It is worth noting a petition for 
winding up a partnership as an registered company without any petition against the members or 
former members can also be filed by a responsible insolvency practitioner or the Secretary of 
the state. 
17 UK LLP Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090). 
18 USC § 303 (d). 
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each general partner’s non-partnership property over such partner’s non-
partnership debts.19 The reason for considering assets of general partners is that 
they are vicariously liable for the partnership’s debts. As limited partners and 
partners of LLPs are only liable to the extent of their contributions, their assets 
will not be considered for the purpose of determining the financial situation of 
the partnership. Under the Chinese PEL, the insolvency of a partnership is 
defined as when “a partnership is unable to pay off the debts due.”20 To 
reinforce the unlimited liability of general partners, the law should provide that 
the financial situation of general partners also be considered to determine the 
insolvency of partnerships. 
 
Furthermore, when a partnership becomes insolvent, creditors should be able to 
apply for its bankruptcy. However, creditors should not be given the alternative 
to go directly after the general partners, as provided by the Chinese PEL.21 In 
the US, creditors can only demand partners to pay off partnership debts after 
the partnership assets are exhausted.22 This protects partners’ assets from direct 
claims of partnership creditors and reflects the entity view of partnerships. 
Chinese partnership law also contains a similar rule, which states that a 
partnership shall first pay off its debts with all of its property,23 and then the 
partners shall bear unlimited joint and several liability for the unpaid part of the 
partnership debts.24 However, this is actually compromised by the provision that 
allows creditors to directly apply for bankruptcy or demand general partners to 
pay off debts when the partnership cannot pay off its debts. Such inconsistency 
reflects the confusion over the nature of partnership under Chinese law. 
Although Chinese law fails to clearly define a partnership as a legal entity, it in 
fact treats a partnership like a legal entity in many ways. For example, it allows 
a partnership to own assets and to sue and be sued in its own name.25 Therefore, 
to be consistent with the de facto entity status of the partnership, partnership 
                                         
19 USC § 101 (32)(B). 
20 PEL 2006, article 92. 
21 ibid., article 92. 
22 Larry E Ribstein, “The Important Role of Non-Organization Law,” Wake Forest L. Rev. 40 (2005): 
751. 
23 PEL, article 38. 
24 ibid., article 39. 
25 See 1.1.2. 
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bankruptcy law should require partnership creditors to claim directly against the 
partnership and only go to partners after the partnership assets are exhausted. 
 
v. Contribution of General Partners to The Partnership Estate  
General partners with unlimited liability for the partnership’s debts should be 
required to contribute to the bankruptcy estate of partnership.  Under the US BC, 
a petition for bankruptcy starts the bankruptcy procedure and creates a 
bankruptcy estate, which consists of all of the equitable and legal interests that 
the debtor has or can claim, including property rights, contractual rights, and 
causes of action.26 Partners will be required to contribute to the bankruptcy 
estate of the partnership. If there is a deficiency of the partnership estate to 
pay claims in full, a claim can be made against a general partner to the extent 
that she is personally liable for the deficiency.27 Chinese law should also devise 
similar provisions to ensure the implementation of the unlimited liability rule.  
 
vi. Preference Transaction and Fraudulent Transfer by Partners 
Specific rules should be formulated to restrain partners from transferring 
partnership assets. In the UK, legal rules against preference and fraudulent 
transfer also apply to partnerships which are wound up as unregistered 
companies in accordance with the IA 1986.28 For UK LLPs, there is an additional 
provision that distributions made to members in the two years before insolvency 
will be clawed back if the member "knew or ought to have realised" at the time 
of the withdrawal that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding an insolvent 
winding up.29 Under US bankruptcy law, a partner is an insider of the partnership, 
and therefore a transfer by the partnership to a partner within one year of the 
bankruptcy can be voided under the preference provision.30 Further, transfer by 
the partnership to a general partner while the partnership is insolvent or which 
                                         
26 BC § 541. See also Wright, “Bankruptcy Issues in Partnership and Limited Liability Company 
Cases,” 1 (above note 13). 
27 BC § 723. 
28 IA 1986, s 221.  
29 ibid., s 214 A, inserted by UK LLP Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090). 
30 Wright, “Bankruptcy Issues in Partnership and Limited Liability Company Cases,” 4 (above note 
13). 
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renders the partnership insolvent will be deemed as fraudulent transfer.31 To 
constrain partners’ opportunism against partnership creditors, similar rules 
should also be provided by the Chinese law.  
 
Summary of 4.2.1 
In summary, to establish a bankruptcy regime for partnerships, China can 
emulate the bankruptcy law in the UK and US. Detailed rules should be designed 
in order to give equal treatment to creditors and give the debtor a fresh start, in 
accordance with the basic principles of bankruptcy law.32 The next section will 
consider the situation where both the partnership and one or more partners are 
in bankruptcy and the concomitant conflicts between creditors of the 
partnership and those of the partners.  
 
4.2.2 When Partnership and Partners are both Bankrupt 
As general partners assume unlimited liability for the partnership debts, 
partnership bankruptcy is often accompanied by bankruptcy of general partners. 
In those situations, problems arise as to the ranking of partnership creditors and 
partners’ personal creditors. It is clear that partnership creditors should go after 
the partnership assets first. However, when personal creditors claim against the 
partnership’s estate, or when partnership creditors claim against personal assets, 
what is the order of priority between partnership creditors and personal 
creditors? 
 
Chinese law is silent on these issues. To solve the conflicts between partnership 
creditors and personal creditors, many scholarly articles have argued for 
adopting the “dual priorities rule” from the Anglo-American legal system.33 
However, these articles fail to examine the underlying reasoning of the dual 
priorities rule and ignore the fact it has been partly abolished in both the US and 
                                         
31 BC § 548 (b). 
32 See 4.1. 
33 See, for example, “Using Partnership Bankruptcy to Resolve Debt Disputes [论合伙企业适用破产
程序处理债务纠纷 Lun Hehuo Qiye Shiyong Pochan Chengxu Chuli Zhaiwu Jiufen],” 
China.Findlaw.Cn, March 6, 2010, 
http://china.findlaw.cn/gongsifalv/hhqyf/qyzs/qyzw/16205_2.html#p2 (accessed on September 1, 
2013). 
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UK. An examination of the history and theory of the dual priorities rule will 
demonstrate that it may not be the perfect solution to the conflicts between 
personal creditors and partnership creditors.  
 
i. Origins of the Dual Priorities Rule under Anglo-American Law 
The dual priorities rule states that partnership creditors have priority over 
personal creditors of partners with respect to the partnership estate, while 
personal creditors have priority over partnership creditors with respect to 
personal assets. In the US, the dual priorities rule has also been dubbed as the 
“jingle rule” for its resonance and superficial symmetry.34 
 
The dual priorities rule has a long history under the common law. It was 
established in England by the Court of Chancery.35 In a 1683 case, Craven v. 
Knight,36 the court held that the creditors of a partnership enjoy priority over 
partnership assets, i.e. they can claim partnership assets before personal 
creditors of the owners of the partnership. Another case, in 1715, Ex parte 
Crowder,37 established the parallel rule that personal creditors have priority 
over partnership creditors over the person’s private estate. In 1728, a classic 
statement of the dual priorities rule was made in Ex Parte Cook:38  
 
“[l] t is settled, and a resolution of convenience, that joint creditors 
shall first be paid out of the partnership or joint estate, and the 
separate creditors out of the separate estate of each partner; and if 
there be a surplus of the joint estate, besides what will pay the joint 
creditors, the same shall be applied to pay separate creditors; and if 
there be, on the other hand, a surplus of the separate estate beyond 
what will satisfy the separate creditors, it shall go to supply any 
deficiency that may remain as the joint creditors.” 
                                         
34 J J Henning, “Criticism, Review and Abrogation of the Jingle Rule in Partnership Insolvency: A 
Comparative Perspective,” S. Afr. Mercantile LJ 20 (2008): 312. 
35 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and R Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” Harvard L. 
Rev. 119 (2005): 1335，1378. 
36 [1683] 21 ER 664 (Ct of Chancery). 
37 [1715] 23 ER 1064 (Ct of Chancery). 
38 [1728] 24 ER 834 (Ct of Chancery) 835. 
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ii. Reform of the Dual Priorities Rule in the UK and US 
The dual priorities rule was enshrined by English and US legislation well into the 
twentieth century. The first part of the rule - that partnership creditors have 
priority over partnership assets - still exists in the Anglo-American law and can 
also be found in many continental jurisdictions.39 Partnership creditors’ priority 
over partnership assets is justified. A partner can only get her share of surplus 
after the partnership creditors have been paid, so it is logical that her personal 
creditors should not rank higher.40 
 
On the other hand, the second part of the dual priorities rule - that personal 
creditors have priority over personal assets - has been abolished in both England 
and the US. It has been argued that this part of the rule was developed only as a 
matter of convenience41 and its logical unsoundness was veiled by its superficial 
symmetry and resonance with the first part of the rule.42 The main criticism 
against the priority of personal creditors over personal assets is that it 
contravenes the unlimited liability of general partners, which is a core principle 
of the partnership law. General partners assume unlimited liability for 
partnership debts. Postponing claims of partnership creditors will obstruct them 
from claiming on personal assets of general partners. After personal creditors 
are paid, partnership creditors usually get little, especially when the partnership 
is operated on partners’ assets and has few assets in its own name. Thus, the 
priority of personal creditors over partners’ personal assets compromises the 
unlimited liability rule and severely undermines the creditworthiness of 
partnerships.43  
 
A more reasonable approach regarding partners’ personal assets can be found in 
Scotland, where the second part of the dual priorities rule has never been 
adopted. Under Scots law, partnership creditors rank in priority to personal 
                                         
39 Henning, “Criticism, Review and Abrogation of the Jingle Rule in Partnership Insolvency: A 
Comparative Perspective,” 307 (above note 34). 
40 ibid., 312. 
41 ibid., 307. 
42 ibid., 312. 
43 ibid., 309. 
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creditors over the partnership estate and pari passu with personal creditors on 
separate estates for any unpaid balance.44 The Scottish Bankruptcy Act 1985 
provides that where a partnership creditor claims against the estate of one of 
the partners, she has to estimate the value of (1) the debt to the creditor from 
the partnership estate where that estate has not been sequestrated or (2) the 
creditor's claim against the partnership estate where the estate has been 
sequestrated, and then deduct such value from her claim against the partner's 
separate estate. She can claim against the partner's separate estate for the 
balance after the deduction has been made, and this claim rank pari passu with 
those of the partner's personal creditors.45 
 
In Britain, the problem of the second part of the dual priorities rule was 
addressed in the Report of the Review Committee: Insolvency Law and Practice 
(Cork Report) in 1982.46 The report proposed to eliminate the dual priorities rule 
and bring it in line with the Scottish model. Although it reckons that priority of 
partnership creditors is correct, it finds priority of personal creditors to be 
unjustified. However, the Insolvent Partnership Order 1986 still retained the 
dual priorities rule and did not incorporate the reform proposed by the Cork 
Report. The dual priority rule lingered on until the Insolvent Partnership Order 
1994 came into effect. This order abolished the priority of personal creditors of 
partners and provides that when the partnership assets are not sufficient to pay 
its debts, the partnership creditors can claim the balance of the debts against 
each partner's separate estate and will rank pari passu with separate creditors.47 
 
In the US, The proposal  to abolish the dual priorities rule was made by the 
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws in 1973.48 The Bankruptcy Code 1978 adopted 
this proposal and states in section 723(a) that the trustee of a partnership in 
bankruptcy has a claim against any general partner for the deficiency of the 
partnership estate to pay in full the claims against the partnership. Further, 
                                         
44 ibid., 309. 
45 Scottish Bankruptcy Act 1985, Schedule 1, s 6. 
46 Insolvency Law Review Committee Chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice: 
Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558), 1982. 
47 See IA 1986, s 175A. S 175A was inserted by the Insolvent Partnership Order 1994 (SI 
1994/2421), Sched 4, para 23. 
48 Henning, “Criticism, Review and Abrogation of the Jingle Rule in Partnership Insolvency: A 
Comparative Perspective,” 321 (above note 34). 
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section 723(b) provides that the trustee shall first seek recovery of such 
deficiency from any general partner in such partnership that is not a debtor in a 
bankruptcy case. Section 723(c) states that the trustee has a claim against the 
estate of each general partner that is a debtor in a bankruptcy case, and ranks 
equally with personal creditors of partners in distribution of their individual 
estates. Section 723(d) provides that if the trustee's recovery from the estates of 
general partners is greater than the deficiency of partnership debts, the court 
shall determine an equitable distribution of the surplus of the recovery. The 
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) 1994 and 1997 reinforced this position in the 
Bankruptcy Code by providing that partnership creditors share pro rata with the 
personal creditors of partners in partners' separate estates.49  
 
The abrogation of the dual priorities rule is incomplete in the US, since it only 
applies to cases where both a partnership and one of its general partners are 
“Chapter 7 debtors”. It has been proposed that equal priority should be given to 
partnership creditors and separate creditors, regardless of whether the 
partnership is a debtor under the BC, and this should apply to cases under all 
chapters of the BC.50  
 
Summary of 4.2.2 
In summary, rather than copying the dual priorities rule under the common law, 
China should adopt the current stance of the partnership law in the UK and US 
by granting priority on partnership assets to partnership creditors while allowing 
them to rank pari passu to personal creditors over partners’ personal assets.  
 
4.2.3 Partner Bankruptcy without Bankruptcy of the Partnership  
i. Enforcement of Partners’ Interests and Charging Order 
When a partner is bankrupt while the partnership is still economically viable, her 
creditors may seek to enforce her interests upon the partnership. However, such 
enforcement may harm the interests of other partners and partnership creditors. 
                                         
49 ibid., 324. 
50 ibid., 323. 
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To prevent this, the Chinese partnership law states that where a partner’s 
personal creditor owes debts to the partnership, she cannot use her claim 
against the partner to offset her debts owed to the partnership.51 Further, a 
partner’s personal creditor cannot subrogate the rights of the partner and 
exercise the partner’s rights in the partnership. This rule emanates from the 
recognition of the consensual nature of the partnership, which demands that no 
one shall become a partner or exercise partners’ management rights without 
consent of other partners.52  
 
The Chinese partnership law also provides for how a partner’s personal creditors 
can enforce that partner’s interests in the partnership. It provides that a partner 
can use the proceeds distributed to her by the partnership to pay off her debts 
where her personal assets are insufficient to pay off her personal debts.53 
However, her creditors can apply to the court to execute her share of property 
in the partnership to collect the debts. Other partners will have a priority in 
purchasing the partnership share.54 This means that when other partners offer to 
buy the partner’s share under similar terms as offered by non-partners, the 
partner must sell her share to other partners. The gist of this provision is that 
personal creditors of partners can force partners to transfer their share by a 
court order. This may lead to reduction of partnership assets, unless other 
partners offer to purchase the debtor partner’s share. 
 
In contrast, in the Anglo-American context, personal creditors of partners cannot 
directly demand a sale of the debtor partner’s share. Instead, the “charging 
order” can be used by partners’ judgment creditors to enforce their claims 
against partners and receive the distributions that should have been received by 
the debtor partner.55 
 
                                         
51 PEL, article 41. 
52 ibid., article 43. 
53 ibid., articles 42, 74. 
54 ibid., article 42. 
55 Partnership Act 1890, s 23 and UPA § 504. See discussion below for specific contents. 
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The charging order is “a statutory procedure whereby an individual partner's 
creditor can satisfy its claim from the partner's interest in the partnership.”56 
The English Partnership Act 1890 is the first statute to promulgate a charging 
order provision. In the US, the charging order has been a feature of the 
partnership law since the Uniform Partnership Act 1914 and Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act 1916. It has also been absorbed into LLC statutes.57   
 
Without the existence of the charging order, actions taken by a judgment 
creditor of a partner can be destructive for the operation of a partnership. As 
stated by an English court in 1895, “When a creditor obtained a judgment 
against one partner and he wanted to obtain the benefit of that judgment 
against the share of that partner in the firm, the first thing was to issue a [writ 
of execution], and the sheriff went down to the partnership business, seized 
everything, stopped the business, drove the solvent partners wild, and caused 
the execution [judgment] creditor to bring an action in Chancery in order to get 
an injunction to take into account and pay over that which was due by the 
execution debtor. A more clumsy method of proceeding could hardly have grown 
up.”58 
 
As the Anglo-American view of partnership was changing from an aggregate of 
partners to an independent entity,59 more protection was given to partnership 
assets. The charging order is designed to partition partnership assets from 
partners, prevent creditors directly seizing the partnership assets and at the 
same time satisfy partners’ creditors with the interests in the partnership.60 To 
achieve this, the charging order regime allows judgment creditors to apply to 
the court for an order to charge the share of the debtor partner. In the following 
                                         
56 Bryan A Garner, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 8 ed., (Thomson West, 2004), 703.  
57 Daniel S Kleinberger, Carter G Bishop, and Thomas Earl Geu, “Charging Orders and the New 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act-Dispelling Rumors of Disaster,” Prob. & Prop. 18 (2004): 30. 
58 Brown, Janson & Co. v Hutchinson & Co., [1895] QB 737 (CA) 739 (Lindley LJ), cited from Yong 
Wu and Thomas Earl Geu, “The New PRC Limited Partnership Enterprise Law and the Limited 
Partnership Law of the United States: A Selective Analytical Comparison,” UCLA Pac. Basin LJ 
25 (2007): 133. 
59 See 1.2.2 (i). 
60 Thomas E Rutledge, “I May Be Lost but I'm Making Great Time: The Failure of Olmstead to 
Correctly Recognize the Sine Qua Non of the Charging Order,” Journal of Passthrough Entities 
(2010): 65, 66. 
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paragraphs, specific formulations of the charging order under the UK and US 
partnership law will be discussed.  
 
In the UK, section 23 of the Partnership Act 1890 provides that only partnership 
debts can be enforced against the partnership assets, and a judgment creditor of 
a partner can only enforce her claim against the partner’s interests in the 
partnership through a charging order. The holder of a charging order will also 
acquire a position of an assignee of the economic right of a partner.61 This 
means that she can receive interests distributed to the debtor, but she cannot 
participate in the management of the partnership.  
 
In the US, although state laws vary on the specific language regarding charging 
orders, a basic formula can be found in the UPA 1997. The UPA 1997 states, “A 
charging order constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor’s transferable interest 
in the partnership.”62 Namely, the holder of charging order is entitled to the 
distributions that the debtor partner would have received. However, the holder 
has no other right that is associated with the status of a partner. She cannot 
participate in the management of the partnership and has no interest in the 
partnership property. She has no rights to information from the partnership and 
is not owed fiduciary duties or the obligation of good faith and fair dealing by 
other partners or the partnership.63 As in the UK context, the holder of a 
charging order is in a similar position to a transferee (assignee). 64 The 
difference between a charging order holder and a transferee is that the debtor 
partner’s interests are not directly transferred to the charging order holder. The 
interest subject to the charging order can be transferred to the charging order 
holder through a foreclosure order issued by the court.65 However, the 
foreclosure will not take place if the debtor partner, the partnership, or the 
other partners redeem the debtor partner’s interest.66 
 
                                         
61 G Morse, Partnership Law, (OUP, 2010), 204. 
62 UPA 1997 § 504 (a) (b). 
63 ibid. 
64 Thomas E Rutledge, “Charging Orders: Some of What You Ought to Know (Part I),” Journal of 
Passthrough Entities 9 (2006): 15. 
65 UPA 1997 § 504 (b). 
66 UPA 1997 § 504 (c). 
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Chinese partnership law may introduce the charging order regime so that 
partnership assets will not be reduced because of actions taken by personal 
creditors of partners. Under the current Chinese partnership law, personal 
creditors can force partners to transfer their share by a court order. This may be 
advantageous to the personal creditors of partners, but it is unfair to other 
partners and creditors of the partnership. Similarly, it is also detrimental to the 
interests of creditors and debtor partners to have a partner’s bankruptcy 
automatically lead to dissolution of the partnership. This will be further 
discussed in the following subsections. 
 
ii. Partner Bankruptcy and Partnership Continuity  
The Chinese PEL provides that bankruptcy or an individual’s inability to pay off 
debts67 will lead to automatic withdrawal of the partner instead of partnership 
dissolution.68 The exception is that a limited partner who is an individual will not 
automatically withdraw from the partnership, even if she loses the ability to pay 
off debts.69 The consequence of a general partner’s withdrawal is that other 
partners will return the partner her share of property, with deductions for the 
losses she caused to the partnership.70 The partner continues to assume 
unlimited liability for the partnership debts that occurred before the 
withdrawal.71 As to withdrawal of a limited partner, the limited partner will only 
be liable for the partnership debts that occurred before withdrawal, to the 
extent of the property that has been returned to her.72  
 
That a partnership will continue to exist despite the bankruptcy of a partner is 
reasonable in the economic sense. If a partner’s bankruptcy leads to dissolution 
of the partnership, the going concern value of the partnership will be 
undermined. It is true that partnerships can change such default rule by 
contractual provisions. However, as many small partnerships may not be 
                                         
67 Individuals cannot become bankrupt under Chinese law. Therefore bankruptcy of a partner here 
refers to bankruptcy of a corporate partner, and the equivalent circumstance for an individual is 
the inability to pay off debts.  
68 PEL 2006, article 46. 
69 ibid., article 78. 
70 ibid., article 51. 
71 ibid., article 53. 
72 ibid., article 81. 
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sophisticated enough to devise such provisions, it is more reasonable to give 
partnerships greater continuity by default.  
 
The continuity of partnerships reflects the view of the nature of partnerships in 
a given jurisdiction. Traditionally, partnerships are regarded as aggregates 
rather than independent entities under the Anglo-American law and will dissolve 
upon bankruptcy of a partner. The English partnership law retains this rule for 
general and limited partnerships,73 as they still lack separate legal personality 
under English law. On the other hand, a UK LLP, which is a body corporate, will 
continue to exist despite bankruptcy of its members.  
 
In the US, the UPA 1997 recognises partnerships as legal entities and gives them 
greater continuity than traditionally under the common law. It provides that 
bankruptcy and other circumstances that would otherwise cause dissolution of 
the partnership under previous versions of UPA will only lead to dissociation of 
the partner.74 As long as other partners buy out the interests of the dissociated 
partner, the partnership will continue to exist as the same entity.75 In a word, a 
partner’s dissociation under the UPA 1997 can result in either a buyout of the 
dissociated partner’s interests by the partnership or a dissolution of the 
partnership.76 
 
These provisions are basically replicated by the ULPA 2001. However, the ULPA 
specifies that bankruptcy is not a circumstance for dissociation of a limited 
partner, although it will lead to dissociation of a general partner.77 The Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) 2006 contains a rule similar to that under 
the UPA, which states that bankrupt members of member-managed LLCs are 
regarded as dissociated from the LLC.78 However, it provides no obligation to 
                                         
73 Partnership Act 1890, s 33. It is worth noting that although this provision applies to a Scottish 
partnership as well, a Scottish partnership has separate legal personality. See section 1.1.2. 
74 UPA 1997 § 601. 
75 UPA 1997 § 603. 
76 This is confirmed by the summary of the UPA, which can be found at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act (accessed on 
November 1, 2013). 
77 ULPA 2001 § 603. 
78 ULLCA 2006 § 602. 
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buy out a dissociating member and gives greater protection to the continuity of 
an LLC.79   
 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that greater continuity of a 
business organisation usually suggests an independent entity status under the 
law. Although Chinese law does not explicitly recognise partnerships as legal 
entities independent from their partners, it has adopted a stance similar to the 
US partnership law regarding the continuity of partnerships when one or more 
partners are bankrupt. This provides further evidence for the de facto entity 
status of partnerships under Chinese law.  
 
Another noticeable trait of the US partnership law is that a limited partner will 
not dissociate from the partnership upon bankruptcy but a general partner will. 
In contrast, the Chinese PEL provides that limited partners will withdraw upon 
bankruptcy. This is unreasonable since the bankruptcy of limited partners does 
not have much effect on the limited partnership as they usually do not 
participate in the management.  
 
If limited partners withdraw from the partnership upon bankruptcy, their share 
of property will be returned, and this will undermine the operation of the 
limited partnership. It is also not beneficial to the personal creditors of the 
bankrupt partner if the partner is forced to withdraw from a partnership that 
can produce profits in the long run. Therefore, the more sensible approach is to 
follow the US example and provide that general partners will withdraw upon 
bankruptcy but limited partners will not. 
 
Summary of 4.2.3 
When one partner of a partnership is bankrupt, the partnership should be 
protected from the direct claims of personal creditors of the bankrupt partner. 
Otherwise, it is not fair to non-debtor partners or to creditors of the partnership. 
Further, a partnership should continue to operate despite a partner’s bankruptcy 
                                         
79 For more information, see the summary of the ULLCA at 
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Limited%20Liability%20Company%20(Revised) 
(accessed on September 1, 2014). 
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as long as it is financially sound and other partners with unlimited liability have 
no financial difficulty. Given such considerations for the interests of the 
partnership’s creditors and non-debtor partners, the current Chinese partnership 
law needs to embrace some changes. First, it can introduce the charging order 
regime developed under Anglo-American law, which permits a personal creditor 
of a partner to receive her interests in the partnership without allowing the 
creditor to seize upon the partnership assets. It recognises the going concern 
value of partnerships and embodies a balance between the interest of personal 
creditors, non-debtor partners, and creditors of the partnership. Second, the 
Chinese partnership law should formally acknowledge the partnership as an 
independent legal entity. A clarification of the entity status of partnerships is 
important for strengthening the continuity of partnerships and improving the 
consistency of partnership law. Finally, as limited partners do not participate in 
the management of a partnership and do not assume unlimited liability for 
partnership debts, limited partners should not be required to withdraw upon 
bankruptcy. The next section will proceed to examine the theoretical foundation 
of directors’/partners’ duties to creditors and propose a modification of such 
duties into Chinese law from a comparative perspective. 
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4.3 Directors’/Partners’ Duties to Creditors  
4.3.1 Directors’/Partners’ Duties to Creditors in the UK and US 
i. Overview 
When a company is insolvent, creditors will replace shareholders as the residual 
claimants of the company’s value.1 As a result, directors’ decisions directly 
affect creditors’ interests when the company is insolvent or approaching 
insolvency. Since creditors will bear the ultimate costs, directors have the moral 
hazard to take more risks when approaching insolvency.  This is especially true 
in private companies where the gains of risk-taking will directly accrue to the 
director-owner. Problems of excessive risk taking may also arise in partnerships 
with limited liability, which are similar to private companies in that ownership 
overlaps with management and owners are shielded from creditors’ claims by 
the limited liability institution.2 Therefore, personal liability should be imposed 
on directors, including shareholders who act as directors, and managing partners 
to constrain the problem of excessive risk-taking.  
To protect creditors, the common law system has developed the doctrine that 
directors must take into consideration of the interests of the creditors of the 
company as part of their duties to the company in the event of financial 
difficulty.3  The UK Companies Act 2006 imposes on directors a statutory duty to 
consider the interests of creditors as part of the duty to promote the success of 
the company.4 Additionally, such duty is reflected in the fraudulent and 
wrongful trading clauses of the insolvency law. The fraudulent trading provision 
in the UK insolvency law provides that directors are liable to contribute to the 
corporate assets as the court thinks fit if they defraud creditors intentionally in 
the course of winding up.5 The wrongful trading clause, on the other hand, 
requires the directors to take "every step with a view to minimising the potential 
                                         
1 Andrew R Keay, “Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and 
Over‐Protection of Creditors,” The Modern L. Rev. 66, no. 5 (2003): 665. 
2 See  2.2.2 (ii).  
3 Keay, “Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over 
Protection of Creditors,” 666 (above note 1). 
4 CA 2006, s 172. 
5 IA 1986, s 213. 
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loss to the company’s creditors" when they know that "there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation".6 The 
result of failure to comply with this provision is also a contribution set by the 
courts. The major difference between fraudulent trading and wrongful trading is 
that the former requires proving an element of fraud and thus it is harder to 
establish than wrongful trading. 7 In reality, it is wrongful trading which plays a 
primary role in constraining directors from taking excessive risks. More 
discussion on the UK wrongful trading provision will be made in the final section, 
which considers the possibility to emulate such provision under Chinese law.  
Although a directorial creditor-regarding duty has been established for years in 
the corporate context under the common law, when it comes to partnerships 
with limited liability, it is unclear whether there is such duty. Theoretically, 
partners or managers of limited partnerships, LLPs and LLCs will also have the 
incentive to engage in excessive risk-taking in the event of insolvency and should 
be subject to a creditor-regarding duty.  
The UK LLP seems to have embraced such theory. The duties of directors under 
the fraudulent and wrongful trading provisions are extended to members of UK 
LLPs.8 Additionally, by inserting 214A into the Insolvency Act 1986, the UK LLP 
Regulations 2001 provides that distributions made to members in the two years 
before insolvency will be clawed back if the member "knew or ought to have 
realised" at the time of the withdrawal that there was no reasonable prospect of 
avoiding an insolvent winding up.9 
However, in the US Delaware where the contractarian theory of LLCs and limited 
partnerships prevails, courts are reluctant to impose any mandatory duty on 
directors/partners of LLCs and limited partnerships as these business entities are 
considered to enshrine the maximum of freedom of contract. In a recent 
Delaware case, the court has declined to allow creditors of an LLC to claim 
                                         
6 ibid., s 214. 
7 Hans C Hirt, “The Wrongful Trading Remedy in UK Law: Classification, Application and Practical 
Significance,” European Company and Financial L. Rev. 1, no. 1 (2004): 71, 85. 
8 Fraudulent and wrongful trading provisions are provided for in IA 1986, ss 213, 214. Their 
application to LLP is mandated by UK LLP Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090).   
9 UK LLP Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090). 
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against directors’ breach of fiduciary duties on behalf of the LLC.10 To determine 
whether it is necessary to impose a creditor-regarding duty on 
directors/partners, the following part will consider the theoretical debates 
surrounding such duty.  
ii. Theoretical Debates on a Creditor-Regarding Duty  
Except for its uncertainty, the directorial duty to creditors under the Anglo-
American legal system has also attracted criticism on the ground that it will 
undermine efficiency. One argument claims that forcing directors’ to factor 
creditors’ interests into their decision-making will reduce directors' incentive of 
risk-taking and as a result companies will miss profitable business opportunities 
and efficiency will be reduced.11  
It is true that when directors become concerned with their own position rather 
than the goal of wealth-maximisation for shareholders, they tend to make more 
risk-averse decisions and even apply for premature liquidation.12 However, even 
if a creditor-regarding duty will reduce directors' incentive of risk taking, it will 
not eliminate it. In addition, although an appropriate level of risk-taking spirit 
will stimulate the growth of the company, excessive risk-taking will lead to its 
downfall. When the company is on the edge of insolvency, directors and 
shareholders may gamble everything since it is creditors, not them, that will 
bear the ultimate costs. Under such circumstances, a creditor-regarding duty is 
indispensable in constraining shareholders and directors from risk-taking.  
Further, the risks to directors posed by a creditor-regarding duty can be reduced 
by other mechanisms. The business judgment rule can prevent the courts from 
second-guessing directors’ business decisions and increase their incentive in risk-
                                         
10 CML V, LLC v. Bax , 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. 2010), the report of this case is available at 
http://www.delawarellcblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/C-M-L-V-LLC-vs-John-Bax.pdf . 
(accessed on September  5, 2013) 
     In this case, a creditor of an LLC filed derivative claims against the board of the LLC for breach 
of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Although admitting creditors of the corporation had a right 
to make a derivative action against breach of duty to the corporation under the Delaware law, 
the court denied that creditors of the LLC had the derivative standing to sue on behalf of the 
LLC principally on the basis of the principle of freedom of contract underpinning the LLC statute. 
11 Keay, “Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and 
Over‐Protection of Creditors,” 682 (above note 1). 
12 ibid., 683. 
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taking. The business judgment rule under the US corporate law presumes that 
corporate directors have exercised due care by acting on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that their actions are in the best interests of 
the corporation unless a rebutting evidence can be provided. Given the 
constraints of the business judgment rule, it is rare for the US courts to hold 
directors liable for breach of duty of care.13 
Also, liability insurance for directors is likely to foster their risk-taking incentive 
and neutralise the effects of a creditor-regarding duty. In the UK, under Section 
233 of Companies Act 2006, companies are permitted to insure their directors 
against liability for breach of duty. Such insurance is also available in the US, but 
generally at a much higher price.14  
Another efficiency-based argument against a creditor-regarding duty is that such 
duty will increase directorial-monitoring and agency costs.15 Admittedly, once 
directors are charged with a duty to creditors triggered by deterioration of the 
company’s financial health, they have to engage in constant checking of the 
companies' financial situation and consult legal and financial experts for this 
purpose. Such evaluations will cost time and money and the losses will 
ultimately accrue to the company. However, even without a creditor-regarding 
duty, responsible corporate governance requires directors to closely monitor the 
financial situation of the company.  Moreover, as directors' monitoring may 
identify and solve the problems in the management of the company, the costs of 
directors' monitoring increased by a creditor-regarding duty are likely to be 
offset by improvement of the company's financial health.  
Finally, it has been argued that creditors can protect themselves by charging 
compensation for higher risks or inserting contractual terms to constrain 
directorial behaviour. Admittedly, adjusting creditors such as banks and 
institutional lenders usually condition loans on security or personal guarantee 
from directors and adjust interests to the risks associated with the company. 
                                         
13 Szto, “Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context,” 112 (above 
note 16). 
14 Keay, “Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over 
Protection of Creditors,” 685 (above note 1). 
15 ibid., 685-686. 
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However, most creditors are non-adjusting creditors who cannot match their 
contractual terms to the risks posed by the company, including tort creditors 
who have no opportunity to negotiate with the company before the damage is 
caused. In addition, even for adjusting creditors, it is difficult for them to assess 
the risks ex ante and prevent directors behaving opportunistically simply by 
contracting.16 Creditors cannot charge compensation ex ante based on 
unpredictable risks. Even if creditors have carefully crafted contractual terms ex 
ante, such terms may not to be fulfilled in the event of insolvency. Under such 
circumstances, creditor-regarding duties are indispensible for restraining 
directors from single-mindedly pursuing wealth-maximisation for the firm. Such 
duty also allows directors to take into account creditors' interests without being 
exposed to the claim of not acting in the best interests of shareholders.17  
To summarise, the arguments against the efficiency of the directorial creditor-
regarding duty are questionable. It is necessary to impose on directors a duty to 
creditors when a firm is in financial difficulty in order to constrain directors 
from engaging in excessive risk-taking. The above analysis also holds true in the 
context of partnerships with limited liability, where partners are incentivised to 
take excessive risks by the limited liability protection. Drawing on the theory 
and practice in the UK and US, the remaining sections will turn to the absence of 
a directors’/partners’ duty to creditors under Chinese law.  
4.3.2 Directors’/Partners’ Duty to Creditors in China 
i. Directors’ Duty to Creditors under Chinese Law 
(a) Overview 
Under Chinese law, there is no express provision that directors/partners owe a 
duty to creditors. Nor it is likely that such duty will be developed within the 
current framework of duties of directors/partners given the judicial rigidity in 
interpreting fiduciary duties.18  
                                         
16 See 3.1.1.   
17 ibid., 670. 
18 See 3.2.2(i).  
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However, Chinese company law and bankruptcy law actually leaves the 
possibility for creditors to claim against directors. Under the Company Law 2005, 
one of the circumstances that disqualify a personal as a corporate director is 
being a director of a company and was personally liable for the bankruptcy of 
the company.19  Within three years from the liquidation of the company, the said 
person shall not serve as a director of another company. This stance is confirmed 
by the EBL, which further provides that a director shall bear civil liability 
according to law when her failure to comply with duties of loyalty and diligence 
leads to bankruptcy of a company.20  This means directors may bear civil liability 
for causing damage to creditors when they breach their duties under the law. 
Another provision in the EBL that may be the ground for creditors to claim 
against directors states that the legal representative21 of the debtor company 
and the person who is directly responsible will bear the liability for 
compensation if the debtor company commits an act that constitute void or 
voidable actions to the detriment of creditors.22  
Nevertheless, the above provisions are too general to be functional. In practice, 
directors and shareholders are usually held liable to creditors for breaching their 
“liquidation obligation” as provided by the Company Law 2005 and the relevant 
judicial interpretation issued by the SPC. The “liquidation obligation” is 
designed to ensure timely and lawful liquidation and is imposed on shareholders 
of a limited liability company (private company) or the directors and controlling 
shareholders of a joint stock company (public company). The contents of the 
liquidation obligation are two-folds. First, the Company Law 2005 provides that a 
liquidation committee must be set up within 15 days from the date when the 
circumstances for dissolution arise,23 including: (1) the term of business 
operation as specified in the company’s articles of association expires or other 
causes for dissolution as specified in the articles of association occur; (2) a 
resolution on dissolution is passed by the shareholders assembly; (3) merger or 
                                         
19 Company Law 2005, article 147. 
20 EBL 2006, article 125. 
21 Legal representative under Chinese law is a person who represents the company to outsider and 
has power to bind the company. It can be assumed by executive director, the chairman of the 
board of directors or manager of a company, see Company Law 2005, article 13. 
22 EBL 2006, article 128. What constitutes void and voidable actions are provided by articles 32 
and 33 of the EBL 2006. For more discussion of void and voidable actions, see 4.1.2. 
23 Company Law 2006, article 183. 
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division of the company necessitates its dissolution; (4) the business licence is 
revoked, the company is ordered to close down, or the registration of the 
company is revoked according to law;24 (5) the court dissolves the company upon 
demand of shareholders when the company was in great difficulty in operation 
and management and its continuing operation will incur great losses to 
shareholders.25 
The consequence of failure to set up a liquidation committee in time is provided 
in a judicial interpretation issued by the SPC,26 which states that creditors can 
sue shareholders of an limited liability company or the directors and controlling 
shareholders of a JSC for compensation for the debts of the company to the 
extent of the losses caused by their failure to form a liquidation committee and 
commence liquidation within the statutory time limit. Further, if their neglect 
to perform their liquidation duty leads to loss of the primary properties, account 
books, and important documents of the company and renders it impossible to 
carry out liquidation, creditors can demand them to bear joint and several 
liability for the debts of the company.  
Second, directors and controlling shareholders must refrain from misbehaviour 
that disrupt a fair and timely liquidation.  As provided by the relevant judicial 
interpretation, directors and controlling shareholders can be held liable to 
creditors for maliciously disposing of the corporate assets after the company is 
dissolved, deregistering the company with a false liquidation statement27 or 
deregistering the company without liquidation.28  
                                         
24 Business license can be revoked for fabricating statement of registered capital, having no 
operations within six months after the registration or stopping trading for six months after 
starting business and so forth. See Regulations on the Administration of Company Registration 
[公司登记管理条例 Gongsi Dengji Guanli Tiaoli], an English translation is available on 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=66585 (accessed on May 5, 
2013) 
25 Company Law 2006, article 180. 
26  Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues about the Application of the 
Company Law (II) [最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国公司法》若干问题的规定(二) Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa Ruogan Wenti De 
Guiding (Er)] 2008, amended in 2014, article 18. An English translation is available on 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6812&CGid= (accessed on November 5, 
2013).  
27 ibid., article 19 
28 ibid., article 20 
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The main purpose of the liquidation obligation is to constrain widespread neglect 
and abuse in the liquidation procedure. To illustrate this point, typical cases on 
liquidation obligation will be discussed here. 
(b) Cases on Directors’ Liquidation Obligation  
 In Shanghai Cunliang Commercial Limited Liability Company (Cunliang) vs. 
Jiang Weidong & Wang Weiming etc., the ninth guiding case29 issued by the SPC 
in 2012, the issue of failure to liquidate a company in time was discussed. 30 In 
this case, Cunliang was owed the payments for steel it delivered to Changzhou 
Tuoheng Machinery Limited Liability Company (Tuoheng).  Cunliang sued 
shareholders of Tuoheng for delay in liquidating the company after its license 
was revoked and demanded them to be jointly liable for the debts of Tuoheng. 
The court found that shareholders of Tuoheng had the liquidation obligation and 
their delay in liquidation had led to loss of the main assets and accounts of the 
company; therefore, they should be jointly liable for the debts of the company 
in accordance with the company law and the relevant judicial interpretation. 
The court also dismissed two shareholders' claims that they were not involved in 
the management of Tuoheng on the ground that as Tuoheng was a limited 
liability company, so its shareholders as a whole should be treated as the 
liquidation obligator under the company law and all of them have the obligation 
to liquidate the company in time regardless the number of shares and the extent 
of involvement in the management. 
The Cunliang case is concerned with the inaction of shareholders when the 
company should be put into liquidation. There are other cases concerned with 
the malicious behaviour against creditors committed by directors and controlling 
shareholders. For example, in a case published by the judiciary in the city of 
Qingdao,31 a company was deregistered without giving notice to its creditor, 
                                         
29 See previous discussion on the lawmaking power of the SPC.  
30 The official report of this case can be found on the website of the SPC: 
http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2012-09/26/content_51507.htm. 
An English translation of this case can be found on http://www.shnuodi.com/_case.asp?iid=940 
(accessed on 1 September 2014). 
31 Yadong Liu and Yamei Zhang, “Teng Typical Company Cases in Qingdao [Qingdaoshi Shida 
Gongsifa Dianxing Anli Tekan 青岛市十大公司法典型案例特刊],” November 22, 2011, 
http://epaper.qdcaijing.com/cjrb/html/2013-11/15/content_155474.htm (accessed on June 16, 
2015). 
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leaving its creditor unable to collet its debts. The creditor alleged that 
shareholders of the debtor company had maliciously deregistered the company 
to escape debt, as they did not give notice to the creditor during the liquidation 
procedure as required by law. This case resulted in conciliation between the two 
parties with the shareholders paying part of the corporate debt to the creditor.  
In another case also published by the Qingdao judiciary,32  shareholders of a LLC 
deregistered the company with liquidation statement, which showed that the 
company had completed the liquidation procedure and paid all the debts. The 
appellate court found that the liquidation statement was fabricated and the 
shareholders’ intent in deregistering the company was to avoid payment to a 
creditor. Therefore, it concluded that shareholders should be jointly liable to 
the creditor. 
From the above cases it can be concluded that the liquidation obligation under 
Chinese law is designed to ensure that creditors’ interests will not be hampered 
by delay or irregularities in the liquidation procedure. However, an analysis of 
the statutes and cases will reveal that the liquidation obligation is not intended 
to constrain directors’ excessive risk taking problem and new provisions should 
be devised. The discussion below will compare liquidation obligation with the UK 
wrongful trading clause to demonstrate this point and consider the possibility to 
introduce a wrongful trading provision into Chinese law. 
ii. Revising Directors’/Partners’ Duty to Creditors under Chinese Law 
(a) Comparative Analysis of Wrongful Trading and Liquidation Obligation  
Under the UK wrongful trading provision, directors or controlling shareholders 
can be held liable to creditors if they fail to take the steps they ought to have 
taken to minimise the loss to creditors when they knew or ought to have 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid 
going into insolvent liquidation.33  To determine whether directors know or 
ought to have known the prospect of an insolvent liquidation and whether they 
have taken necessary steps to reduce losses, the courts have to refer to the test 
                                         
32 ibid. 
33 IA 1986, s 214. 
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of directors’ knowledge, skill and experience.34 If a director fails to live up to his 
duty under the wrongful trading provision, upon application of the liquidator, 
the court will mandate her to contribute to the company’s assets an amount as 
it sees fit.35   
The function of liquidation obligation under the Chinese law sometimes looks 
similar to that of the UK wrongful trading provision. For example, when a 
company is in a dire financial situation and its business licence was revoked for 
stopping trading for more than six months,36 its directors and controlling 
shareholders are obligated to liquidate it timely and lawfully. Delay in 
liquidation or maliciously disposing the company’s assets will result in a liability 
for the company’s debts.37  
Similar behaviour could also be caught by the UK wrongful trading provision, 
which requires directors to take necessary measures to reduce losses to creditors. 
To the extent that the liquidation obligation reduces losses to creditors when a 
company is in financial difficulty, its function seems similar to that of wrongful 
trading. However, a closer examination of the two will reveal that they are 
fundamentally different.  
First, the fundamental distinction between the liquidation obligation under 
Chinese law and the UK wrongful trading provision lies in their purpose. While 
the former compels directors to liquidate timely and lawfully when 
circumstances for dissolution have arisen, the latter is designed to constrain 
directors’ excessive risk taking by requiring them to reduce losses to creditors 
when they know or ought to have known there is no reasonable prospect of 
avoiding an insolvent liquidation.38 Under the liquidation obligation, directors’ 
interests are not aligned with creditors and they do not have much incentive to 
take necessary steps to reduce losses to creditors.  
                                         
34 IA 1986, s 214 (4); also see Roy Miles Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 
4 ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 536. 
35 Ibid., s 214 (1). 
36 Business license can be revoked for fabricating statement of registered capital, no operations 
within six months after the registration or stop trading for six months after starting business and 
so forth. See Regulations on the Administration of Company Registration (above note 24).  
37 Company Law 2006, article 184; Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues 
about the Application of the Company Law (II), articles 18-20 (above note 26) 
38 See 4.3.1. 
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Second, due to the divergent policies behind them, the liquidation obligation 
and the UK wrongful trading have different, although sometimes overlapping, 
scope of application. For example, deregistering the company without 
liquidation does not lead to a breach of the UK wrongful trading provision since 
this provision only bites when directors plunge the company into insolvency by 
taking excessive risks. However, the liquidation obligation will be breached if 
directors deregister the company without liquidation and this is one of the 
typical misconducts targeted by the liquidation obligation provisions. Another 
example is that liquidation obligation will not prevent directors from liquidating 
the company prematurely and causing losses to creditors. In contrast, this is 
caught under the UK wrongful trading provision.39 
Third, the triggering point of the liquidation obligation and directors’ duty under 
the UK wrongful trading provision is different. The liquidation obligation is not 
defined by reference to a company’s financial situation and is triggered by the 
circumstances for dissolution, including revocation of business licence, non-
trading for more than six months, and shareholders’ application for judicial 
dissolution etc. These circumstances may occur before or after a company is in 
financial difficulty. In contrast, the wrongful trading provision will only be 
triggered when a company is in financial difficulty. To be specific, under the UK 
wrongful trading provision, directors’ duty arises when there is no reasonable 
chance of avoiding an insolvent liquidation, a point earlier than the onset of 
formal liquidation procedure.40 
Fourth, it is creditors who have the standing to sue against breach of the 
liquidation obligation. This is because in China breach of the liquidation 
obligation is usually viewed as a tort committed against creditors. Thus, by the 
principle of tort law, the right to claim against breach of liquidation obligation is 
conferred on creditors.41 In contrast, in the UK, the right to claim against 
                                         
39 See Goode, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 532 (above note 34). 
40 Paul Davies, “Directors' Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the 
Vicinity of Insolvency,” European Business Organization L. Rev. 7, no. 1 (2006): 301，318. 
41 “An Exploration on the Judicial Practice of the Flawed Fufillment of Liquidation Obligation[不当履
行清算义务案件审判实务若干问题探析 Budang Lvxing Qingsuan Yiwu Anjian Shenpan Shiwu 
Ruogan Wenti],” 2012, 
http://hetong.cnki.net/law/detail/detail.aspx?filename=FLSY201207014&dbcode=CLKJ&dbname
= (accessed on June 16, 2015) 
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wrongful trading is conferred on the liquidator, rather than individual creditors, 
in the insolvency proceeding. This derives from the common law principle that 
directors’ duty to creditors are part of their duty to the company and is not 
owed to individual creditors.42  
To summarise, the liquidation obligation under the Chinese law diverges greatly 
from the UK wrongful trading provision. It is not intended to constrain directors’ 
excessive risk taking behaviour although it sometimes can catch these behaviour. 
Therefore, China needs to introduce a directorial duty to creditors, specifically 
designed to mitigate excessive risk taking. As will be further discussed, directors’ 
duty under the UK wrongful trading provision can be a viable model for China.  
(b) Introducing Wrongful Trading into Chinese Law 
With the abolition of the paid-in minimum capital regime in China, creditors are 
faced with more risks of directors’ unreasonable trading. In order to curb the 
excessive risk-taking problem, China needs to introduce a directorial duty to 
creditors in financial difficulty. The UK wrongful trading provision can be a 
promising model for China to emulate, however, some cautions must be made: 
First, directors’ duty under the wrongful trading provision should be triggered 
when there is no reasonable prospect of paying off debts that fall due, rather 
than when the company meets the legal definition of bankruptcy under Chinese 
law. The financial standard for bankruptcy under Chinese law is relatively 
stringent and requires both cash flow insolvency and balance sheet insolvency.43 
Further, the application of wrongful trading should not be restricted to the 
insolvent liquidation. In China, the formal bankruptcy procedure is rarely used 
and often delayed due to the stringent financial standard for starting the 
procedure and the interference of the government.44  
                                         
42 Keay, “Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and 
Over‐Protection of Creditors,” 670 (above note  1). 
43 EBL 2006, article 2. See 4.1.2 (i). 
44 Roman Tomasic and Zinian Zhang, “From Global Convergence in China's Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law 2006 to Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation in China,” Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 12, no. 2 (2012): 295.. Also see 4.1.3 (ii).  
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Second, as directors are most familiar with the state of the business, the 
Chinese wrongful trading rule should not force the directors to liquidate the 
company when it is in financial difficulty. Rather, they should be allowed to 
decide whether to continue trading, rescue company or put the company into 
insolvent liquidation as long as they honestly believe doing so can reduce losses 
to creditors. This can encourage an increasing use of out-of-court workouts with 
creditors and the reorganisation procedure provided by the Chinese bankruptcy 
law. Currently, it is rare for bankrupt enterprises to take advantage of the 
reorganisation procedure in China.45 Promoting rescue of businesses not only 
gives them a second chance, but it is also beneficial for their creditors when a 
business is worth more as a going concern than being sold piecemeal.46 
Third, a wrongful trading rule in China should be formulated with more certainty. 
With the absence of stare decisis and limited judicial discretion, judges in China 
do not have the power to establish law through their decisions in individual cases. 
Therefore, the task of fine-tuning a wrongful trading provision should not be left 
to the Chinese judiciary. Rather, the legislature should formulate the wrongful 
trading provision in a more definite way. To begin with, a non-exhaustive list of 
behaviour that constitute wrongful trading can be added to the Chinese wrongful 
trading clause and further expanded through the judicial interpretation of the 
SPC. For example, the list can include premature liquidation that causes losses 
to creditors, excessive compensation to creditors when the company is in 
financial difficulty, and failure to preserve the company’s assets and collect the 
company’s debts. Further, besides the general language of “take every step to 
minimise losses to creditors”, a list of specific defenses for directors should be 
provided. Common practices of rescuing the company should be recognised as 
defenses for directors. For example, introducing “strategic investors” to 
purchase the shareholding of the company, a common method for directors in 
China to rescue the company,47 should be an adequate ground of defense if 
properly conducted. Finally, the method for calculating the compensation should 
                                         
45 According to a research, in 2008 there were only 23 reorganisation cases accepted by Chinese 
courts and this amounts to 0.78% of all in-court bankruptcy cases. See ibid., 304.; also 4.1.4. 
46 “UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law,” Uncitral.org, 2005, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (accessed on September 
1, 2013). 
47 Tomasic and Zhang, “From Global Convergence in China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 to 
Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation in China,” 314 (see above note 44). 
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be specified. As the purpose of wrongful trading is to limit and reduce the losses 
of creditors, the amount of compensation should be limited to the losses of 
corporate assets caused by directors’ wrongful trading.  
Summary of 4.3 
The common law system has established the principle for years that directors 
must take into consideration of the interests of the creditors of the company as 
part of their duties to the company in the event of financial difficulty. However, 
it is still unclear whether such duty will apply to partnerships with limited 
liability. On examination of theoretical debates on this issue, it can be 
concluded that directors should be subject to a creditor-regarding duty when the 
firm is in financial difficulty in order to constrain directors from taking excessive 
risks to the detriment of creditors. As the excessive-risk taking problem caused 
by limited liability also exists in partnerships with limited liability, partners in 
these entities should also be subject to creditors in the event of financial 
difficulty.   
In China, directors and shareholders are usually held liable to creditors for 
breaching their ‘liquidation obligation’ in accordance with the Company Law 
2005 and the relevant judicial interpretation issued by the SPC. The liquidation 
obligation may constrain excessive risk-taking in some cases, however, it is not 
designed for this purpose and its main function is to ensure that creditors’ 
interests will not be hampered by delay in liquidation or irregularities in the 
liquidation procedure. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a wrongful trading 
rule into China based on the UK model, although some modifications must be 
made. 
Conclusion of Chapter 4 
The Chinese EBL 2006 has made great progress compared with the previous 
Chinese bankruptcy law. Against the background of deepening market-oriented 
reform, Chinese bankruptcy law is evolving from a public policy tool to a 
formalised mechanism for debt collection. However, it is still far from the 
“efficient and effective” bankruptcy law as envisioned by the UNCITRAL 
legislative guide, principally because the state still interferes with the 
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bankruptcy procedure. Further, the EBL has failed to provide detailed rules for 
partnership bankruptcy, although partnerships are explicitly permitted to apply 
for the liquidation procedure. Partnership bankruptcy is a subject rarely 
discussed in China. This is partly because partnerships are mostly small 
businesses, which are usually eclipsed by corporations, especially SOEs. However, 
with the introduction of limited partnerships and SGPs, partnerships will assume 
a bigger role in the economy, and more cases of partnership insolvency are likely 
to emerge. In time, partnership bankruptcy will become a problem that must be 
dealt with. Finally, directors’/partners’ direct duty should be introduced into 
Chinese bankruptcy law to constrain the problem of excessive risk taking. If 
China is going to reform its bankruptcy in the future, it can emulate the 
bankruptcy law in the UK and US, especially bankruptcy rules for partnerships.  
 
However, emulating legal rules of other countries entails potential pitfalls. One 
of them is lack of thorough study of the foreign laws, which will lead to flawed 
legislation. Another more critical problem is poor implementation of the law. In 
China, a major obstacle to implementation of law is the unwillingness of the 
government to change its role and let the market function under the rule of law. 
This has been shown by the ubiquitous state involvement in bankruptcy cases, 
which has led to subordination of efficiency to political goals. Implementation of 
law also depends on the establishment of supporting institutions. For example, 
with the absence of a registry system of personal assets, it is difficult to 
distinguish partners’ personal assets from partnership assets. This has also 
obstructed the establishment of a personal bankruptcy regime in China.48 In a 
nutshell, formulation of rules is only the first step. A successful emulation 
ultimately turns on the implementation of law.  
 
                                         
48 Tang Liangyuan, “New Issues in Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,” September 28, 2008, 
https://insol.org/Turton%20Award/New%20Issues%20in%20Chinese%20Enterprise%20Bankru
ptcy%20Law%20Final%20Article%206%20Jan.pdf (accessed on September 1, 2013). 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Extending Creditor Protection Rules to Partnerships with Limited Liability 
Limited liability is usually viewed as a feature of corporations, but this thesis has 
identified a trend of expansion of limited liability into partnerships.1 In fact, this 
trend already began to emerge in the US as early as the 1970s, when LLCs were 
created with limited liability despite their resemblance to partnerships. Then, in 
the 1990s, LLPs were established in the US to protect professionals from the 
liability arising from the negligence or misconducts of other partners. Finally, 
the limited partnership, which had been neglected in the US when it was first 
created, was revived as the form of choice for private equity firms. A similar 
pattern can also be found in Britain, which has also enacted an LLP statute in 
2000 and seen limited partnerships become a major form for private equity firms. 
China has also embraced this trend by introducing limited partnerships and SGPs 
with the promulgation of a new partnership law in 2006.  
 
While limited liability can be instrumental in amassing large amounts of capital 
and encouraging entrepreneurialism, many scholars in the UK and US have 
questioned its theoretical justification.2 Based on a review of the literature 
discussing limited liability, this thesis concludes that limited liability cannot be 
fully justified by efficiency and entails huge risks for creditors, especially those 
of private companies and partnerships with limited liability. Hence, limited 
liability should be constrained with various legal devices, and creditor protection 
should be strengthened when business owners are shielded from personal 
liability.   
 
In reality, the expansion of limited liability is accompanied by a deregulatory 
trend in corporate law and relaxation of creditor protection rules in the UK, US, 
and China.  For example, most US states require no minimum capital, and the UK 
has abolished the minimum capital requirement for private companies.3 Very 
recently, China also abolished its minimum capital requirement for companies in 
                                         
1 See Chapter 1. 
2 See Chapter 2. 
3 See 3.1.2. 
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2014. Further, although in the US partnerships with limited liability closely 
resemble corporations in terms of entity status and liability shield, they are 
subject to less regulation than corporations. In China, there is also a regulatory 
asymmetry between corporations and partnerships. While the regulatory 
asymmetry in the US reflects a division between the contractarian and 
communitarian theories of the firm, such asymmetry in China seems to be out of 
neglect rather than deliberate policy considerations.  
 
The regulatory asymmetry between corporations and partnerships with limited 
liability in terms of creditor protection is questionable. Traditionally, partners 
undertake unlimited liability for the debts of the partnership. Therefore, unlike 
creditors of corporations, creditors of partnerships are not protected by 
stringent legal rules. However, with unlimited liability being replaced with 
limited liability in partnerships, the absence of creditor protection rules under 
partnership law is no longer justifiable.  
 
This thesis has examined the essential creditor protection rules under corporate 
law in the UK, US, and China and considered whether they should be transposed 
into partnership law. The findings are as follows: first, the legal capital rule, 
including minimum capital and capital maintenance, is redundant and 
ineffective for creditor protection; it has seen its decline in UK, US, and China. 
Therefore, there is no reason to extend legal capital to partnerships. Second, 
compared with the legal capital rule, mandatory liability insurance is a better 
safeguard for tort creditors; liability insurance can ensure compensation for tort 
creditors and have a regulatory function on insured businesses.4 In practice, 
professional partnerships are usually required to purchase liability insurance. 
Third, managing partners in partnerships with limited liability should be subject 
to a minimum level mandatory fiduciary duties as directors in corporations. This 
is because fiduciary duties are indispensable for the internal governance of 
partnerships.  Fourth, when the limited liability shield in non-corporate entities 
has evolved to be like that in corporations, they should also be subject to the 
veil-piercing rule, which is a final resort for creditor protection. In the US, the 
judiciary has already started to apply veil-piercing to non-corporate entities. 
                                         
4 See 3.1.3. 
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Last and most importantly, the limitations of these measures for creditor 
protection have been well noted in this thesis. It has found specific rules in the 
insolvency protection are more meaningful for creditor protection. This is true 
for both corporations and partnerships. Insolvency procedure is a collective 
procedure for creditors to collect their debts. A sound insolvency regime can 
prevent creditors from acting individually and grabbing the assets of the debtor. 
In this way, it saves costs for individual creditors and preserves the aggregate 
value of the debtor’s assets. The automatic stay on creditors’ individual actions 
can allow breathing space for the debtor and ensure equitable and orderly 
distribution for creditors. In addition, avoidance of fraudulent transfers and 
preferences can recover assets for the benefit of all creditors. Further, as in the 
corporate context, a reorganisation procedure for partnerships can be 
instrumental in maximising the value of a partnership as a going concern and 
increase the chance of repayment for its creditors. 
In a nutshell, as partnerships go from unlimited liability to limited liability, their 
creditors start to face the risks of limited liability, no less than creditors of 
corporations. Therefore, corporate rules for creditor protection should be 
adapted to the context of partnerships with limited liability. Most importantly, a 
formal insolvency procedure for partnerships should be established by analogy to 
that of corporations. The regulatory asymmetry in creditor protection between 
partnership law and corporate law should be closed up to prevent directors and 
business owners from engaging in “regulatory arbitrage,” namely to circumvent 
regulation of corporate law by registering as alternative entities that can also 
provide limited liability. In considering whether to extend corporate rules for 
creditor protection into partnerships, this thesis has also made an overall 
evaluation of the creditor protection regime in China, based on a comparison 
with its UK and US equivalents. The next section will make a summary of findings 
and recommendations on the Chinese creditor protection regime.  
5.2 Recommendations for Strengthening the Creditor Protection Regime in 
China 
Since the launch of economic reform in the 1980s, China has been making 
substantial changes on its legal infrastructure to bring it into line with its 
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booming market economy. In today’s China, a modern legal framework, essential 
for a market economy, is already taking shape. The creditor protection regime 
under Chinese law resembles that in the UK and US in terms of basic principles. 
However, it still has its unique features and problems that are associated with a 
society in transition. Based on a comparison with UK and US law, this thesis has 
made an overall evaluation of the creditor protection regime in China and 
propounded several recommendations.  
First, the legal and institutional environment for creditor self-protection in 
China should be improved. If sophisticated creditors can effectively protect 
themselves by adjusting interest rates and designing complex covenants, the 
costs of going through the legal process will be saved. However, currently, 
creditors in China, including banks, are still impeded from self-protection by 
factors such as lack of information of borrowers, difficulty in enforcing contracts, 
and flaws in the security law.  
Second, China should further reform the legal capital rule under its company law. 
In 2014, China abolished the minimum capital requirement for limited liability 
companies (private companies) and joint stock companies (public companies). 
However, its rigorous capital maintenance regime remains intact. To encourage 
investment and entrepreneurialism, China should gradually relax the capital 
maintenance regime and supersede it with more effective rules for creditor 
protection.  
Third, China should encourage the development of liability insurance. Compared 
with legal capital, mandatory liability insurance is a better safeguard for tort 
creditors. It ameliorates businesses’ exposure to escalating legal liability and at 
the same time ensures compensation for tort victims. Moreover, insurance 
companies can play an important role in monitoring insured companies for 
compliance with laws and regulations. Although the liability insurance industry is 
growing in China, it still has a long way to go. Particularly, insurance companies 
need to strengthen their expertise in monitoring insureds. Otherwise insureds 
will lack the incentive to prevent the occurrence of liability. This is not only 
detrimental to the insurance industry but also to the society as a whole. 
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Fourth, to improve the flexibility and effectiveness of fiduciary duties and the 
veil-piercing rule, the Chinese judiciary should be strengthened. As China has a 
statute-based legal system with the legislature at the centre, the judiciary in 
fact has no law-making power and is shackled in its discretion. Therefore, unlike 
in the UK and US where fiduciary duties and veil-piercing are developed by 
judges and being continually shaped by judicial interpretation, fiduciary duties 
and veil-piercing rule are promulgated in Company Law 2005 by the legislature.  
The lack of law-making power of the Chinese judiciary has weakened the 
efficacy of fiduciary duties and the veil-piercing rule, as their main force comes 
from allowing the judiciary to impose liability on directors or controlling 
shareholders on a case-by-case basis. To improve the coherency and flexibility of 
fiduciary duties and veil-piercing rule under Chinese law, the Chinese court 
should be given more discretion, and at the same time an equivalent to the rule 
of stare decisis should be established. However, as the Chinese legislature will 
still be the main force of lawmaking, it is still incumbent upon the legislature to 
promulgate specific rules to clarify many issues regarding fiduciary duties and 
veil-piercing. Further, it is impossible for the Chinese judiciary to develop a 
creditor-regarding duty, following their counterparts in the UK and US, and 
therefore the legislature should provide for such duty in statutory law. One 
example for emulation is the UK wrongful trading clause.  
Fifth, Chinese bankruptcy law needs to be revamped to achieve fair and 
efficient distributions for creditors. In principle, Chinese bankruptcy law 
resembles those in both the UK and US. To facilitate creditor protection through 
the bankruptcy law, this thesis has proposed modifications of Chinese 
bankruptcy law drawing on the legal rules in both the UK and US. For example, a 
directors’/partners’ duty to creditor has been proposed based on the example of 
the UK wrongful trading provision. However, the most worrying problem of 
Chinese bankruptcy does not lie in its flaws of formulation. Rather, it is the 
state interference that runs through most bankruptcy cases. To be specific, local 
governments can influence bankruptcy cases handled by the courts under their 
purview by preventing them from accepting bankruptcy cases and controlling the 
bankruptcy procedure through liquidation committees or interim working 
committees. Thus, the efficacy of Chinese bankruptcy law ultimately turns on 
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the governmental willingness to retreat from the stage and unleash the power of 
the market. Moreover, China should devote more resources to the cultivation of 
insolvency practitioners who can supervise bankruptcy cases professionally and 
independently. 
Finally, the creditor protection regime in Chinese partnership law should be 
reinforced. Most importantly, a partnership bankruptcy regime should be 
established. This thesis has made proposals for establishing a partnership 
bankruptcy regime based on the experience of the UK and US. As their 
experience demonstrates, most rules for partnership bankruptcy should be 
designed by analogy to those for corporations. However, special consideration 
should be given to the characteristics of partnerships, such as unlimited liability 
of general partners and lack of separation of management from ownership. In 
addition, as partnership bankruptcy may lead to partner bankruptcy and vice 
versa, conflicts between partnership creditors and partners’ personal creditors 
must be considered.  
To summarise, this thesis has made an overall evaluation of the creditor 
protection regime in China and found that it has already incorporated legal rules 
essential for counteracting the risks of limited liability and thus balanced the 
interests of business entities and their creditors. However, the creditor 
protection regime in China is still a work in progress and needs to borrow from 
the theory and practice of other countries.  
This thesis has relied on the theory and practice in the UK and US to inform the 
evaluation of Chinese law, not because the legal rules in these two countries are 
perfect but because of the constant exposure of their imperfections and their 
fast responsiveness to new realities.  As a country in the midst of rapid changes, 
China can not only emulate specific legal rules in the UK and US but can also 
assimilate the rationality and pragmatism of their legal theory. A caution must 
be made when China is emulating legal rules of the UK and US. As China has a 
statute-based legal system with the legislature at the center, importation of 
judge-made law from the UK and US is unwise without a transformation of the 
judicial role in China, which is going through a progressive change and needs to 
be closely observed by the legal scholarship. 
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